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ABSTRACT 
 
 
An administrative system‟s capacity to take effective action can be undermined by the uncertain 
and rapidly changing conditions that are often generated by disruptive events. Resilience has 
been identified as the most practical approach to overcoming this administrative problem. 
Resilience has multiple definitions, one of which is “[t]he capacity of a system, community or 
society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and 
maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to 
which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase this capacity for learning from 
past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures” (International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005, p. 4). This study argues that, in contrast to conventional 
administrative systems, resilient administrative systems have the capacity to successfully 
respond to disruptive events because they possess the organizational stability to maintain the 
effectiveness of the community in which it operates and the organizational flexibility needed to 
adapt to uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. 
This study advances a framework for administrative resilience, which can be used to 
evaluate the resilience of administrative systems. Through the use of a nested case study that 
employed a mixed-methods design, the framework was used to investigate the administrative 
response system that operated in Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 
26 December 2004. The study generated a number of findings. First, the system was a system of 
 v 
sub-systems, and the organizations that operated in the domestic sub-system possessed extremely 
low levels of resilience. The consequence was that the domestic sub-system could not formulate 
an effective response to the constraints present in the post-tsunami environment. Second, it was 
the inclusion of the organizations in the international sub-system, which brought with them high 
levels of resources, technology and experience, as well as the interactions exchanged between 
international and domestic organizations, which improved the resilience of the overall 
administrative system. These findings indicate that policy makers can promote the development 
of administrative resilience through the development and implementation of socio-technical 
infrastructures that facilitate administrative action. 
 vi 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Some of humankind‟s most spectacular achievements would not have occurred without the 
support of complex technological and administrative systems. While these systems have 
improved humankind‟s capacity to resolve complicated problems, their uncoordinated 
development and expansion have enabled many of them to become tightly coupled (Perrow 
1984, p. 331). In some instances, the processes employed within these systems have also become 
rigid; creating the potential for mismatches between a system‟s structure and the operational 
conditions that it is designed to manage. These developments have increased the risk that these 
systems, interconnected together through a complicated web of interdependencies, will fail when 
stressed by a disruptive event. Today, a minor disturbance in one system, if left unchecked, can 
create a cascade of failures that can expand to disrupt multiple systems simultaneously. 
An expansive cascade of system failures occurred after Hurricane Katrina, when 
malfunctions in the levee system caused the City of New Orleans to become inundated with 
floodwater. The subsequent breakdown of the city‟s critical infrastructure worked to disrupt 
critical technical systems, including electrical systems, water pumping and distribution systems, 
transportation systems, and most importantly, communication systems. The administrative 
systems that relied on these technical systems also became disrupted, in part, because decision 
makers were constrained by conditions of uncertainty and unable to acquire the information they 
needed to take effective action (Ostrom 2005; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). 
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1.1 THEORETICAL PROBLEM: UNCERTAIN CONDITIONS AS A CONSTRAINT 
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
The administrative disruptions that occurred after Hurricane Katrina were caused by uncertain 
and rapidly changing conditions, which constrained administrative action and facilitated the 
death of more than 1,300 Americans. Disaster experts, including those from the United States 
government, concluded that the difficulties encountered by the emergency responders that 
operated in the City of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina were generated, in large part, by the 
administrative system within which they operated. This conclusion was supported by the United 
States Congress, which indicated in its comprehensive after-action report, The Failure of 
Initiative, that the administrative problems that followed Katrina “cost lives, prolonged suffering, 
and left all Americans justifiably concerned [that] our government is no better prepared to 
protect its people than it was before 9/11” (United States Congress 2006, p. 359). 
To improve the capacity of administrative systems, the problems generated by uncertain 
and rapidly changing conditions, which inhibit governmental and non-governmental 
organizations from taking timely and coordinated action during a crisis event, must be moderated 
or eliminated. According to Elinor Ostrom, uncertainty represents the indeterminacy that occurs 
when “institutional arrangements leave open wide avenues for choice, and each individual‟s 
outcome is dependent upon the actions taken by others” (Ostrom 2005, p. 48-49). Ostrom 
indicates that “[u]ncertainty characterizes a situation in which the probabilities of specific actions 
leading to outcomes are unknowable. The set of actions and the set of outcomes are still assumed 
to be finite and knowable. The linkages between actions and outcomes are also presumed to be 
knowable” (Ostrom 2005, p. 49).  
3 
 
Uncertainty creates problems for administrative systems when their constituent 
organizations and decision makers find that their structures and processes no longer apply to the 
conditions present within the operational environment. When this occurs, decision makers may 
know the general type of action they should take to obtain certain outcomes, but they are unable 
to predict with any degree of certainty which of their actions will actually enable them to obtain 
the outcomes they desire. In the context of administrative systems that manage post-disaster 
operations, this type of uncertainty is exacerbated by two interrelated factors. First, as suggested 
by Ostrom, it is difficult to predict whether a particular action will lead to a particular outcome 
because such predictions depend on knowing the actions of others, which is highly unlikely. 
Second, the operational environment can change, for example, through the collapse of critical 
infrastructure or the movement of dislocated populations. Changes in the operational 
environment can force policy makers to either modify the activities they need to complete to 
obtain their desired outcomes, or in the most extreme circumstances, modify their desired 
outcomes. By way of further explanation, when an administrative system responds to a crisis, the 
uncertainty present within the operational environment can beget uncertainty, which constrains 
administrative action and creates additional uncertainty. This study seeks to identify the 
mechanisms that can help administrative systems to break this cycle of uncertainty. 
The customary response to the problems created by uncertain and rapidly changing 
conditions has been to reinforce administrative structures and to provide decision makers with 
increasingly detailed standard operational plans and procedures. Such forms of administrative 
reinforcement can be extremely successful, especially when policy makers are attempting to 
respond to small predictable events that are not constrained by limitations in information access. 
An excellent example of administrative reinforcement has been the use of fire departments to 
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respond to the problem of structure fires in urban areas. As communities have expanded, policy 
makers have adjusted the distribution of fire departments and the procedures used by fire fighters 
to ensure that personnel and resources can be directed to fires immediately after they are 
detected. Policy makers have also expanded the responsibilities of fire departments to include 
other tasks, for instance, search and rescue activities. The evolution of the administrative systems 
that are responsible for managing the problems caused by structure fires has been extremely 
effective, and has almost eliminated the threats and risks posed by urban conflagrations.  
The strategy of administrative reinforcement can be ineffective when policy makers seek 
to improve an administrative system‟s capacity to respond to disruptive events that unfold in 
operational environments constrained by limitations in information access. For example, the 
strategies used by policy makers to confront the problem of urban structure fires would be 
inappropriate for the management of large wildland fires, which are dynamic in their growth and 
can experience rapid change in response to shifts in weather, wind and other environmental 
conditions. Beyond the financial costs involved in building and staffing fire houses in rural areas, 
the decision makers that respond to wildland fires may find that additional layers of 
administrative structure can undermine their operational flexibility. Moreover, given that 
wildland fires do not stop at city and county boundaries, the development of a large 
administrative system for wildfire response would create a number of issues for decision makers. 
This means that disagreements could develop among officials from neighboring communities 
about jurisdictional restrictions and the management of operations. The successful resolution of 
these issues may require the development of increasingly detailed policies and procedures, which 
would only further constrain the capacity of decision makers to initiate and coordinate activities. 
If decision makers have to review check lists of required tasks before commencing operations, a 
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wildland fire can consume thousands of acres and encroach upon urban areas. To rapidly 
extinguish a wildland fire, decision makers must have the capacity to identify and implement 
creative solutions to the problems generated by uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. 
Alternative forms of administrative structure may improve the capacity of administrative 
systems that operate in such conditions. One strategy might be for policy makers to transition 
towards administrative structures that take better advantage of the flexibility provided by 
decentralization and heterogeneous organizational networks (Kettl 2002). There is growing 
support for such a transition, as evidenced by the range of scholars who advance the argument 
that networks have come to play an increasingly important role in the governance of public 
administration systems (Agranoff 2006, 2007; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; O'Toole and Meier 
2004). Other scholars have expanded upon this argument by suggesting that heterogeneous 
organizational networks can improve the capacity of administrative systems by providing 
decision makers the information and flexibility they need to adapt and self-organize (Comfort, 
1999). While this research has contributed to the field of public administration, questions remain 
about the extent to which alternative administrative structures would facilitate good governance, 
and more importantly, the extent to which these structures would emerge and evolve.  
1.2 THEORETICAL INQUIRY: ADMINISTRATIVE RESILIENCE AS A 
RESPONSE TO CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
Resilience has been identified as the most practical approach to overcoming the administrative 
problems generated by uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. Resilience is a construct that 
has many definitions, one of which is “[t]he capacity of a system, community or society 
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potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain 
an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the 
social system is capable of organizing itself to increase this capacity for learning from past 
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures” (International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005, p. 4). Even with its prominence in recent policy discourse, 
resilience has remained an exclusive policy goal, in part, because the concept of resilience has 
been primarily used as a metaphor to describe a desired condition (Manyena 2006). 
There has been some success with efforts to evaluate the resilience of communities, 
especially those that live under the threat of disaster. Engineers have evaluated resilience with 
respect to the manner in which communities are prepared to deal with a specific type of threat, 
for example, seismic risk (Bruneau et al. 2003). Economists have evaluated resilience using 
models that measure the economic losses of disaster (Rose 2004). Others have taken a broader 
perspective, and have developed quantitative measures that can evaluate the resilience of a 
community‟s economic, social and technological components (Bruneau and Tierney 2006). 
Despite these contributions, scholars acknowledge the need for studies that expand contemporary 
theoretical and empirical understandings of resilience (Manyena 2006). 
 One important question that can be asked is how these ideas contribute to the notion of 
administrative resilience. A wide variety of theorists, including Gunderson and Holling (2002), 
have indicated that systems are resilient to the extent they possess either the organizational 
stability to resist a system disturbance, for example, through the construction of life-line systems 
that can survive an earthquake, or the organizational flexibility to absorb a system disturbance, 
for example, to bounce back after experiencing a system permutation. This study argues that 
resilient administrative systems possess both characteristics. That is, they demonstrate the 
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stability needed to maintain the operational effectiveness of the community in which it operates, 
and the flexibility needed to absorb the shock of the event by rapidly scaling up activities in 
response to the demands generated by changing operational conditions. The notion of 
administrative resilience is similar to the concepts of robustness, which Elinor Ostrom defines as 
a system‟s capacity to maintain a certain level of performance, even if certain components of the 
system, or the environment within which the system operates, changes (Ostrom 2005, pp. 258). 
Like Ostrom‟s Institutional Advancement and Development Framework, the concept of 
administrative resilience draws a distinction between a system‟s structure, which represents the 
operational environment and the rules that decision makers employ to make decisions, and a 
system‟s processes, which represents the methods of communication that decision makers use to 
make decisions. The key to administrative resilience resides in the interaction between structure 
and process, which is driven by the exchange of information among the actors in the system, 
thereby enabling the system to adapt in response to changes in operational conditions. 
1.3 THEORETICAL QUESTIONS: EXPLORING THE ELEMENTS AND 
DYNAMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESILIENCE 
If we accept the proposition that administrative systems can adapt and self-organize, various 
theoretical questions need to be addressed before such systems can actually be designed and 
implemented. This inquiry into resilient administrative systems begins with a review of five 
critical theoretical questions. The initial theoretical question asks: what are the characteristics of 
resilient administrative systems? First, while they may vary in size, resilient administrative 
systems will share a common system goal or outcome. Some resilient systems would be 
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extremely small, comprised of only a few individuals or a few groups within a specific 
organization. Other resilient systems would be extremely large and comprised of a multitude of 
individuals or organizations. Whether the system is large or small, the decision makers and 
organizations that operate in a resilient administrative system would be focused on completing a 
single overarching task, for example, surviving a battlefield engagement with an unpredictable 
enemy or delivering humanitarian assistance in a complex post-disaster environment. 
 Second, resilient administrative systems would vary in terms of their heterogeneity, 
meaning that while the participants in the system may all share similar characteristics, for 
example, they might all be individuals or organizations, they will possess a diversity of 
resources, capacities, goals and constraints (Comfort and Haase 2006; Ostrom 2005). Third, 
resilient administrative systems would also be scalable. In the disaster management context, the 
participants would come from multiple levels of jurisdiction and multiple funding sources 
(Comfort 1999). Resilient administrative systems are scalable to the extent that their participants 
have the capacity to seek assistance from other organizations, whether vertically by level of 
jurisdiction or horizontally by source of funding, and to identify and acquire the information and 
resources they need to complete their activities. Fourth, resilient administrative systems would 
also be dynamic. As Ostrom (2005, p. 14) explained in Understanding Institutional Diversity, the 
operational environment, or the action arena, for a system of participants is comprised of the 
“social space where participants with diverse preferences would interact, exchange goods and 
services, solve problems, dominate one another or fight.” This suggests that the structures and 
processes of resilient administrative systems would evolve, as the participants seek optimal 
outcomes based upon their individual preferences, capacities and constraints.  
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Finally, resilient administrative systems would be creative, and the interactions 
exchanged between the participants in such a system would facilitate the development of new 
strategies for action. As the participants collect and exchange information, and develop an 
understanding of their operational environment, they will be able to identify the strategies that 
will moderate the constraints generated by uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. As newly 
created strategies may not be positive, the system must possess feedback loops and processes 
that can help the system to evaluate outcomes, and where necessary, shift away from a negative 
strategy (Ostrom 2005, p. 14). This dynamic process suggests that resilient administrative 
systems are actually complex adaptive systems (Axelrod and Cohen 2000; Holland 1995).  
Another important characteristic of resilient administrative systems is that they operate as 
nested sets. In describing the concept of the nested set, Ostrom indicates that complex systems 
are comprised of individuals and their structures, which are parts of even larger structures 
(Ostrom 2005). This suggests that resilient administrative systems, which are complex systems, 
are like a set of Russian matryoshka dolls, where a series of increasingly smaller dolls can be 
situated (or nested) within one another. Citing Arthur Koestler, Ostrom indicates that the 
participants within a nested set system are connected through interactions such as 
communication channels, transportation lines, or chains of command (Koestler 1973; Ostrom 
2005). While distinctions can be made between the governmental actors that operate at the 
national, state and local levels of jurisdiction, in the administrative context, these actors are tied 
together through various legal, financial, operational and social connections. According to 
Ostrom and Koestler, the challenge for researchers is to figure out how to separate these systems 
into their component parts so that they can be analyzed as both systems and sub-systems. 
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The second theoretical question asks: what situations facilitate the emergence of 
resilience in administrative systems? While almost every administrative system will possess 
some capacity for resilience, there are three situations where resilient administrative systems 
emerge. First, they can emerge incrementally, as policy makers adjust the organizational 
structure and processes of an administrative system in response to newly detected risks and 
threats. This process is typically reactive in nature, as policy makers seek to “muddle through” 
complicated and ill-structured policy problems (Lindblom 1959, 1979). An example of an 
incremental attempt to promote resilience occurred after September 11, 2001, when the United 
States moved to eliminate gaps in its domestic security apparatus through the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security. Considered one of the most significant attempts to reorganize 
the federal bureaucracy, this administrative adjustment brought twenty-two separate agencies 
under the control of the Department of Homeland Security. While this Department has been the 
focus of criticism, the purpose behind this reorganization was to coordinate the design and 
implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States against terrorist attacks. 
Resilient administrative systems can also emerge in heterogeneous situations with open 
information exchange. Ostrom discusses the emergence and operation of such forms of 
administrative systems in her analysis of how communities can manage common-pool resources 
(Ostrom 1990, 2005). In common-pool resource situations, neither the government nor the free 
market can help a diverse community of individuals sustain the long-term use of natural 
resources such as water, timber or fish. To overcome this problem, the individuals that have an 
interest in a common-pool resource can self-organize to form institutions that can successfully 
manage the resource in evolving conditions. Although a full discussion of this process is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, Ostrom has identified eight principles that are critical to the emergence 
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of resilient institutions: “(1) clearly defined boundaries; (2) proportional equivalence between 
costs and benefits; (3) collective-choice arrangements; (4) monitoring; (5) graduated sanctions; 
(6) conflict-resolution mechanisms; (7) minimal recognition of the right to organize; and (8) 
nested enterprises” (Ostrom 2005, p. 259).  
 The third situation that facilitates the emergence of resilience in administrative systems 
occurs when organizations have access to a high degree of technical infrastructure that can be 
used for information management. If the technical infrastructure is properly designed and 
implemented, it can be used to support the collection, exchange and interpretation of the 
information needed for decision making. Resilient administrative systems would be 
sociotechnical in their design, meaning they use technology to support the information processes 
that facilitate action (Coakes, Willis, and Clark 2002). One of the most effective ways to utilize 
technology to facilitate administrative action is to integrate information collection and 
distribution processes into a unified decision support system that can enable decision makers to 
develop situational awareness in uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. Without discussing 
sociotechnical systems directly, Aaron Wildavsky argued that technology can support the 
development of administrative resilience. According to Wildavsky, resilience “does not mean 
waiting for the event to strike before trying to respond to it. Rather, it means preparing for the 
inevitable – the approach of a new, surprising event – by expanding general knowledge and 
technical facility, and generalized command over resources” (1998, p. 221). 
The third theoretical question asks: what would be the rate of change within resilient 
administrative systems? Theorists indicate that networks can encourage a diverse community of 
organizations, whether public, private or non-profit, to interact and engage in public policy 
strategies as a collective entity (Bardach 1998; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Radin et al. 1996; 
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Salamon 2002). Networks are critical to the process of change because they facilitate system 
learning, adaptation and self-organization (Carley and Hill 2001; Strogatz 2003; Watts 2003). As 
the organizations in an administrative system utilize their networks to respond to changes in 
operational conditions, the patterns of interactions exchanged amongst organizations will also 
change (Kenis and Knoke 2002). The rate of change within resilient administrative systems, 
however, will differ from system to system. In some systems, for example those that adopt 
incremental adjustments or manage common pool resources, the rate of change may be 
extremely gradual, occurring over periods of months, years or even decades. Change within these 
types of systems can be driven by shifts in the nature of the threat or the quantity of the resource 
being managed, the measured movement of critical organizations into or out of the system, or the 
gradual modification of the interactions that are exchanged among critical organizations. Other 
resilient systems, such as those that manage surprising and system-shocking events, will have the 
capacity to undergo rapid change, occurring over a period of just hours or days (Comfort 1999). 
The change that occurs in these systems can be driven by the need to rapidly scale up operations, 
the need to absorb and incorporate a diversity of organizational actors, and the need to rapidly 
adjust interactions in response to constantly changing operational conditions. 
The fourth theoretical question asks: what are the conditions that influence the capacity 
of resilient administrative system to adapt and self-organize? There are three general ways to 
improve administrative resilience. Administrative resilience can be influenced through the 
promotion of organizational learning. Researchers indicate that organizations can learn to modify 
their internal and external behavior (Argyris and Schon 1978, 1996). Like individuals, networks 
of organizations can be encouraged to engage in behavior that facilitates self-organization 
(Comfort 1999). The process of organizational learning is not automatic, and the degree to which 
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it occurs depends upon factors such as the operational environment (Fiol and Lyles 1985), the 
structure of the organization (Morgan 2006), how information is interpreted (Daft and Lengel 
1986; Huber 1991), organizational memory (Prahalad and Hamel 1994), the use of appropriate 
technologies (Brown and Duguid 1991; Dodgson 1993), and the acquisition and dissemination of 
information (Dodgson 1993). While not all seven factors need be present for organizations to 
learn, as the number of factors increase, so too does the chance that organizations, and the 
systems in which they operate, can adjust to their operational environment. 
Second, the availability of information can also influence the capacity of resilient 
administrative systems. Officials in contemporary administrative systems often struggle to make 
effective decisions in crisis situations (Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). The consequences 
generated by ineffective decisions can not only undermine the capacity of individual 
organizations, they can also undermine the capacity of an entire administrative system (Comfort 
1999). This problem can be managed through technology, which can be used to overcome the 
challenges of information collection, analysis and dissemination, and enable a heterogeneous 
collection of organizations to act as a collective entity (Comfort 2005; Quarantelli 1997).  
Two veins of literature explore how information technology can improve the capacity of 
an administrative system to operate in uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. The first vein 
explores the types of technology available to officials, for example, sensor technologies for event 
detection and information collection, database and server technologies that can track 
organizational resources and personnel, and communication technologies such as cellular 
phones, satellite phones, email and software-defined radios (Meissner et al. 2002; National 
Research Council 2007). The second vein considers how the integration of technology improves 
decision making, for example, by folding the technologies into a unified decision-support system 
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that bridges the gap between the decision making officials and their operational environment 
(Wallace and Balogh 1985). Through the effective use of technology, officials would not only 
improve their situational awareness, they would also improve their ability to make effective 
decisions (Comfort 2005; Pourvakhshouri and Mansor 2003). 
Finally, technology alone will not resolve the administrative problems created by 
uncertainty. Rather, administrative systems must employ technology to transform information 
into the knowledge that organizations need to facilitate action (Coakes, Willis, and Clark 2002). 
The solution to the problem of information deficiency is the sociotechnical approach, which 
examines “the relationships and interrelationships between the social and technical parts of any 
system” and how these relationships can enhance organizational knowledge and effectiveness 
(Coakes, Willis, and Clark 2002, p. 5). The sociotechnical model requires that administrative 
systems be designed to balance five elements: its personnel; its structure; its technology; its task; 
and the environment in which it operates (Coakes, Willis, and Clark 2002).  
The design for an effective sociotechnical system has remained relatively unchanged 
since first outlined by Albert Cherns in 1976. The system‟s design must be compatible with the 
organizational goals, meet some minimal criteria to ensure that it obtains its goals, control 
variance, perform multiple functions, and ensure that organizational boundaries promote 
information flows (Cherns 1976, 1987). Equally important, the organization must reward those 
who demonstrate and support congruence and learning behavior (Cherns 1976, 1987). Although 
much more distributed, power and authority continue to play an important role because those 
with expertise must be able the command the resources and information they need to complete 
the tasks to which they are assigned (Cherns 1987). Applying such a design to administrative 
systems, which must maintain high levels of interoperability between their technical and social 
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components, would help to ensure that information flows and feedback loops exist among the 
range of critical organizational actors (Comfort 2005; Comfort et al. 2001). By blending their 
technical systems and their social systems, organizations, and indeed an entire administrative 
system, can generate the knowledge needed to manage uncertain and rapidly changing conditions 
(Garvin 1993, 1998). 
 The preceding argument suggests that there are various approaches that policy makers 
can use to improve the resilience of administrative systems. Yet the inquiry into resilient 
administrative systems should not stop here. Another important challenge for those who seek to 
study, design and implement resilient administrative systems is to figure out how to identify the 
means to capture the dynamics between the emergence and dissolution of such systems. In other 
words, as a system evolves through periods of continuity and change, is it possible to identify the 
point where an administrative system tips into dysfunction and the point where it begins to 
reconfigure its structures and processes to maintain a continuity of operations?   
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY: CONTRIBUTING TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE RESILIENCE 
The present study provides four contributions to the fields of public administration and disaster 
management. First, this study supports the conclusion that socio-technical infrastructure, 
properly designed and implemented, contribute to an administrative system‟s capacity to adapt to 
the spectrum of uncertainties generated by disruptive events. Second, this study bridges gaps that 
exist in the public administration and disaster management literatures by expanding upon the 
theoretical and empirical understandings of administrative resilience. Third, this study provides a 
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workable definition of administrative resilience. Fourth, this study validates a framework for 
administrative resilience, which can be used to evaluate the resilience of administrative systems 
in practice. This framework is designed to provide policy makers with a tool that they can use to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in their administrative systems and to evaluate the extent to 
which their systems possess the capacity to adapt and self-organize in uncertain and rapidly 
changing conditions. The framework is also scalable, meaning it can be used to evaluate 
administrative systems of a variety of sizes, including teams, organizations and communities. 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The first part of this study consists of four chapters, which appraise the theoretical underpinnings 
of resilient administrative systems and provide insights into the methods that can be used to 
investigate such systems. The present chapter reviews the impetus behind this research, which is 
needed to improve our theoretical and empirical understandings of administrative systems that 
function in rapidly evolving conditions. Chapter two reveals the dynamics that underlie resilient 
systems through a review of the resilience and decision making literatures, and also introduces 
the framework of administrative resilience. Chapter three identifies the study‟s primary research 
questions, as well as the methodological components used to address each question. Chapter four 
reviews the administrative system analyzed by this study, which was selected to investigate the 
adaptive capacity of an administrative system that operated in actual conditions. 
The second part of this study consists of five chapters, which present the findings related 
to the administrative system under analysis. Chapter five presents the findings related to the 
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organizational composition, rate of growth, and activities identified in the administrative system. 
Chapter six presents the findings related to the structural evolution of the administrative system, 
using network analysis to identify and evaluate the structural changes that occurred in the 
administrative system. Chapter seven reports the opportunities and constraints present within the 
administrative system. Using the framework of administrative resilience, chapter eight presents 
findings that report the extent to which the system under study possessed the capacity to adapt 
and self-organize in uncertain conditions. Chapter nine reviews the study‟s primary findings, 
outlines a series of recommendations for improving administrative resilience, and presents an 
agenda for the continued examination of resilient administrative systems. 
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2.0  THE FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESILIENCE 
While contemporary administrative systems have the capacity to manage small, localized events, 
these systems can become constrained by the uncertainties generated by large, disruptive events. 
The previous chapter indicated that the capacity of administrative systems that are constrained by 
conditions of uncertainty could be improved by developing the decision making capacity of the 
individuals and organizations that operate within such systems. This chapter explores this 
contention in two ways. First, it identifies how uncertain conditions constrain administrative 
action. Second, it identifies how contributions from the resilience and decision making literatures 
may assist policy makers to develop administrative systems that can adapt and self-organize. 
2.1 UNCERTAINTY AND RAPIDLY CHANGING CONDITIONS AS 
CONSTRAINTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
The events that transpired after Hurricane Katrina indicate that uncertain and rapidly changing 
conditions not only degrade the capacity of an administrative system, which can lead to a 
cascade of failures, they also undermine the capacity of the system to function as a cohesive 
entity. While administrative constraints can be created by a wide variety of conditions, those that 
occurred after Hurricane Katarina were generated by: 1) the disruption of critical infrastructure; 
2) community heterogeneity; 3) information and resource asymmetries; and 4) the dynamic and 
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non-linear nature of the operational environment. These constraints create problems for both the 
individuals and organizations that participate in conventional administrative systems by reducing 
their situational awareness, undermining their decision making capacities and inhibiting their 
ability to take timely and targeted action. 
First, disruptive events create problems by destroying the critical infrastructure that 
communities need to support their day-to-day operations (International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction 2005). Critical infrastructure include life-line systems such as transportation systems, 
electrical systems, communication systems, water and sanitation systems, and public works 
systems (Tierney 1997; Webb, Tierney, and Dahlhamer 2000). A community affected by a 
disruptive event is unable to initiate the processes of response or recovery until its life-line 
systems are reestablished or external support is received. Likewise, the administrative systems 
that operate in an affected community will be constrained by the destruction of infrastructures 
that they need to conduct operations. The disruption of communication infrastructures, for 
example, can inhibit decision makers from collecting and disseminating the information they 
needed to facilitate effective action after a disruptive event. 
 Disruptive events also expose the heterogeneity that exists within a community (Katrina 
2006). Most communities are comprised of a diverse collection of individuals, who differ in 
terms of their age, sex, race, level of education and socio-economic status. The segments that 
exist within these communities will undoubtedly have different capacities and different needs. 
After a disruptive event, decision makers who operate in conventional administrative systems 
often struggle to identify the capacities and needs of the affected communities. Administrative 
systems can be strengthened by providing decision makers with the tools they need to identify 
the capacities and needs of those living and working within a community. Additional steps can 
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be taken to ensure that these tools provide decision makers with the ability to match specific 
capacities with specific needs. The problems caused by heterogeneity, however, are not limited 
to those affected by disruptive events. For instance, heterogeneity can exist with respect to 
response organizations, which will represent different levels of jurisdiction and different 
community interests. These organizations must be successfully integrated, because they will 
form the administrative system that will identify and implement the response strategies, even 
though their missions and goals will often overlap or come in conflict with each other.  
Disruptive events also reveal the disconnections and discontinuities that exist among 
response organizations (Comfort 2007). Some response organizations possess information about 
the needs of certain segments of a community, but not the resources to meet those needs. Other 
organizations possess substantial resources, but not the information they need to deliver those 
resources effectively. Such information asymmetries are particularly problematic, and are caused 
by factors such as information overload, which occurs when organizations are bombarded with 
so much information that their managers are unable to identify a course of action. In other 
instances, information asymmetries are caused by information shortages due to inadequacies in 
information collection, information storage, and information dissemination. Disconnections and 
discontinuities are also caused by the lack of organizational interaction, which inhibits the 
distribution of information throughout an administrative system. Similar challenges exist with 
the distribution of resources. For example, the capacity of response organizations to deliver 
resources varies, with some organizations capable of conducting activities without assistance. 
Finally, the dynamic and non-linear nature of disruptive events may prevent 
organizations from identifying and responding adequately to an ever-shifting spectrum of 
opportunities and constraints (Comfort 1999; Mileti 1999; Ostrom 2005). Employing traditional 
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methods of decision making, many organizations do not act until they have the information that 
allows them to make the “best” possible decision. In an uncertain and rapidly changing 
operational environment, traditional organizations may freeze, doing nothing when action is 
most needed (Banks 2006/2007). Other organizations may acquire the information they need to 
by interacting with organizations that are operating effectively within the operational 
environment. Depending on the nature of the disruption, the variety of organizational needs, and 
the capacity of the organizations in the administrative system, it can be difficult, if not 
impossible, for decision makers to anticipate the sequence, frequency and purpose of inter-
organizational interactions in the operational environment. In such situations, decision makers 
are simply unable to predict whether their actions will lead to their desired outcomes. 
2.2 THE RESILIENT ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The concept of resilience has developed traction in the public policy arena as a solution to the 
problems generated by disruptive events (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2005). 
Initially applied to the management of uncertainty, Aaron Wildavsky defined resilience as “the 
capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce 
back” (Wildavsky 1988, p. 77). Alternative definitions construe resilience as “the capacity to 
adapt existing resources and skills to new situations and operating conditions [that] appear 
directly related to the degree of access to, and exchange of, information in systems seeking 
change” (Comfort 1999, p. 21). Although the focus of significant discussion, especially in the 
fields of ecology, engineering and economics, scholars and practitioners have yet to formulate a 
consensus as to what resilience actually means  (Gunderson et al. 2002). 
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Conceptualizations of resilience generally fall within one of three broad themes. The first 
theme is structural resilience, where systems are resilient to the extent that they can maintain a 
constant state of operations during a system-shocking event (Bruneau et al. 2003; Bruneau and 
Tierney 2006). Systems that are structurally resilient have the capacity to resist a disturbance, 
and their resilience can be improved through the fortification and strengthening of critical 
infrastructure. The second theme is social resilience, where systems are resilient to the extent 
they can absorb a system-shocking event without losing their core operational capacity (Bruneau 
and Tierney 2006; Wildavsky 1988). Systems that are socially resilient have the capacity to 
“bounce back” from a disturbance. The resilience of these systems can be improved by 
promoting flexibility through social and technological development. The third theme is cognitive 
resilience, where systems are resilient to the extent that the decision makers that operate in the 
system have sufficient information to adapt and self-organize to the constraints and opportunities 
found in the post-disaster environment (Comfort 1999). Systems that are cognitively resilient 
have the capacity to manage a disturbance through adaptation and self-organization. The 
resilience of these systems can be improved by promoting their ability to learn. 
While this research is primarily framed under the theme of cognitive resilience, all three 
themes are applicable to systems of public administration. When a disruptive event occurs, a 
resilient administrative system must demonstrate the stability needed to maintain the 
effectiveness of the social, political and economic systems of the community in which it 
operates, and the flexibility needed to absorb the shock of the event, rapidly scale up response 
activities, and adapt to the opportunities and constraints encountered in the disaster environment. 
The development and implementation of an administrative system with such a capacity would 
represent a quantum leap in humankind‟s ability to manage the disruptions caused by events such 
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as natural disasters, the spread of infectious diseases, and terrorist attacks. While the construct of 
administrative resilience is relatively simple to comprehend, the manner in which resilience is 
actually facilitated, measured or maintained is not fully understood (Manyena 2006). 
Promoting the implementation of resilient administrative systems will require a 
fundamental reorganization of the manner in which societies are structured and governed (Kettl 
2002). While not ignoring the value of administrative hierarchy, scholars have long suggested 
that complex public policy problems are best resolved through collaborative multi-organizational 
arrangements (Radin et al. 1996). By taking advantage of governance models based upon 
decentralized networks, resilient administrative systems would engage the full spectrum of 
organizations in a community, whether public, private or non-profit in character, and encourage 
them to use their resources and expertise simultaneously to respond to public policy problems as 
a collective entity (Bardach 1998; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Salamon 2002). 
While decentralization may improve an administrative system‟s capacity to operate in 
uncertain and rapidly changing conditions, the system nevertheless needs a certain degree of 
hierarchy to preserve transparency and accountability (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). Striking a 
balance between flexibility and stability not only improves an administrative system‟s access to 
expertise, resources and information, it also improves the system‟s capacity to scale up 
operations quickly and adjust to meet the demands of the operational environment. In this sense, 
the processes that guide the operation of resilient administrative systems are similar to the 
processes that guide the operation of complex adaptive systems. Complex adaptive systems are 
unique in that they possess both the structural stability and structural flexibility needed to 
manage disruptive stimuli. Actors that participate in a complex adaptive system make decisions 
by exploiting preexisting rules and building blocks, while at the same time, exploring new and 
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unique opportunities (Gell-Mann 1994; Kaufmann 1993). Complex adaptive systems manage 
disruptive stimuli because they strike a balance between order and disorder. If the system is too 
ordered, the interactions between actors are rigid and there is little if any opportunity to initiate 
change (Kaufmann 1993). If the system is too disordered, the interactions between actors are too 
chaotic and they have little if any opportunity to contemplate change (Kaufmann 1993). When 
order and disorder are appropriately balanced, a complex adaptive system will operate along the 
“edge of chaos,” which is the point at which the actors in a system can successfully exchange 
information and identify an effective course of action in response to disruptive stimuli (Axelrod 
and Cohen 2000; Comfort 1999; Kaufmann 1993). The closer a system is to the “edge of chaos,” 
the more it is capable of self-organization and adaptation (Kaufmann 1993). The challenge is to 
identify the conditions than push administrative systems towards the “edge of chaos.” 
2.3 EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING IN UNCERTAIN AND 
RAPIDLY CHANGING CONDITIONS 
To operate along the “edge of chaos,” policy makers who participate in resilient administrative 
systems will need to possess the capacity to make effective decisions in uncertain conditions 
(Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). Developing such capacity will be difficult, given that 
operational environments constrained by uncertainty are in a constant state of flux and present 
decision makers with an unlimited and unpredictable stream of obstacles and opportunities. The 
solution is not to require that policy makers make the very best decisions during an 
administrative crisis. Such a threshold would be impossible to meet. Rather, policy makers must 
be encouraged to make good decisions, which help to promote effective administrative action. 
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To make good decisions, decision makers need to have the capacity to adjust, where necessary, 
the processes behind their decision making behavior. Such a capacity can be difficult to establish 
in conventional administrative systems, which require managers to follow strict protocols, even 
in emergency situations. If the goal is to move away from protocols that constrain decision 
making, an important question is whether it is possible to identify the decision making conditions 
that influence the capacity of administrative systems to adapt? This question can be explored 
through a review of traditional and non-traditional models of decision making. 
2.3.1 The Traditional Model of Decision Making 
In his seminal work, Administrative Behavior, A Study of Decision Making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations, Herbert Simon outlined the processes of rational decision making 
within administrative organizations (Simon 1997). According to Simon, decisions are rational “if 
in fact it is the correct behavior for maximizing given values in a given situation” (Simon 1997, 
p. 85). This implies that the “subject molds all his behavior into an integrated pattern by (a) 
viewing the behavior alternatives prior to the decision in a panoramic fashion, (b) considering 
the whole complex of consequences that would follow on each choice, and (c) with the system of 
values as criterion, singling out one from the whole set of alternatives” (Simon 1997, p. 93). 
The emphasis on rational decision making has not been without criticism. Even Simon 
pointed out that, because of its dependence on complete knowledge, the requirements of rational 
decision making are almost impossible to fulfill. In making this argument, Simon detailed the 
specific limitations of rational decision making processes. First, “[r]ationality requires complete 
knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each choice. In fact, 
26 
 
knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary” (Simon 1997, p.93). Second, “[s]ince these 
consequences lie in the future, imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in 
attaching value to them. But values can only be imperfectly anticipated” (Simon 1997, p.93). 
Finally, “[r]ationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors. In actual 
behavior, only a few of all these possible alternatives ever come to mind” (Simon 1997, p. 94). 
Simon also argued that the rational decision making process was impossible to complete 
due to the limited cognitive capacity of human beings, who can only mange a handful of items at 
any time. Rather than seeking to maximize the value of any given decision, decision makers 
follow the principles of bounded rationality and satisfice, using the information that is currently 
available to them to make decisions that are “good enough” for the circumstances (Simon 1997, 
p. 119). In the context of public policy, this process is known as disjointed incrementalism, 
where policy decisions are made in stages, and each decision is based only the information that is 
available to policy makers at the time the decision is made (Lindblom 1959, 1979). 
2.3.2 Non-Traditional Models of Decision Making 
Ever since Herbert Simon began to challenge decision making models based upon rationality, 
researchers have sought to understand how humans actually go about making decisions in 
uncertain conditions. Recent research on decision making can be organized into three general 
categories. The first category considers decision making at the individual level. In Sources of 
Power: How People Make Decisions, Gary Klein explores the processes of naturalistic decision 
making, which enable humans, who are limited in time, knowledge and capacity, to make 
effective decisions under uncertain conditions (Klein 1999). According to Klein, “the features 
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that help define a naturalistic decision making setting are time pressure, high stakes, experienced 
decision makers, inadequate information (information that is missing, ambiguous, or erroneous), 
ill-defined goals, poorly defined procedures, cue learning, context (e.g., higher-level goals, 
stress), dynamic conditions, and team coordination” (Klein 1999). These are the very conditions 
that make administrative decision making in uncertain environments difficult. 
To explain how effective decisions are made in dynamic and uncertain environments, 
Klein developed the recognition-primed decision model. Unlike the rational based model of 
decision making, Klein‟s model suggests that decision makers do not spend time looking for the 
“best option” when confronted by a problem, but rather, they search for and select the first 
“workable option” through a dynamic and nonlinear process (Klein 1999, p. 30). Initially, an 
experienced decision maker is confronted with a problem. The decision maker then determines 
whether that problem is “typical,” meaning that it can be related through “analogy or prototype” 
to a previous experience (Klein 1999, p. 24). If not, the decision maker attempts to organize the 
incoming information into a workable framework. Once the framework is established, the 
decision maker understands “what types of goals make sense (so the priorities are set), which 
cues are important (so there is not an overload of information), what to expect next (so they can 
prepare themselves and notice surprises), and the typical ways of responding in a given 
situation” (Klein 1999, p. 24). By selecting a course of action in this manner, the decision maker 
quickly evaluates, through “mental simulation,” whether the action is appropriate given the 
circumstances (Klein 1999, p. 27). If the decision maker decides that the action is inappropriate, 
she quickly modifies and reevaluates the course of action. Once an appropriate course of action 
is identified, it can be quickly implemented. This process of decision making not only allows for 
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the rapid selection of strategies in an uncertain environment, but more importantly, it enables 
decision makers to adapt and adjust their strategies when necessary. 
The second category considers decision making at the group level. In Cognition in the 
Wild, Edwin Hutchins introduces the framework of distributive cognition, which explains how 
individuals form cognitive groups to resolve problems as a collective entity (Hutchins 1995). 
Hutchins argues that groups can develop into cognitive systems that have the capacity to resolve 
complex problems by separating the problem into component tasks, which can then be resolved 
through the coordination of knowledge and action. Such collaboration enables groups to resolve 
problems that individual decision makers could not (Hutchins 1995, p. 175). 
Groups that engage in distributive cognition can be organized socially to form a 
computational architecture, which is separated into computational organization and social 
organization (Hutchins 1995, pp. 185-186). The computational organization of a group is 
“defined by the computational dependencies among the various parts of the computation” 
(Hutchins 1995, pp. 185-186). These dependencies are shaped by the requirements of the 
problem, or more precisely, the calculations or resources needed to resolve the problem.  
A group‟s social organization “structures the interactions among the participants to the 
computation [problem]” in different ways (Hutchins 1995, p. 186). First, when confronting a 
complicated problem, the tasks that are performed by the members of the group will occur in 
parallel. The overlapping of some of these tasks enables the creation of a “complex functional 
system” (Hutchins 1995, p. 189). Second, the processes of information flow in groups utilizing 
distributive cognition will be both “top-down” and “bottom-up” (Hutchins 1995, p. 190). Top-
down processes can represent information requests or feedback reports. Bottom-up processes can 
represent the information that is requested by the decision maker. The simultaneous operation of 
29 
 
both processes ensures that all of the actors in the system have the information they need to make 
decisions that are both necessary and appropriate. Third, the group members themselves will also 
have different responsibilities. Some members will be “daemons,” who observe the operational 
environment for “specified conditions” which requires a “specified action” (Hutchins 1995, p. 
191). Other group members will be “buffers,” who introduce slack into the cognitive process by 
filtering information that flows through the system (Hutchins 1995, p. 194). Buffers play a 
critical role because they prevent system failure by ensuring that critical information reaches the 
daemons at the appropriate time, and that the activities of the daemons do not come in conflict 
with each other in performing ongoing or yet-to-be initiated tasks (Hutchins 1995, p. 198).  
Fourth, the sequence in which the tasks taken by the group to resolve the problem is also 
important. Some procedures will be “sequentially unconstrained,” meaning that the task can 
occur at anytime because it will not conflict with other ongoing or yet-to-be initiated tasks 
(Hutchins 1995, p. 198). Such tasks can be accomplished through a “swarm of ants” strategy 
where the group members, acting in isolation, will take action in the appropriate circumstances. 
Other procedures must be “sequentially constrained,” which means that the task can only occur 
at a certain time or else it will conflict with other ongoing or yet-to-be initiated tasks (Hutchins 
1995, p. 198). To avoid such errors, the sequencing of tasks can be regulated through the 
implementation of rules within the group. 
Fifth, there must be a “fit” between the “computational dependencies and the social 
organization” of the group (Hutchins 1995, p. 203). This means that a group‟s organization 
determines the extent to which the group can obtain its goal. Hutchins elaborates this point by 
indicating that “[w]hen a problem has a deeply nested goal structure, a social hierarchy can 
provide a mechanism for distributing the attention to various parts of the goal structure” 
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(Hutchins 1995, p. 203). Ensuring that the group obtains its goal requires the management of the 
social relationships within that group. Finally, also helping to tie together the computational 
organization and the social organization are the tools that are used by the members of the group. 
Tools, which themselves can be the result of cognitive processes distributed across time, are a 
critical element because they transform the tasks that have to be completed by decision makers. 
According to Hutchins, “tools permit the people using them to do the tasks that need to be done 
while doing the kinds of things [that] people are good at: recognizing patterns, modeling simple 
dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects‟ in the environment” (Hutchins 1995, p. 155). 
 Groups that engage in distributive cognition have the capacity to structure information so 
that the members of the group understand, and respond to, anticipated as well as unanticipated 
problems. This is because the processes and interactions that are exchanged among the group 
members and their set of tools enable the development of a common knowledge base that 
contains information about the system‟s status. This knowledge base is “inter-subjectively shared 
among the members of the” group and forms the basis for a learning system (Hutchins 1995, p. 
219). When a problem is encountered by the group, or part of the group fails due to the lack of 
information or communication disruptions, the group members can collaborate to adjust their 
processes and organizational structures to ensure that their goals will still be met. 
The third category includes scholars that suggest that large groups of independent actors 
can come together to create a complex adaptive system (Axelrod and Cohen 2000; Gell-Mann 
1994; Holland 1995). Complex adaptive systems are non-linear systems of agents. These agents 
possess detectors, which enable them to receive information inputs from the environment in 
which they operate. When these actors attempt to make a decision, they analyze information 
according to internal models of rules, which inform them about the type of action they should 
31 
 
take in a given circumstance. These rules are based upon building blocks, which enable the 
agents to simplify their complex environment. To understand observed phenomena, the agents 
apply preexisting building blocks, modify a building block, or generate a new building block 
(Gell-Mann 1994). After an agent makes a decision, they use emitters to output a signal back to 
the environment. The agents in the system can detect this information and the processes of 
analysis and reaction will begin anew. If the actors detect and adopt a successful building block, 
its transmission throughout the system can create a powerful opportunity for change (Gell-Mann 
1994; Holland 1995). The continuous interaction between agents creates a system optimized to 
operate within complex environments, in large part, because the actors can rapidly adjust 
strategies, ensuring not just their own survival, but also the survival of the entire system. 
2.3.3 Harnessing the Complexity of Uncertain Environments 
What can policy makers do to ensure that the administrative system in which they operate can 
automatically adapt in response to uncertain conditions? As suggested by Robert Axelrod and 
Michael Cohen, policy makers can harness the complexity generated by these conditions by: 
“deliberately changing the structure of a system in order to increase some measure 
of performance, and to do so by exploiting an understanding that the system itself 
is complex. … [T]he idea is to use our knowledge of complexity to do better.  To 
harness complexity means living with it, and even taking advantage of it, rather 
than trying to ignore it or eliminate it” (Axelrod and Cohen 2000, p. 9). 
According to Axelrod and Cohen (2000), there are a variety of strategies that policy makers can 
follow to harness the complexity found in such systems. For example, policy makers can modify 
the variation, interactions and selection processes that exist within a system. To do so, policy 
makers can encourage the organizations within a system to embrace variety by allowing them to 
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exploit opportunity and rewarding them when they identify novel solutions (Axelrod and Cohen 
2000). Second, policy makers can modify interaction patterns by making adjustments within 
organizations or by making adjustments to the environment in which organizations operate. 
Interactions are important because they connect the organizations and resources and help to 
develop the “networks of reciprocal interaction that foster trust and cooperation” (Axelrod and 
Cohen 2000, p. 156). Finally, policy makers can ensure that organizations identify and select 
successful strategies by providing them with a clear understanding of what constitutes success 
and rewarding them when they cast aside ineffective strategies (Axelrod and Cohen 2000). By 
adjusting these factors, policy makers can help organizations embrace of complexity and 
encourage the development of resilient administrative systems. 
2.4 THE FRAMEWORK OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESILIENCE 
Resilient administrative systems are heterogeneous in their composition, emerge in a variety of 
situations, and experience structural evolution in response to disruptive stimuli. The successful 
operation of a resilient administrative system depends upon seven specific conditions, each of 
which promotes effective decision making in situations that traditionally undermine 
administrative action. These conditions reflect the fact that decision makers must: 1) understand 
their operational environment; 2) interact with the environment, as well as the individuals and 
organizations in that environment; 3) have access to information; 4) be able to compare patterns 
of action; 5) have the ability to make rapid decisions; 6) have the authority to adjust their 
strategies; and 7) employ technology to support decision making processes. Facilitating these 
conditions in an administrative context provides decision makers, and the organizations in which 
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they operate, with the structure and flexibility they need to manage conditions that may 
undermine the capacity of contemporary administrative systems. More importantly, by 
strengthening the presence of these conditions, policy makers could guide the activities within 
the system towards the “edge of chaos,” enabling the system to adapt and self-organize.  
 How then might policy makers develop insights into the design and operation of resilient 
administrative systems? Elinor Ostrom indicates that social scientists use the terms, 
„frameworks, theories, and models‟ interchangeably, generating substantial confusion as to their 
meanings and applications (Ostrom 2005, p. 27). Moving from the general to the precise, Ostrom 
argues that frameworks, theories and models represent a nested set of concepts. Frameworks 
represent the most general level of analysis, and “identify the elements (and the relationships 
among these elements) … that organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry” (Ostrom 2005, p. 
28). By way of further explanation, Ostrom indicates that frameworks:  
“provide the most general set of variables that should be used to analyze all types 
of settings relevant for a framework. Frameworks provide a metaphoric language 
that is necessary to talk about theories and that can be used to compare theories. 
They attempt to identify the universal elements that any relevant theory would 
need to include. Many differences in surface reality can result from the way these 
variables interact with one another. Thus, the elements contained in a framework 
help the analyst generate the questions that need to be addressed when first 
conducting an analysis” (Ostrom 2005, p. 28). 
 
At a more specific level of analysis are theories, which “enable the analyst to specify which 
components of the framework are relevant for certain kinds of questions and to make broad 
working assumptions about those elements” (Ostrom 2005, p. 28). Finally, at the most precise 
level of analysis are models, which can be used to “make precise assumptions about a limited set 
of parameters and variables” (Ostrom 2005, p. 28).  
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 This study develops a framework that can be used to investigate resilient administrative 
systems. As its name implies, the framework of administrative resilience is a conceptual device 
to identify the elements and the relationships among the structures and processes that facilitate 
adaptation and self-organization in administrative systems. The purpose of the framework is not 
to test casual hypothesis among a series of variables, but rather, to generate a series of questions 
that can guide the initial series of investigations into administrative resilience. 
 Scholars have already begun to develop frameworks to investigate the resilience of 
administrative systems. For example, in Shared Risk: Complex Systems in Seismic Response, 
Louise Comfort (1999) investigated the administrative response systems that emerged following 
eleven earthquakes in nine countries. Her findings indicate that there are four components that 
encourage adaptation and self-organization in administrative systems responsible for managing 
disruptions caused by natural disasters (Comfort 1999). Three of the components represented the 
system‟s technical structure, organizational flexibility, and cultural openness. These components 
contained a range of indicators, which received a rank of low, medium or high when identified 
within the system under analysis. A fourth component was also identified, information search 
and exchange, which represented the extent to which the organizations acquired and used 
information to coordinate collective action. The components were unified by a discussion of the 
initial conditions present in these systems prior to the earthquakes. 
Using data derived from documentary reports, a content analysis of news reports, and 
interviews with emergency response managers, Comfort (1999) classified the administrative 
response systems as non-adaptive, emergent adaptive, operative adaptive or auto-adaptive. At 
one end of the continuum are non-adaptive systems, which possess low levels of technical 
structure, organizational flexibility and cultural openness. Emergent adaptive systems possess 
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low levels of technical structure, medium levels of organizational flexibility and an emerging 
openness to new conceptualizations of risk (Comfort 1999). Operational adaptive systems 
possess medium levels of technical structure, organizational flexibility, and openness to new 
conceptualizations of risk (Comfort 1999). While the operational adaptive system may 
demonstrate the capacity to adapt in limited circumstances, these three systems are primarily 
characterized by their reactive nature. At the other end of the continuum are auto-adaptive 
systems, which possess high technical structure, organizational flexibility and cultural openness 
(Comfort 1999). Auto-adaptive systems are by nature proactive, and can exhibit high levels of 
adaption in uncertain and rapidly changing operational environments. The higher a system 
ranked along this continuum, the better able it is to “adapt to sudden change, reallocate its 
resources and energies in response to a major threat … without losing its basic capacity for 
performance” (Comfort 1999, p. 231). 
 
 
 
Table 1: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Framework of Administrative Resilience 
 
 
Decision Making Conditions Framework of Administrative Resilience 
Environment Environmental Component 
Information Information Component 
Rapidity 
Organizational Component 
Adjustment 
Pattern Identification Cultural Component 
Technology Technological Component 
Interaction Interaction Component 
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As an extension of the research conducted in Shared Risk, the framework of 
administrative resilience accommodates recent theoretical and methodological developments in 
two distinct ways. Regarding the first modification, where the framework employed in Shared 
Risk emphasizes technical structure, organizational flexibility, cultural openness and information 
exchange, the framework for administrative resilience modifies the definitions of these 
components and, as indicated in Table 1, introduces the environmental and interaction 
components. The six components that underlie the framework for administrative resilience 
represent the factors that promote adaptation in systems that operate in uncertain conditions. 
Further, the components used to develop the framework of administrative resilience were 
organized into two categories; those that reflect system structure and those that reflect system 
process. The environmental, technological and interaction components fell into the category of 
system structure. The environmental component represents the set of initial conditions in which 
an administrative system must operate, and evaluates the social and regulatory conditions that are 
present in a system prior to a disrupting event. The technological component represents the 
technology at use within the administrative system, and considers the extent to which 
organizations in the system integrate the technology to create an effective decision-support 
system. As its name implies, the interaction component represents organizational interaction, and 
considers the extent to which their interactions enable the distribution of information, resources 
and personnel throughout the system. In contrast, the information, organization and cultural 
components fell into the category of system process. The information component represents the 
availability of information in the administrative system, and considers whether the organizations 
that operate in a system use that information to facilitate action. The organizational component 
represents rapidity and adjustment, and considers the extent to which organizations have the 
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operational plans, personnel, training and resources needed to engage in adaptive and 
collaborative activities. The cultural component represents organizational memory and values, 
and considers the extent to which organizations understand the risks they confront and have the 
ability to identify and resolve problems through the use of previous experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Graphical Representation of the Framework of Administrative Resilience1 
 
 
 
The second modification reflected the distinctions between order and disorder as 
discussed by the complex adaptive systems literature. The framework used in Shared Risk to 
classify systems did not distinguish between order and disorder. As  
                                                 
1
 Type of system categories adapted from Comfort, Louise K. 1999. Shared risk: Complex systems in seismic 
response. New York: Pergamon. 
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Figure 1 indicates, the modified continuum will provide a richer description of the 
structure of the administrative system under analysis. These modifications enable the framework 
of administrative resilience to be used to classify the adaptive capacity of an administrative 
system, regardless of its purpose or function, and to determine the extent to which it approaches 
the theoretical “edge of chaos,” the point at which system adaptation is at its highest. Equally 
important, the framework of administrative resilience can also be used to provide policy makers 
with recommendations about how to improve the adaptive capacity of an administrative system, 
which if implemented, might push the system closer to the “edge of chaos.” For instance, if an 
evaluation indicates that an administrative system is low on technical structure, and is clearly 
situated within the emergent adaptive category, investments in technology might improve the 
capacity of the system so that it becomes an operational adaptive system. The subsequent chapter 
introduces the specific research methods that can be used investigate the resilience of 
administrative systems. 
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3.0  RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
RESILIENCE 
What methods are appropriate for the investigation resilience within an administrative system 
such as the one that operated in Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 
26 December 2004? Within the framework of a nested case study, I developed a mixed-methods 
design that employed content analysis, descriptive statistics, network analysis, as well as semi-
structured interview and survey data to investigate the resilience of this administrative system, as 
well as its constituent domestic and international administrative sub-systems. 
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To meet the objectives of this study, I needed to identify an administrative system that had been 
placed under significant stress and had demonstrated the capacity to adapt after a disruptive 
event. Based upon these criteria, I elected to examine the administrative system that operated in 
Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004. The 
following research questions guided this field study: 
1. To what extent did the organizations that conducted operations in Indonesia after the 
Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004 facilitate the 
development of an administrative response system? 
 
 What was size and organizational composition of the administrative system? 
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 What was the rate of entry for organizations in the administrative system? 
 
 What was the rate of growth of the administrative system? 
 
 What were the activities performed within the administrative system? 
 
2. To what extent did the interactions exchanged among response organizations after the 
Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004 drive the structural 
evolution of the administrative response system? 
 
 To what extent did the density of the administrative system evolve? 
 
 To what extent did the diameter of the administrative system evolve? 
 
 To what extent did the number of components in the administrative system evolve? 
 
 To what extent do Hamming distance statistics indicate the existence of structural 
evolution within the administrative system? 
 
 To what extent did organizations in the administrative system shift the target of their 
interactions from one class of organization to another? 
 
3. To what extent did constraints and opportunities influence the administrative system 
that responded to the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004? 
  
 What were the primary operational constraints in the post-tsunami environment? 
 
 What were the primary operational opportunities in the post-tsunami environment? 
 
4. To what extent did the administrative response system possess the capacity for 
resilience after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004? 
 
 To what extent did the administrative system possess the principal components outlined 
in the framework of administrative resilience? 
 
 To what extent can the administrative system be classified as resilient, meaning it 
possessed the capacity to adapt in response to conditions of uncertainty? 
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3.2 THE NESTED CASE STUDY AND MIXED METHODS DESIGN 
By combining research methods into a single design, researchers can improve their ability to 
understand the phenomena they elect to analyze (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). Indeed, 
researchers agree that the best social science research will “often combine features” of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Yin 2003). Building upon 
this holistic perspective of research, I employed a nested case study that utilized a mixed 
methods design to collect empirical evidence related to the system selected for analysis. 
3.2.1 The Nested Case Study 
Elinor Ostrom has argued that institutions that operate in dynamic conditions need to be analyzed 
as a nested set (Ostrom 1990, 2005). In Understanding Institutional Diversity, Ostrom revealed 
that there is a need to “develop the appropriate theoretical language for analyzing [multilevel 
complex systems]” (Ostrom 2005, p. 13). She argued that without the emergence of this 
theoretical lexicon, such systems will remain just outside the grasp of human understanding. 
Taking this argument one step further, this study argues that there is also a need to develop the 
methodological language that can help researchers to structure the analysis of such systems. The 
reason why a methodological lexicon is important for discussions about administrative resilience 
is that contemporary case study designs are unable to separate complex systems into their 
constituent sub-components without threatening the validity of the research findings. 
A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003, p. 13). Contemporary case studies fall into one of four 
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categories: (1) holistic single-case designs; (2) holistic multiple-case designs; (3) embedded 
single-case designs; and (4) embedded multiple-case designs (Yin 2003). According to Yin, a 
study‟s research questions can be used to identify which case study design is appropriate. The 
research questions also point to the study‟s unit(s) of analysis and its unit(s) of observation. In 
many instances, the unit of analysis, the “whom or what” being studied, is a phenomena that is 
indistinguishable from the case itself (Yin 2003). The unit of analysis can take numerous forms, 
including individuals, groups, organizations or entire systems. If the study has a single unit of 
analysis, then the holistic case study design is appropriate, and the researcher will investigate that 
unit of analysis as a distinct entity. If there are multiple units of analysis, then the embedded case 
study design is appropriate, and the researcher will investigate and compare the units of analysis 
as distinct entities. In contrast, the units of observation are what researchers examine to create 
descriptions of the unit(s) of analysis and to explain the differences that exist between them. 
Although the case study design has helped researchers generate insights into complex 
social phenomena, contemporary designs are constrained by two significant limitations. First, 
contemporary designs consider units of analysis as distinct, independent entities. This is 
appropriate when researchers attempt to make comparisons between distinct cases or 
independent units of analysis. By bounding cases and units of analysis in this fashion, 
researchers restrict their ability to analyze units that are non-distinct and mutually supporting. 
This restriction is limiting when they seek to analyze units that are organized as a component, or 
series of components, within which multiple nested sub-components reside. The second 
limitation is that contemporary case study designs prevent, or at the very least severely restrict, 
the simultaneous examination of certain types of phenomena from multiple levels of analysis.  
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Contemporary case study designs prevent researchers from moving up and down levels of 
analysis without threatening the validity of their empirical conclusions. In holistic case designs, a 
shift in the level of analysis will change the unit of analysis and the unit of observation. In 
embedded case designs, a shift in the level of analysis may change the unit of analysis and/or the 
unit of observation. In either type of case design, movement between levels of analysis threatens 
research validity because, as the units of analysis or the units of observation change, the 
empirical conclusions generated by the research may become logically incompatible with the 
original research questions. When selecting the appropriate case study design, researchers must 
avoid inadvertent shifts in either the units of analysis or the units of observation. The failure to 
avoid such shifts can generate Type III errors, whereby the researcher collects data that answers 
the wrong research question (Dunn 2003). 
These limitations are not criticisms of the case study as a research strategy, but rather, 
suggest that contemporary case study designs are, at times, inappropriate for addressing certain 
types of research questions. To overcome these limitations, some have focused on the “nested 
analysis,” which employs a “mixed methods” approach for comparative analysis, blending the 
strengths of large-N quantitative analysis with strengths of small-N qualitative analysis to enrich 
the analysis of complicated social problems (Coppedge 1999; Lieberman 2005). Others have 
focused on an alternative form of case study design, the “nested set” design (Haas 1990; Huggins 
2007; Kamolvej 2006; Ostrom 1990, 2005). While the nested set has been discussed in relation 
to the analysis of social systems, little work has been done to develop the concept into a 
methodologically sound case study design for social science research. 
Building upon the nested set discussion, the nested case study design is an alternative 
case design that not only overcomes the limitations discussed above, but can also be used to 
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systematically analyze the resilience of administrative systems. In contrast to the holistic and 
embedded designs, the nested design frames units of analysis as non-distinct and mutually 
supporting entities. The first characteristic of the nested case design reflects the significance of 
the nested set, which is an enclosed system that is comprised of a series of concentric domains. 
Within the nested framework, data can be organized into a primary component, the system under 
analysis, and a collection of ever-smaller nested sub-components. 
Second the components and sub-components in a nested case can be organized 
hierarchically. Some hierarchies take the form of a regular pyramid, where a small, but powerful, 
unit controls or influences the actions of, and interactions within, a series of increasingly larger 
sub-components. Examples of such systems might include military or corporate organizations, 
which possess a strict “chain of command” form of administrative structure. Alternatively, other 
hierarchies can take the form of an inverted pyramid, where a large, but powerful, unit controls, 
or at the very least influences, the actions of, or interactions in, a series of increasing smaller sub-
components. An example of such a system would be the international system, made up of 
international, national and sub-national actors. While international actors such as the United 
Nations do not have direct control over national governments, they do have the capacity to exert 
significant influence over actors at the national and sub-national level of jurisdiction. Even in 
nations where the governmental system is decentralized, the national level government, with its 
large bureaucracy, budget and regulatory power, can have a significant influence over the 
activities of provincial and local actors. Regardless of the type of hierarchy, the structure of these 
systems is derived from the sub-components present in the hierarchy. Researchers who wish to 
understand how such systems operate must not study one sub-component to the exclusion of all 
others. They must examine all of the sub-components in the system simultaneously. 
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Figure 2: Nested Case Study Design 
 
 
 
Third, the structure of the primary component and its sub-components is shaped by the 
patterns of interaction exchanged in the system under analysis. These interactions, defined by 
function, are exchanged between the actors that operate in and across the sub-components that 
make up the primary component. By distinguishing between the primary component and its 
constituent sub-components, the nested case design, as summarized in Figure 2, enables 
researchers to analyze comparatively a system‟s sub-components, or combine the sub-
components to form a primary component, which can be analyzed as a single, unified system. In 
this fashion, the nested case design provides researchers with a conceptual framework that 
enables them to move up, down or across sub-components without shifting the unit of analysis or 
the unit of observation. The flexibility provided by the nested case design makes it the 
appropriate choice for the analysis of resilient administrative systems. 
 
 The phenomenon of interest contains 
multiple units of analysis 
 
 The units of analysis are non-distinct and 
mutually supporting, and can be organized as 
a unified nest set. 
 
 The nested set contains one primary 
component and one or more hierarchically 
organized sub-components 
 
 The structure of the components is shaped by 
functionally defined interaction patterns, 
which may be non-linear 
 
 Analysis can occur on the actors, activities 
and relationships in and across the sub-
components, and/or the primary component. 
NESTED CASE STUDY 
Primary Component 
Sub-Component One 
Sub-Component Two 
Sub-Component Three 
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The field study examined in this study is the administrative system that operated in 
Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004. I separated 
the system into two non-distinct and mutually supporting sub-components and one primary 
component. The first sub-component is the domestic administrative system (hereafter domestic 
administrative sub-system or domestic sub-system), which represents the domestic organizations 
that participated in system under analysis. The second sub-component is the international 
administrative system (hereafter international administrative sub-system or international sub-
system), which represents the international organizations that came from jurisdictions outside of 
Indonesia and participated in system under analysis. These two sub-components were integrated 
to form the primary component (hereafter core administrative system or core system), which 
represents all of the organizations that engaged in critical response related interactions with other 
organizations during the period under analysis. The interactions that were used to generate the 
structure of these systems were taken from the daily record of inter-organizational exchanges 
that took place following the tsunami, including but not limited to, the transfer of information, 
personnel and resources among response organizations. By organizing the study in this fashion, 
it is possible to evaluate the adaptive capacity of both the international and domestic 
administrative sub-systems. It is also possible to investigate how the non-linear series of 
interactions among the organizations that operated within, and across, the sub-components 
influenced the adaptive capacity of the core administrative system. 
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3.2.2 Mixed Methods Design 
Within the framework of a nested case study design, I employed mixed methods to collect and 
organize the data needed to investigate the theoretical questions outlined in chapter one, as well 
as the research questions asked of the field study under analysis. These methods included content 
analysis, descriptive statistics, network analysis, semi-structured interviews and surveys.  
3.2.2.1 Content Analysis 
Complicated research questions can be answered through a content analysis of relevant source 
materials (Fontana and Frey 2003). The data that I collected for this study came from newspaper 
articles, organizational documents such as situation reports, archival materials located on 
websites, and after action reports. The use of these materials ensured that the data collected 
addressed the research questions, which consider the conditions under which the administrative 
system under analysis emerged, its organizational composition, its rate of development, the 
extent to which its structures evolved, and the factors that influenced its adaptive capacity. 
3.2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The content analysis generated an extensive amount of quantitative data on the organizations and 
interactions identified in the administrative system. These data will be presented as descriptive 
statistics to identify the numbers, jurisdictional levels, sources of funding and frequency 
distributions of organizations detected in the system. These statistics will also plot, by date, the 
rate at which organizations were reported as entering the system, as well as the number and type 
of interactions detected within the system. These data are relevant because they address the first 
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and second research questions, which consider the organizational composition of the 
administrative system under analysis and the rate at which this system developed. 
3.2.2.3 Network Analysis 
Network analysis is used to identify the patterns in relationships among interacting units in a 
social environment (Wasserman and Faust 1994). I used data collected during the content 
analysis to analyze the interactions among organizations that participated in the Indonesian 
response system. The network analysis revealed the structure of the system, the characteristics of 
the organizations that operated and interacted in the system, and extent to which the system‟s 
structure evolved. These data are relevant because they address the second research question, 
which considers the rate of structural change within the administrative system under analysis. 
3.2.2.4 Semi-Structured Interviews and Surveys 
I collected data from experts who possessed knowledge about the administrative system under 
analysis through the use of semi-structured interview and survey instrument. The qualitative and 
quantitative date that were collected were used to address the third and fourth research questions. 
These questions seek to identify the primary operational constraints and opportunities that were 
present the post-tsunami environment, as well as, the extent to which the administrative response 
system possessed the components of administrative resilience. 
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3.3 THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND UNITS OF OBSERVATION  
The character of the nested case study design is shaped by its unit of analysis and units of 
observation. The unit of analysis is the administrative response system which emerged to operate 
in Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami. The unit of analysis is derived 
from two separate units of observation. The first unit is the “organizational actors” that 
participated in the system. The organizational actors included public organizations, non-profit 
organizations, private organizations and special-interest organizations. The second unit is the 
“inter-organizational interactions” exchanged among the organizations that participated in the 
system. I defined an interaction as any linkage between response organizations, which 
represented channels for the transfer resources or information (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
3.4 DATA COLLECTION, DATA CODING AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The investigation of administrative systems under stress can be accomplished through the careful 
application of multiple research methods. I employed the following processes of data collection, 
data coding, and data analysis to address the research questions at issue in this study. 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
To develop an accurate representation of the system under consideration, I collected three 
categories of data. The first category came from the documentary sources that I used to identify 
the organizational actors and interactions in the administrative system. Listed in Table 2, these 
documents were published in English between 26 December 2004 and 17 January 2005, and 
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were gathered from electronic databases, organizational websites, and email correspondence. 
The second category was related to the administrative system that was responsible for disaster 
management in Indonesia prior to 26 December 2004. These materials included disaster 
management laws and regulations collected from archives, legal databases, governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, and officials with knowledge of the administrative response to 
the 2004 tsunami. The third category was collected from a series of surveys and semi-structured 
interviews with experts who participated in, or had knowledge of, the administrative response to 
the tsunami. The review of the primary documentary source materials enabled me to identify the 
organizations that operated in the Indonesian system. The semi-structured interview and survey 
questions used to complete this study are detailed in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Documentary Source Materials2 
 
 
Source One Source Two Source Three Source Four Source Five 
 
Newspapers: 
The Jakarta Post 
 
Situation Reports: 
United Nations 
Office for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian 
Affairs - Geneva 
 
 
Emergency Updates: 
Center of Excellence 
in Disaster response 
and Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
Situation Reports: 
United Nations 
Office for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian 
Affairs - Jakarta 
 
 
Situation Reports: 
Center for Health 
Emergency 
Preparedness and 
Response; 
Indonesian Ministry 
of Health; and 
World Health 
Organization – 
Indonesia 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Interviews revealed that the content of the situation reports produced by BAKORNAS PBP was translated and 
included in the daily situations reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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3.4.2 Data Coding 
I began data coding by identifying the organizations and interactions reported in the 
documentary source materials. These data were stored an Excel spreadsheet.
3
 The coding rules 
employed in this process are listed in Appendix B and Appendix C. Second, I used the network 
analysis software Ora to convert the data contained in the spreadsheet into three sets of relational 
matrices.
4
 These matrices were symmetric and non-directional, and represented the chronological 
record of the organizations and interactions detected in the core system and its sub-systems. This 
process created a total of sixty-six distinct matrices; twenty-two matrices for the core system and 
each sub-system. Third, I prepared the interview and survey data for analysis. Using the software 
MAXQDA, I coded the interview transcripts using the “open coding” process of grounded theory 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008, p. 3).
5
 The coding schema that was employed in this process is 
described in Appendix D. The survey results were entered into the software SPSS. These data 
were separated into two categories: international respondents and domestic respondents. For my 
final step, I scored the components of the framework of administrative resilience for the core 
system and its sub-systems. As described in Appendix E, each of the components in the 
framework is comprised of six sub-components. Using the data collected from the surveys, the 
coded interview transcripts, and other relevant materials, the sub-components were scored on an 
ordinal scale (1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high) to “distinguish the gross differences [with]in the 
                                                 
3
 The organization that was listed first in a transaction was coded as the initiating organization. 
4
 Ora, Copyright © 2001-2010, is a software tool for the analysis of social networks. Ora was developed by Dr. 
Kathleen M. Carley, Director of the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems 
(CASOS), Carnegie Mellon University. For more information, visit: http://casos.cs.cmu.edu/.  
 
5
 For more information on MAXQDA, visit: http://www.maxqda.com/. 
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… response system” (Comfort 1999). To generate the final score that would be awarded to each 
of the components, I averaged the scores awarded to each component‟s sub-components.  
3.4.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis corresponded with the sequence of the research questions. The first step of the 
analysis considered the extent to which the response organizations facilitated the development of 
the core system and its sub-systems. I addressed this question by generating descriptive statistics 
from the data stored in the Excel spreadsheets to evaluate the number, category and frequency 
distribution of the organizations and interactions detected in these systems. I also used these 
results to evaluate the size and organizational composition of the systems, as well as the nature 
of the transactions detected within the systems. My analysis continued after I plotted the data 
longitudinally, by date, to evaluate rates of organizational access and system growth. The second 
step considered the extent to which organizational interactions drove the structural evolution of 
the system. I addressed this question using the matrices that I created to generate network 
statistics that would identify the response system‟s density, distance, and number of components. 
These statistics, created using Ora, were plotted longitudinally, by date, for the evaluation of 
structural change using the Hamming distance statistic (Hamming 1950). I also examined the 
extent to which response organizations shifted their choice of organizational partners. 
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 Table 3: Resilience Assessment Components and Indicators 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Component 
Information 
Component 
Organization 
Component 
Cultural 
Component 
Technology 
Component 
Network 
Component 
Auto-
Adaptive High High High High High High 
Operative 
Adaptive Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Emergent 
Adaptive Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low 
Non-
Adaptive Low Low Low Low Low Low 
 
 
 
The third step of my analysis evaluated the constraints and opportunities present in the 
response system. Focusing again on the core system and its sub-systems, I reviewed the survey 
data and the coded interview transcripts to identify the principle constraints and opportunities. I 
supported this analytical process with excerpts culled from the interview transcripts. The final 
step considered the extent to which the core system and its sub-systems possessed the capacity 
for resilience. This analytical step began with a review of the scores awarded for the components 
of the framework of administrative resilience against the set of resilience indicators identified in 
Table 3. By way of example, if all of a system‟s components received a medium ranking, then it 
would be interpreted as operational adaptive. I continued the analysis with an evaluation of the 
structural stability of the systems, which sought to identify the extent to which the systems could 
be interpreted as operating along the “edge of chaos,” and if not, whether they were constrained 
by an excess of structure or flexibility. The data used to address this question was extracted from 
the survey results and interviews transcripts. These results enabled me to situate the core system 
and its sub-systems in the framework of administrative resilience as identified in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the Framework of Administrative Resilience6 
 
 
 
3.5 THREATS TO VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
I did not attempt to identify or test a series of casual hypotheses derived from theoretical 
propositions in this study. Rather, my goal was to acquire a better understanding of, through the 
use of descriptive statistics, social network data and qualitative data collected from surveys and 
semi-structured interviews, the phenomenon known as administrative resilience. The remainder 
of this section identifies the threats to validity and reliability present in my study; specifically 
construct validity, internal validity, and general reliability. 
                                                 
6
 Type of system categories adapted from Comfort, Louise K. 1999. Shared risk: Complex systems in seismic 
response. New York: Pergamon. 
 
System 
Complexity 
 
and 
 
System 
Adaptability 
Disordered Ordered 
Highly Flexible System Highly Stable System 
The 
Edge of Chaos 
System Classification 
1 = Auto-Adaptive 
2 = Operational Adaptive 
3 = Emergent Adaptive 
4 = Non-Adaptive 
 
1 2 3 4 4 3 2 
55 
 
3.5.1 Construct Validity 
In social science parlance, “construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences can be 
legitimately be made from the operationalizations in your study to the theoretical constructs on 
which those operationalizations were based (Trochim 2001, p. 64; Trochim 2006). The 
theoretical construct at issue in my study is administrative resilience, which I defined as the 
capacity of an administrative system to demonstrate the stability needed to maintain the 
effectiveness of the social, political and economic stability of the community in which it 
operates, and the flexibility needed to absorb the shock of the event, rapidly scale up response 
activities and adapt to the opportunities and constraints generated by conditions of uncertainty. 
This construct was based upon a review of the resilience literature (Bruneau et al. 2003; Bruneau 
and Tierney 2006; Comfort 1999; Gunderson et al. 2002; Wildavsky 1988).  
 According to Lee Cronback and Paul E. Meehl, “constructs may vary in nature from 
those very close to „pure description‟ (involving little more than extrapolation of relations among 
observation-variables) to highly theoretical constructs involving hypothesized entities and 
processes…” (Cronbach and Meehl 1955, p. 300). To evaluate the resilience of administrative 
systems, I developed and employed the framework of administrative resilience, which is an 
accurate description of the construct of resilience in the administrative context. As an exploratory 
framework, the framework for administrative resilience seeks to capture descriptively the process 
and structures of interaction, information exchange and information processing that promote 
adaption and self-organization in administrative systems.  
 A variety of methods can be employed to establish construct validity in quantitative 
studies that use independent and dependent variables to evaluate and test theories or models. 
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These methods include “interitem correlations, intertest correlations, test-"criterion" correlations, 
studies of stability over time, and stability under experimental intervention” (Cronbach and 
Meehl 1955, p. 300). Methods such as exploratory factorial analysis and confirmatory factorial 
analysis can also be used to establish construct validity (Thompson and Daniel 1996). One of the 
limitations of the present study is that I did not frame administrative resilience as a dependent 
variable for the purpose of hypothesis testing. As a result, I am unable to employ quantitative 
methods to establish construct validity. Future research will advance the construct of 
administrative resilience beyond “pure description” by framing it as a variable that can be 
measured and evaluated using positivistic techniques. 
 Construct validity also requires that the components and sub-components operationalized 
within my framework of administrative resilience represent an accurate reflection of the 
resilience in the administrative context. There are five reasons why this is the case. First, the 
organization of the framework is supported by the literature on non-traditional decision making, 
which indicates that there are seven specific conditions that promote effective decision making in 
uncertain environments (Axelrod and Cohen 2000; Gell-Mann 1994; Holland 1995; Hutchins 
1995; Klein 1999). Second, the theoretical premise of the framework is supported the literature 
on complex adaptive systems, which suggests that the non-linear nature of heterogeneous 
systems of interacting actors, from which emergent phenomenon arise, are difficult to model 
using linear methods of scientific inquiry (Miller and Page 2007). While not yet a computational 
model, in its current form, the framework of administrative resilience captures descriptively the 
factors that promote administrative adaptation and self-organization. Third, the components and 
sub-components identified in the framework of administrative resilience were developed using 
the growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on the subject of complexity and 
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resilience in administrative systems responsible for disaster management activities (Comfort 
1999; Comfort 2007; Mileti 1999; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). Indeed, research on the 
measurement and monitoring of risk and vulnerability has used many of the same indicators that 
are employed in the sub-components of the framework of administrative resilience, for example, 
levels of training, emergency response planning, availability of resources, and capacity for 
coordination (Birkmann 2006; Bruneau et al. 2003; Bruneau and Tierney 2006; Cardona 2007). 
Finally, the framework passed the “common-sense” check known as face validity, as a 
preliminary version of the framework was reviewed and approved for use in the study by a group 
of disaster management experts from Indonesia. 
3.5.2 Internal Validity 
The exploratory nature of this study also gave rise to concerns about internal validity. These 
concerns centered on issues related to selection bias. To ensure that data would be collected on 
the core system, as well as its constituent sub-systems, the selection of interview subjects was 
organized according to levels of jurisdiction, and took into account the differences between 
public, private and non-profit organizations. A list of potential interview subjects was generated 
during the review of the documentary source materials. This list was roughly balanced between 
international subjects and domestic subjects. In this sense, the selection of subjects was biased. 
There are two reasons why this study balanced the subjects in this fashion. First, the 
tsunami wrought such devastation that, in many areas, the wave destroyed the infrastructure 
designated for local and provincial actors. Consequently, domestic organizations were unable to 
coordinate a response (Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton 2006). Second, Indonesia responded to 
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the void in domestic authority by creating the “SuperSatkorlak, (the Provincial Coordinating 
Committee established for Aceh Province and supported by the Indonesian National Government 
in Jakarta) and the SuperSatlak (the Municipal Coordinating Committee established for the 
Municipality of Banda Aceh and supported by the Indonesian National Government in Jakarta)” 
(Comfort 2007). With authority to manage millions of tons of aid and billions of dollars worth of 
financial assistance, these committees ensured that many of the organizations present in the core 
administrative system were international, meaning they came from outside of Indonesia. 
A second concern about selection bias arose during the process of data collection. In 
some situations, the subjects that were initially selected were not available to participate in the 
study; the result of time constraints or the fact that the subjects were no longer in the country. 
When such a situation was encountered, replacement subjects were identified through the use of 
snowball techniques or though discussions with personal Indonesian contacts. Both situations 
created the potential for selection bias, which meant the data would not be representative of the 
system and sub-systems under analysis, but rather specific groups of closely related actors in 
those systems. Such concerns about bias were moderated by avoiding subjects that would result 
in oversampling and subjects that did not possess knowledge related to the focus of the study. 
3.5.3 External Validity 
The results generated in this study were also threatened by issues of external validity. The major 
issue was whether the sample of subjects that provided data was representative of the 
administrative system that operated in Indonesia. This problem was only partially related to the 
size of the sample, which was restricted due to financial and time constraints. Although I 
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collected data from a relatively small number of subjects, I also moderated the problem of non-
representative sampling by separating the semi-structured interview questions and the survey 
questions into two distinct areas of focus. The questions that fell into the first area of focus asked 
the subjects to report on the administrative system as a whole. The questions that fell into to the 
second area of focus asked the subjects to report on their specific organization, whether domestic 
or international in status. Organizing the focus of the instruments in this manner ensured that my 
analysis was representative of the administrative response system as a whole. 
3.5.4 General Issues of Reliability 
Questions about reliability consider the extent to which the methods and instruments employed 
by the study generate results that are dependable, lack distortion, or are free of measurement 
error (Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 642). Given the exploratory nature of the study, I was primarily 
concerned with generating results that were dependable, meaning “if [I] measure the same set of 
objects again … with the same or comparable measuring instrument, would [I] get the same or 
similar result” (Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 642)? The following sub-sections review the major 
issues of reliability relevant to my study and the steps I took to moderate these issues. 
3.5.4.1 Network Data 
There were various issues related to the reliability of the network data used in my study.  For 
example, it is often difficult to know whether the data collected for analysis is representative of 
the actual, “real world” network or just the perceived network (Borgatti, Carley, and Krackhardt 
2006; Kossinets 2006; Linton, Romney, and Freeman 1987). The network data used in my study 
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were susceptible to the constraints of missing and inaccurate data. While it would be almost 
impossible for me to have completely identified the “real-world” characteristics of the 
administrative system under consideration, I took a series of steps to ensure data reliability.  
First, I collected data from multiple sources to moderate concerns about selection bias, 
which ensured that my representation of the tsunami response system did not reflect the priorities 
of a single organization or a single jurisdictional level. Second, I cross-checked the organizations 
and interactions identified in one set of documentary sources with the organizations and 
interactions identified in the other sets of documentary sources to ensure that the events recorded 
in database actually occurred on the reported dates. If I was unable to identify a specific date for 
an activity using the documentary materials, I would attempt to locate the date using reports or 
news articles published on the internet. Third, if organizations or interactions were suspect, for 
instance, they could not be confirmed through cross-referencing or external searches, I would 
flag them for elimination from the database. Finally, I would identify and eliminate duplicate 
organizations and interactions from the database to prevent double-counting. 
3.5.4.2 Semi-Structured Interview Instrument 
I traveled to Indonesia to conduct semi-structured interviews for my study, and the majority of 
the interview subjects were Indonesian nationals. Such cross-cultural interviews present a litany 
of challenges, one of the most difficult being “the attribution of different meanings to the use of 
language” (Marshall and While 1994, p. 568). An example of such meaning confusion in the 
Indonesian context relates to the use of the word disaster. Prior to the Great Sumatran 
Earthquake and Tsunami, the manner in which Indonesians thought about, and prepared for, 
disaster differed from those in other countries. The pre-tsunami consensus in Indonesia was that 
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disasters were “acts of God,” for which preparation was impossible. The policy consequence of 
this perspective was that Indonesia‟s disaster management institutions were focused on response, 
often to the exclusion of prevention and mitigation activities. 
I implemented various procedures to moderate the threats e generated by cross-cultural 
interviews (Marshall and While 1994). First, I conducted the majority of the interviews with 
subjects who had a strong command of the English language. Second, when the interviews were 
conducted with subjects who only spoke a local language, I arranged to have an official from an 
Indonesian university to participate in the interview for the purposes of translation. Third, if there 
was confusion during an interview, for example, the subject had difficulty understanding a 
question, I would restate the question using a predetermined set of substitute words. If I had 
difficulty understanding a subject‟s response, I would request clarification. Throughout the entire 
interview process, I would probe the subject to “provide validation of the meaning of meaning of 
[words and concepts]” (Marshall and While 1994, p. 568). Finally, I recorded and transcribed 
each of the interviews, which were presented to the subjects for review and clarification. 
3.5.4.3 Survey Instrument 
Survey instruments must be designed to ensure consistency in the responses provided by the 
participants, not just within the survey instrument itself, but also in the event that the survey is 
administered multiple times (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). I took the following steps to 
ensure data reliability. First, to ensure that the organizations that participated in the system and 
sub-system were adequately represented, I selected the survey subjects through purposeful 
sampling. When, purposeful sampling was ineffective, due to the unavailability of the potential 
subject or time constraints, I relied upon snowball sampling. Second, I standardized the survey 
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instrument to overcome problems related to the heterogeneity of the potential subjects. Third, to 
overcome linguistic difficulties, I drafted the survey instrument using neutral language. 
The nested case study design and research methods discussed throughout this chapter 
provide researchers with the means to investigate the presence of resilience in administrative 
systems. As discussed in the opening sections of this chapter, I elected to use this study to 
examine the resilience of an administrative system that had been placed under significant stress 
and had demonstrated the capacity to adapt and self-organize after a disruptive event. The system 
that I selected for examination was administrative response system that operated in Indonesia 
after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004. The subsequent chapter 
explains why this particular administrative system was selected for analysis. 
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4.0  INDONESIA AS A FIELD STUDY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RESILIENCE 
The methods outlined in the preceding chapter provide a framework for the analysis of resilient 
administrative systems. To adequately address the theoretical and research questions posed by 
this study, I needed to identify a field study of an administrative system that not only operated in 
uncertain conditions, but also demonstrated the capacity to adapt and self-organize after a 
disruptive event. I selected the system that operated in Indonesia following the Great Sumatran 
Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004, an event that caused tremendous damage to life 
and property and generated an expansive international response. While this disaster had an 
impact on many countries, I focused on Indonesia because it large and heterogeneous country. 
While subject to significant domestic debate, Indonesia‟s territory is comprised of more 
than 17,000 distinct islands, 3,000 of which are inhabited (Bresnan 2005). Equally interesting is 
the fact that Indonesia‟s official national language is Bahasa Indonesia, yet its citizens represent 
more than more than three hundred distinct ethnic groups and speak more than seven hundred 
distinct languages (Grimes et al. 2005). After the tsunami, Indonesia‟s disaster management 
system, which suffered substantial disruptions, was replaced by a system that lacked formal 
administrative structure. The critical question is how did this system manage the uncertainty? 
This chapter demonstrates how the physical events generated by the earthquake and tsunami of 
26 December 2004 interacted with Indonesia‟s social environment to create the complex set of 
initial conditions within which the administrative response system had to emerge and operate. 
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4.1 WHY SELECT INDONESIA AS A FIELD STUDY? 
Disasters the scale of the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami are not regular occurrences, 
but when they do occur, such events often contain a silver lining. They provide humans with the 
opportunity to stretch their imaginations and to learn from their mistakes (Clarke 2006). In the 
interest of learning from past mistakes, this chapter reviews the reasons why the administrative 
response system that operated in Indonesia after the December 2004 was appropriate as a field 
study for the analysis of resilience. In describing these reasons, the chapter also provides the 
contextual background needed to understand one of the largest disaster events in recorded 
history. Importantly, the discussion identifies the set of initial conditions that serve as a baseline 
for the evaluation of a system that seemed to have adapted and self-organized in response to the 
opportunities and constraints present in an uncertain post-disaster environment. 
4.1.1 Indonesia’s Susceptibility and Vulnerability to Disaster 
Indonesia‟s geographic location and social diversity make the country susceptible to a wide 
variety of hazards, and it is extremely vulnerable to the consequences of disaster. Located at the 
intersection of five major tectonic plates, Indonesia is one of the most seismically active regions 
of the world. The islands that give the country its distinctive character undergo constant 
transformation, being continuously shaped and reshaped by earthquakes, landslides, volcanic 
explosions, floods and tsunamis. In part, Indonesia‟s geological character has also shaped the 
social and cultural development of its people. Although Indonesia has more than 230 million 
citizens, its population is extremely diverse, and is comprised of multiple ethnicities, languages, 
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religions and cultures. For Indonesians, the threat of disaster is ever-present. The question for 
Indonesian policy makers is not whether a natural or man-made disaster will occur, but when. 
After the earthquake and tsunami of 2004, the Indonesian government released the 
National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction, which initiated a national policy response to the 
risks of disaster. This document indicates that Indonesia would adopt the comprehensive 
approach to disaster management advocated by the Hyogo Framework for Action (Republic of 
Indonesia 2006). In doing so, the government recognized that the following items “may interact 
to cause disasters: a) natural and man-made disasters [caused by] geological hazards, hydro-
meteorological hazards, biological hazards, technological hazards and environmental 
degradation; b) the high vulnerability of communities, infrastructure and elements in … disaster 
prone-areas; and c) the low capacity of elements within the community” (Republic of Indonesia 
2006). This comprehensive approach was necessary, given the range of natural and social 
hazards that exist in Indonesia. The following sub-sections review some of these hazards and 
provide some basic statistics about the consequences of disasters in Indonesia prior to 2004. 
4.1.1.1 Natural Disaster Hazards 
Indonesia is highly susceptible to natural disasters, given its location along the seismically active 
zone known as the “ring of fire.” Complicating the problem is the social diversity of Indonesia‟s 
large and heterogeneous population, large portions of which live in high-risk urban and coastal 
areas. The risk increases when events generated by Indonesia‟s physical environment interact 
with its social environment. In its National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction, Indonesia has 
identified the various natural hazards that exist in Indonesia. Some of the most significant 
hazards include: earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, floods, landslides, drought, wildfire, 
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and disease (Republic of Indonesia 2006). Of interest to this study are tsunami events, which are 
defined as “an abnormally long wavelength wave most commonly produced by sudden 
displacement of water in response to sudden fault movement on the seafloor” (Hyndman and 
Hyndman 2009). Interestingly, tsunamis are a regular occurrence in Indonesia. For example, 
between the years 1600 and 2000, the islands of Indonesia were struck by an estimated 106 
tsunami (Latief H., N.T. Puspito, and F. Imamura 2000). 
4.1.1.2 Man-Made Disaster Events 
Indonesia‟s National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction also indicates that the government must 
respond to technological disasters and social unrest, both of which threaten the livelihood of 
Indonesians (Republic of Indonesia 2006). The civil conflict that existed in Aceh at the time of 
the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami had seriously weakened the capacity of public 
agencies to respond to the demands generated by the disaster. While the source of the conflict 
has been lost in a fragmented historical record and constantly evolving political circumstances, 
some frame the conflict as one of political resistance. From this perspective, the Acehnese sought 
to acquire greater political and economic autonomy from the central government, which they 
believe had systematically exploited the natural resources found in the region (Davies 2006; 
Drexler 2008; Reid 2006). Others have frame the conflict as one of religious self-determination, 
where the local populations wanted to preserve their Islamic character through the 
implementation of Shari‟ah law. For the purpose of this study, the source of the conflict is 
irrelevant. What matters is that the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami devastated 
communities that had already experienced more than thirty years of conflict. Pushing regions of 
Aceh beyond administrative collapse, the event made a difficult situation even worse. 
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4.1.1.3 Disaster Events and Consequences 
The hazards identified above indicate that Indonesians live under a significant risk of disaster. 
Precisely quantifying the level of risk, and the extent to which the risk has evolved, is difficult, 
given that the collection of data on Indonesian disasters has only recently become a government 
priority. It is possible to estimate these trends using data contained in the EM-DAT database on 
natural and technological disasters, which includes data on world disaster events from 1900 to 
present. This section reviews the major disaster events that occurred in Indonesia between 1983 
and 2003, the two decades that preceded the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami. The 
dates, names and categories of these events are reported in Appendix F. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Disaster Statistics for Indonesia: 1983 – 2003 
 
 
 Number Deaths Immediately Affected 
Total 
Affected Injured Homeless 
Costs 
(000’) US$ 
1983 9 161 433415 433532 117 0 183197 
1984 10 363 375950 396147 197 20000 2500 
1985 6 52 15378 15385 7 0 0 
1986 7 318 578700 628700 0 50000 0 
1987 10 459 72651 74686 235 1800 71700 
1988 5 229 109070 111570 0 2500 4600 
1989 7 144 93285 98994 209 5500 341 
1990 7 280 40405 40576 171 0 14900 
1991 12 524 278679 279878 199 1000 47000 
1992 4 2632 46330 402157 0 104345 105400 
1993 4 134 271005 271017 12 0 19301 
1994 15 609 3580795 3594156 2031 11330 195921 
1995 8 239 304015 352104 2404 45685 50400 
1996 9 402 849969 868514 455 18090 567830 
1997 6 1130 1102805 1103175 370 0 8089100 
1998 7 1490 144775 147613 88 2750 1500000 
1999 8 162 34645 37567 222 2700 5700 
2000 16 573 752656 816949 3148 61145 241106 
2001 10 587 92500 122116 16 29600 20000 
2002 15 290 607682 609377 1695 0 351600 
2003 17 534 687506 688007 361 140 4961 
TOTAL 192 11312 10472216 11092220 263419 356585 11475557 
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The data presented in Table 4 indicates that disaster events have taken a large toll on 
Indonesia. In just two decades, Indonesia experienced at least 192 major natural disasters. While 
distributed throughout Indonesia‟s archipelago, these events have caused tremendous suffering 
for those who were directly and indirectly affected. Indeed, the data indicate that, of the 
Indonesians that were directly affect by disaster, over 11,000 were killed, over 250,000 were 
injured, and more than 350,000 required shelter due to the loss of their homes and livelihoods. 
The consequences these events are troubling. Between 1983 and 2003, the number of 
Indonesians affected by disaster exceeded eleven million, and the costs of these disasters 
exceeded eleven billion dollars. Clearly, disasters place a heavy burden on the Indonesian nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Total Number of Disaster Events in Indonesia: 1983 – 2003 
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The concern is that both the frequency and consequences of Indonesian disaster events 
will increase. The data contained within the EM-DAT database confirm that such a trend actually 
began in the early 1980s. For example, from 1983 through 2003, there were a total of 192 
reported disaster events, the majority of which were the result of seismic activity or flooding. 
The data also indicate that there were only 9 reported natural disaster events in 1983. By 2003, 
the number of annual disaster events had increased to 17, the highest number reported for the 
period under observation. What is most revealing is that the four year period between 2000 and 
2003 was particularly active, during which 58 disasters occurred. This period accounts for thirty 
percent of all the natural disasters that occurred in Indonesia between 1983 and 2003. The linear 
trend line presented in Figure 4 indicates that the number of Indonesian disasters increased 
steadily from 1983 through 2003. 
As the population of Indonesia continues to expand in future decades, the number of 
disasters, the number of Indonesians affected by disasters, and the costs imposed upon 
Indonesian society by disasters, will also increase. Indeed, as indicated in Figure 5, such a 
pattern already exists. In terms of the yearly cost of disasters, the most costly year for 
Indonesian‟s occurred in 1997, when the fires in Sumatra Province and Kalimantan Province 
caused more than eight billion dollars of damage. While the fires represent an extreme case, the 
financial costs that Indonesians have to pay for disasters continue to rise. Between 1983 and 
1994, the total annual cost of disaster only exceeded one hundred million dollars on two years. 
This is in stark contrast to the decade between 1994 and 2003, in which there were five years 
where the total annual costs of disasters in Indonesia exceeded two hundred million dollars.  
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Figure 5: Estimated Yearly Costs (000’ US$) Due to Disasters in Indonesia: 1983-2003 
 
 
 
The conflict in Aceh was also costly. According to Peiter Feith, who reviewed the Aceh 
peace process, reported that the conflict in Aceh was one of Asia‟s oldest conflicts (Feith 2007). 
While there is a growing literature that explores the human costs of this conflict, it fails to 
identify with any specificity the number of combatants and non-combatants killed between 1975 
and 2004. The number of deaths that is most frequently mentioned is 15,000 (Feith 2007). 
Although the precise number of lives lost will be disputed by scholars in the future, what cannot 
be disputed is that conflict isolated the Acehnese. For instance, the Indonesian government, in its 
desire to manage the conflict area, restricted the media and non-governmental organizations from 
accessing the Province. The government also placed restrictions on the Acehnese, who could not 
own a radio or cell phone without official permission. The Acehnese went about their lives 
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
8000000
9000000
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
Es
tm
at
e
d
 Y
e
ar
ly
 C
o
st
 (
0
0
0
' U
S)
71 
 
trapped between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) and the Armed 
Forces of Indonesia, now known as Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Consequently, the 
Acehnese knew little about events outside their communities, and the international community 
knew little about events that transpired inside Aceh. 
4.1.2 Indonesia’s Perspective on Disaster Management 
Prior to the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami, Indonesia‟s governments and communities 
lacked a comprehensive understanding of the risks generated by disaster events. The 
conventional wisdom was that disasters were “acts of God,” often a punishment imposed upon a 
community for its past transgressions. This perspective led Indonesians to believe that their 
communities were unable to prepare for disasters, and more importantly, that there was little if 
anything that could be done to prevent disasters. Given this premise, the Indonesian government 
had few formal mechanisms for disaster management in place in 2004. Only when a disaster 
actually occurred, would Indonesian policy makers mobilize resources to conduct response 
operations. Equally difficult was the fact that Indonesian citizens did not recognize or understand 
disaster risks such as those generated by tsunamis. For instance, many who lived in the coastal 
communities that were struck by the tsunami did not know that they should move towards higher 
ground after the earthquake. The lack of awareness about the risks generated by disaster resulted 
in the development of an administrative system in Indonesia that was better prepared to respond 
to small disasters, such as fires and floods, than large, multi-jurisdictional disasters.  
The events of 26 December of 2004 caught Indonesian policy makers unprepared. 
Focused primarily on the development of Indonesia‟s political and economic institutions, policy 
makers had yet to embrace the comprehensive notion of disaster management, which assumes 
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that disaster consequences can be reduced through pre-event planning in areas related to 
mitigation, preparation, response and recovery. Rather, Indonesia‟s governmental institutions 
would simply respond to disaster events within their particular areas of responsibility. The legal 
and regulatory structures in place in Indonesia when the tsunami came ashore reflected this 
perception. Prior to December of 2004, legislation that addressed disaster issues within Indonesia 
was not integrated into a coherent policy, but rather, was distributed across a diversity of 
individual acts, for example, Act No. 6 / 1974 on the Basic Arrangement of Social Welfare; Act 
No. 23 / 1992 on Health; Act No. 24 / 1992 on Spatial Planning; Act No. 2 / 2002 on Police 
Institution; and Act No. 3 / 2002 on State Defense (Bannon, Andrade, and Abai 2006; Siahaan 
2006). Summaries of these and other relevant pieces of legislation are provided in Appendix G. 
A review of this legislation indicates the degree of incongruence in Indonesian disaster 
management policy prior to the tsunami. At a general level, Indonesia‟s laws and regulations 
created the potential for institutional confusion over issues of disaster management. The 
country‟s legal structure had no unified definition of disaster. Instead, the legislation would make 
reference to specific categories of disaster, including floods, earthquakes or disease. More often, 
the legislation would refer to “social or natural disasters,” but did not elucidate the specific types 
of events for which the government and communities should prepare. Equally important, the 
legislation did not identify the institutions that would execute these responsibilities, while 
referring to either the Indonesian government or Indonesian communities as the stakeholders 
who possessed the responsibility to respond to disasters. So, with whom did the responsibility for 
disaster management reside? Was it with the central government, or given Indonesia‟s emphasis 
on decentralization, did the responsibility fall upon officials at the regency or district levels? 
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Even if specific institutions were identified, in many instances, the processes by which their 
responsibilities were to be carried out were not (Bannon, Andrade, and Abai 2006). 
While efforts had been taken to clarify Indonesia‟s disaster management policy, 
constraints prevented the adoption of the necessary legislation (National Coordinating Board for 
Disaster Management and Internally Displaced People Affairs 2004). These constraints fell into 
two primary categories. First, given the range of issues before the Indonesian Parliament prior to 
the tsunami, disaster management reform was not considered an issue of national priority 
(National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management and Internally Displaced People Affairs 
2004). Second, even had it been a national priority, there remained the challenge of determining 
how to draft legalization that would weave together the patchwork Indonesia‟s disaster 
management laws, many of which were vague and only indirectly relevant to the issue (National 
Coordinating Board for Disaster Management and Internally Displaced People Affairs 2004). 
4.1.3 Indonesia’s Disaster Management System 
The patchwork system of laws and regulations did not mean that the Indonesian government was 
ignorant of the threats posed by disasters. At the very least, these laws and regulations 
demonstrated that the Indonesian government had acknowledged that disasters could have 
detrimental political, social and economic effects. The Indonesian government admitted to the 
participants to the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Management that efforts had been made 
to pass legislation that would effectively regulate disaster management issues, but political 
difficulties had prevented its development (National Coordinating Board for Disaster 
Management and Internally Displaced People Affairs 2004). The largest pre-tsunami issue was 
that BAKORNAS PBP, the organization responsible for disaster management in Indonesia at the 
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time of the tsunami, was at most an ad hoc coordinating body which lacked the legal and 
budgetary authority to direct and formulate disaster management policy throughout the county. 
The institutional framework behind Indonesia‟s disaster management system first 
emerged in 1979; when President Suharto issued Presidential Decree No. 28 in 1979 and 
established BAKORNAS PBA as the country‟s central disaster management agency. Directly 
answerable to the President of Indonesia, BAKORNAS PBA was designed to operate as a 
coordinating board. This board had three specific responsibilities: 1) to formulate the policies 
and guidelines needed for the effective coordination of natural disaster management activities; 2) 
to formulate the national government‟s natural disaster management program; and 3) to direct 
the natural disaster management activities at the provincial and district levels (Siahaan 2006). 
Over the next thirty years, BAKORNAS PBA underwent three additional structural 
changes. In 1990, President Suharto issued Presidential Decree No. 43, which changed the 
institution‟s name to BAKORNAS PB and brought the military into the arrangement. In 1999, 
President Megawati issued Presidential Decree No. 106, which expanded the institution‟s 
responsibilities beyond natural disasters to include events caused by social unrest and human 
activity. President Megawati also expanded the board membership to include 13 ministers and 
provincial governors. The institution was restructured again in 2001, when the Coordinating 
Minister for the People‟s Welfare was assigned to be the Deputy Chairman of what became 
BAKORNAS PBP (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penangulangan Bencana Dan Penanganan 
Pengungai), also known as the National Coordination Board for Disaster Management. 
Although these changes situated BAKORNAS PBP as Indonesia‟s principal disaster 
management institution, it was primarily a coordinating body amongst a community of powerful 
line ministries. This meant that BAKORNAS PBP suffered from two primary limitations. First, 
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BAKORNAS PBP did not possess the power to implement policy at the national level. Rather, 
BAKORNAS PBP could only coordinate, but not direct, the activities of the line ministries. 
Second, and even more problematic, was that BAKORNAS PBP was constrained by a lack of 
budgetary support. So, while the Indonesian President had charged BAKORNAS PBP with the 
responsibility to develop a comprehensive strategy for disaster management that included polices 
for preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery, it could do little, if anything, to prepare 
Indonesia for the event that would occur in just under three years time. 
From an administrative perspective, BAKORNAS PBP could be separated into horizontal 
and vertical governance structures. The horizontal component of Indonesia‟s disaster 
management system in October of 2004, as reported by the Indonesian government to the 2005 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction, was comprised of national level ministers and officials 
(National Coordinating Board for Disaster Management and Internally Displaced People Affairs 
2004). The actors that comprised the structure of BAKORNAS PBP, as identified by Presidential 
Decree No. 111 of 2001, is provided in Figure 6. BAKORNAS PBP was designed to be a “non-
structural” organization which would meet following a disaster event, receive orders directly 
from the President of the Republic of Indonesia, and coordinate the government‟s response 
activities. The responsibilities of BAKORNAS PBP were actually much broader, and according 
to a report written for the Asian Disaster Reduction Center included: 1) the formulation of 
national disaster management policies and strategies; 2) the coordination and implementation of 
disaster management activities before, during and post-disaster; and 3) the rendering of guidance 
and directives on policies related to the management of disaster prevention, mitigation, response, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts (Triutomo 2003). 
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Chairman: Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia 
Vice Chairman / Director: Coordinating Minister of People‟s Welfare 
Members: Minister of Home Affairs 
 Minister of Social Affairs 
 Minister of Health 
 Minister of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure 
 Minister of Communications 
 Chief Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces 
 Chief Commander of Police 
 Governor of Affected Areas 
Secretary: Secretary of the Vice President 
 
 
Figure 6: Horizontal Structure of BAKORNAS PBP, October 2004 
 
 
 
The vertical component of BAKORNAS PBP delineated disaster related responsibilities 
among the jurisdictional levels. At the provincial level was the SATKORLAK, the non-structural 
body responsible for coordination activities with the jurisdiction, as well as the execution of 
tasks directed by BAKORNAS PBP. The SATKORLAK was typically chaired by the provincial 
governor. At the district level was the SATLAK, which was the non-structural body responsible 
for coordination activities within the jurisdiction, as well as the execution of tasks directed by the 
SATKORLAK. The SATLAK was designed to operate at the municipal level, and was often 
chaired by either the district head or the mayor of a local community. At the sub-district level 
were the SATGAS task forces, responsible for carrying out previously planned disaster response 
activities. These task forces were also responsible for the execution of the activities that were 
directed by the chair of the SATLAK. 
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At the time of the tsunami, the SATKORLAK and SATLAK were the primary bodies 
responsible for the design and implementation of disaster management plans and policies at the 
provincial, district and municipal levels. Indonesia‟s laws actually encouraged governors and 
mayors to design their disaster management structures as they saw fit (Presidential Decree No. 3 
of 2001). Yet since the national government had not emphasized disaster issues, disaster 
management activities were not a policy priority for many of Indonesia‟s local communities. The 
limitations of this administrative structure became clear after the earthquake and tsunami. In 
Aceh, for example, the event devastated the capital city, and disrupted the capacity of both the 
SATKORLAK and SATLAK to function in the post-disaster environment. 
4.1.4 Indonesia’s Disaster Management System in Disaster 
The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 disrupted the administrative systems that 
were responsible for disaster management activities in Indonesia and destroyed many of the 
offices, personnel and resources that communities had to initiate response activities. Due to the 
character of the disaster, the national government, particularly BAKORNAS PBP, found that 
they did not possess the administrative capacity needed to fill the void. Reports indicate that it 
took officials in Jakarta a several days to comprehend what had happened and to decide to open 
the affected regions to the international community (Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton 2006). 
4.1.4.1 Characteristics of the Disaster 
The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 are considered to be distinct, but 
interdependent geologic events, which generated the uncertain conditions that undermined 
decision making in the administrative system that operated in the post-disaster environment. 
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Earthquake 
The earthquake that occurred on the morning of 26 December 2004 was located off the western 
coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. While this region had a long record of seismic activity, the 
earthquake occurred in a fault region that had not been particularly active during the preceding 
forty years (Hudnut 2006). Known as the Sunda Mega-Thrust Plate Boundary, this fault zone 
separates two massive tectonic plates, the Indo-Australian Plate and the Eurasian Plate. The 
Indo-Australian plate is in constant motion, and creeps northward at a rate of approximately 40 
to 50 mm / year (Lay et al. 2005). The region‟s lack of recent seismic activity meant that 
scientists did not consider it as particularly dangerous for ruptures that would generate tsunamis.  
According to Hiroo Kanamori (2006), a seismologist from the California Institute of 
Technology, the duration of the earthquake was more than eight minutes, and generated one of 
the largest seismic events ever recorded. The fault rupture began at “3.3°N, 96.0°E, at a depth of 
about 30 km, and then moved north at a speed of 2.5 km/s for a distance of 1200 to 1300 km 
(Ammon et al. 2005; Lay et al. 2005). In some areas, the slip distribution of the plates was 
extensive, with estimates that range from between ten and twenty-three meters (Ammon et al. 
2005; Tanioka et al. 2006). This disruption heaved large sections of the ocean floor upward, 
which in some areas is estimated at approximately 10 meters (Ghobarah, Saatcioglu, and Nistor 
2006). The energy released during this rupture, with a moment magnitude scale of 9.2, was 
enormous (Kanamori 2006). To place the size of this earthquake into perspective, the United 
States Geological Survey (2005) estimates that the earthquake was equivalent to the detonation 
of 474 megatons of TNT, which is roughly the same as 23,000 Nagasaki sized atomic bombs. 
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Tsunami 
Prior to 2004, concerns about tsunamis were directed towards regions south of Sumatra (Hudnut 
2006). Yet the movement of the tectonic plates on the morning of 26 December 2004 displaced a 
large column of water, pushing it up towards the surface. The resulting tsunami waves quickly 
spread throughout the Indian Ocean, and were eventually detected around the globe (Titov et al. 
2005). Charles G. Groat, Director of the United States Geological Survey, made the following 
statement to the Committee on Science for the United States House of Representatives: 
“A great deal of that energy was transferred to the Indian Ocean‟s 
waters and ultimately to its surrounding shores. Along the length 
of the rupture, the seafloor was jolted upward by as much as 15 
feet, lifting trillions of gallons of sea water – a volume more than 
30 times that of the Great Salt Lake – and generating a tsunami 
that swept both east, inundating the coast of Sumatra, Thailand and 
Burma, and west, crossing the open ocean at hundreds of miles per 
hour on its way to the coasts of India, Sri Lanka, and eventually 
eastern Africa” (United States House of Representatives 2005, pp. 
2-3). 
 
The scope of the consequences generated by the tsunami made it the Indian Ocean 
region‟s first true multi-national disaster. The countries impacted most severely, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, India, the Maldives and Thailand, were victims of their geographic location. The speed 
and size of the tsunami made the event unique. The tsunami traveled across the Indian Ocean at 
speeds in excess of 500 km/h (Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton 2006), and when the wave came 
ashore, for instance in Lhoknga and Banda Aceh, Indonesia, it exceeded heights of 30 meters and 
9 meters, respectively (Borrero, Synolakis, and Fritz 2006). The tsunami also came as a complete 
surprise to those affected. In many communities, there was less than fifteen minutes between the 
earthquake and the impact of the tsunami. In other areas, the lack of awareness in communities 
about the threats posed by tsunami increased the losses (McAdoo et al. 2006). 
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4.1.4.2 Consequences of the Disaster 
The earthquake and tsunami events of 26 December 2004 were also unique because of the 
consequences they generated. Although the final costs of the disaster will never be known, these 
events inflicted significant damage to Indonesia‟s population and infrastructure. 
Impact to Population 
The morning of 26 December 2004 began like almost any other, with families going about their 
daily affairs, fishermen working the coasts, and communities gathering on the beach for holiday 
festivities. After the shaking generated by the earthquake stopped, many people ran out into the 
streets. Others focused their attention on freeing the victims who had become trapped in the 
rubble. Lacking awareness and an integrated tsunami warning system, those who lived along the 
coast had no idea that the receding coastal waters meant that a tsunami was rapidly approaching 
their communities. The extent to which these communities were unprepared for disasters caused 
by tsunamis is revealed by statistics collected from the countries affected by the event. 
According to the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Synthesis Report, the countries that were 
the most affected by the tsunami were Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and the Maldives 
Islands, with a total of 227,000 deaths and 1.7 million displaced persons (Telford, Cosgrave, and 
Houghton 2006, p. 16). The statistics for Indonesia were particularly troubling. By the end of 
January 2004, officials had reported 110,229 deaths, the majority of which were located in the 
city of Banda Aceh, the capital of the Aceh Province (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 5). These numbers are especially high, given that at the time 
of the tsunami, there were approximately 4.4 million people living in Aceh, of which 50% were 
affected by the disaster (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 
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13). A massive number of people were also displaced from their homes. Government estimates at 
the time indicated that 600,000 and 700,000 Indonesians would need some form of government 
assistance (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 9; Telford, 
Cosgrave, and Houghton 2006, p. 59). The consequences of the tsunami exacerbated the 
humanitarian issues that already existed in the Aceh, and made clear that external intervention 
would be needed to stabilize the situation and to facilitate disaster response activities. 
Impact to Infrastructure 
The event also destroyed large sections of Indonesia‟s infrastructure, particularly in Aceh. The 
dual nature of the disaster event meant that the damage was not limited to the coast. Rather, the 
earthquake destroyed infrastructure throughout the island of Sumatra. According to Indonesia‟s 
Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment, “damage and losses to infrastructure totaled Rp. 8.2 
trillion and were dominated by the damage to the transportation [system] (61% of total impact) 
and irrigation, flood control and coastal protection [systems] (25%), with 7.7% in energy 
[systems], 3.4% in water and sanitation [systems], and 2.5% in communication [systems]” 
(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 32). 
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Table 5: Total Damage Estimates Across all Infrastructure Sectors (US$ Million) 
 
 
 
Total Impact Property 
 
Damage Losses Total Private Public 
Social Sectors 1,674.9 65.8 1,740.7 1,440.6 300.1 
  Housing 1,398.3 38.8 1,437.1 1,408.4 28.7 
  Education 110.8 17.6 128.4 9.0 119.4 
  Health 82.5 9.4 91.9 23.2 68.6 
  Culture and Religion 83.4 - 83.4 - 83.4 
Infrastructure 636.0 240.8 876.8 325.9 550.8 
  Transport 390.5 145.4 535.9 165.8 370.1 
  Communications 18.9 2.9 21.8 8.6 13.2 
  Energy 67.8 0.1 67.9 1.1 66.9 
  Water and Sanitation 26.6 3.2 29.8 18.3 11.4 
  Flood Control, Irrigation, Protection 132.1 89.1 221.2 132.1 89.1 
Productive Sectors 351.9 830.2 1,182.1 1,132.0 50.1 
  Agriculture and Livestock 83.9 140.9 224.8 194.7 29.9 
  Fisheries 101.5 409.4 510.9 508.5 2.5 
  Enterprises 166.6 280.0 446.6 428.9 17.7 
Cross Sectoral 257.7 394.4 652.0 562.9 89.1 
  Environment 154.5 - 154.4 548.9 N/A 
  Governance and Administration 89.1 - 89.1 - 89.1 
  Bank and Finance 14.0 - 14.0 14.0 N/A 
Total Impact 2,920.5 1,531.2 4,451.6 3,461.4 990.1 
 
 
 
The total estimated cost of the damage inflicted to Indonesian infrastructure was reported 
by Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (hereafter BAPPENAS), Indonesia‟s State 
National Planning Development Agency and the World Bank. These estimates are presented in 
Table 5, which indicate that the damage was distributed across a wide variety of infrastructure 
sectors. Indonesia‟s Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment Report separates these data into 
their component elements, which are provided in Table 6 (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 33). Four categories of infrastructure deserve specific 
attention. The first category is transportation infrastructure, where “19% of the primary roads, 
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46% of bridges and over 50% of the secondary roads were impacted in the affected area” (Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 35). 
 
 
 
Table 6: Damage within Each Sector (Rp. Billion) 
 
 
 
Total Impact Property Damages Losses Public Private 
Transport 4,984 3,632 1,352 3,442 1,542 
  Roads 1,735 1,576 159 1,635 100 
  Land Transport 2,944 1,803 1,142 1,503 1,442 
  Ports 259 237 22 259 0 
  Airports 46 17 29 46 0 
Water and Sanitation 276 247 29 106 170 
  Water Supply 267 238 29 97 170 
  Sanitation 9 9 N/A 9 0 
Energy 632 631 1 622 10 
  Electric Power 500 500 N/A 500 0 
  Petroleum 132 131 1 122 10 
Communications 203 176 27 123 80 
  Telecommunications 194 167 27 114 80 
  Postal Services 9 9 0 9 0 
Flood Control / Irrigation 2,058 1,230 829 1,229 829 
  Irrigation 542 543 120 542 0 
  Flood Control 1,355 687 829 709 829 
Total 8,153 5,916 2,238 5,522 2,631 
 
 
 
Equally problematic was the disruption of transportation facilities; where all 19 port 
facilities in the region suffered damage, as well as 4 of the region‟s 7 major airports. The second 
category is communication infrastructure, where large portions of the fixed and cellular phone 
services were disrupted, which constrained communications. The third category is water and 
sanitation infrastructure, where both urban and rural systems suffered substantial damage. For 
instance, while urban systems were stressed by disruptions in its purification and distribution 
networks, only about 9% of those who lived in Aceh received water through such networks 
(Scawthorn et al. 2006). The rest of the population received water from other sources, and 
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estimates suggest that all affected region‟s wells and hand pumps were damaged or contaminated 
(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, pp. 34 & 47). 
While not reported in Table 6, the final category relates to the damage inflicted to the 
housing infrastructure, which explains the extremely high numbers of displaced persons (Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, pp. 33). In December of 2004, there 
were approximately 820,000 buildings located in the affected districts, of which 151,600 or 19% 
suffered “an average of about 50% damage,” while an additional 127,000 or 14% were totally 
destroyed (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional and World Bank 2005, p. 26). Clearly, 
the damage inflicted to Indonesian society and infrastructure created substantial difficulties, not 
just for those who lived in affected communities, but also for the organizations that would 
participate in the administrative system responsible for disaster response activities. 
4.1.5 Indonesia’s Capacity to Adapt in Uncertain Conditions 
In the hours immediately following the earthquake and tsunami, Indonesia‟s domestic response 
system government did not have the administrative capacity to formulate an effective response to 
the disaster. The problems experienced in the post-tsunami environment reflected the destruction 
of communication and transportation infrastructures, the loss of governmental offices and 
resources, and most importantly, the loss of governmental personnel. The destruction was so vast 
that the local governments, especially those located in Aceh, were simply unable to function. 
Under the disaster management laws that existed at the time of the tsunami, Indonesia‟s 
national military was charged with the responsibility to initiate disaster relief efforts, including 
the establishment of camps that would provide assistance to those affected by the disaster. Also 
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affected by the earthquake and tsunami, the TNI suffered damage to its equipment and personnel. 
Further, as a consequence of the conflict in Aceh, local populations looked upon the TNI with 
distrust, and were generally unwilling to receive assistance from Indonesian officials, military or 
otherwise (Comfort 2007). Faced with a deteriorating situation, the Indonesian government 
quickly recognized that it had to do something to avoid an even larger crisis. 
 After rejecting offers of assistance from the international community, President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, who had only been in office for three months, opened Aceh to external 
assistance. In making this decision, the Indonesian government accepted the requirement that 
response operations would be executed in accordance with United Nations guidelines. These 
guidelines set the conditions within which the response would unfold, ensuring that operations 
would be easier to manage. These operational boundaries, in conjunction with the inundation of 
international organizations, helped to release the burdens placed on domestic organizations. 
 The disruption of the administrative system that was responsible for disaster management 
in Indonesia prior to the tsunami meant that the domestic and international organizations had to 
respond to the disaster in an ad hoc and unscripted manner. Compounding a litany of already 
existing problems, when the response organizations arrived on scene, they lacked base-line 
information about the affected communities, mechanisms for information exchange, relevant 
operational procedures, and operational plans that would facilitate coordination. The 
heterogeneous system of response organizations had to learn how to coordinate activities 
vertically, across jurisdictional levels, and horizontally, across organizational sectors. Response 
organizations also had to develop innovative solutions to problems without resorting to the 
consensus-based processes of policy making that permeated Indonesia‟s political institutions. 
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These conditions indicate that the administrative system that emerged to operate in 
Indonesia after the 2004 Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami represents a relevant case for the 
examination of administrative resilience. While the response organizations had to conduct their 
operations in an environment that was constrained by uncertainty, they managed to create an 
administrative system of unprecedented size, diversity, flexibility and capacity. More 
importantly, supported by the contributions of a generous international community, and the 
willingness of the Indonesian government to support their activities, the response organizations 
demonstrated the capacity to adapt and self-organize during the month after the tsunami. In just a 
manner of weeks, these response organizations established one of the largest disaster relief 
operations in history. The subsequent chapters of this study evaluate the resilience of this 
administrative system by examining its composition, growth and structural evolution during the 
twenty-two days that followed the earthquake and tsunami. 
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5.0  COMPOSITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
“Were they prepared to respond to what happened in Aceh? Probably not. Would anybody have 
been? I think it was an exceptional event. Did they respond effectively? Yes. Yes. They 
responded very effectively and very rapidly. After the first 48 hours of going, „we don‟t know 
what has happened‟” (Respondent 17 2009). This statement, provided by an official who worked 
in an international organization, indicates that after a brief period of shock, the administrative 
system that operated in Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami quickly 
coalesced and began to organize a response to the devastating event. While this conclusion is 
widely accepted among disaster management practitioners (Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton 
2006), there is little empirical data that actually tracks the development of this administrative 
response system. Chapter five addresses the research question: to what extent did the 
organizations that conducted operations in Indonesia after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and 
Tsunami of 26 December 2004 facilitate the development of the administrative response system? 
This analysis explored four sub-questions. First, what was the system‟s size and composition? 
Second, at what rate did organizations enter the system? Third, what was the system‟s rate of 
growth? Finally, what was the nature of the transactions that occurred in the system? 
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5.1 COMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The administrative system that operated in Indonesia after the tsunami was large and complex. In 
describing this system, an official recalled that, “during the relief, emergency relief and response, 
actually I think it was quite chaotic. And uh, yes, there were numerous organizations from 
overseas and the rest of Indonesia, who came with the idea of helping out, trying to support, and 
creating disaster relief and all that (Respondent 33 2009). Given the influx of organizations into 
Indonesia after the tsunami, what was the character of the administrative response system? 
5.1.1 Full Administrative System 
A total of 909 organizations were identified in the full administrative system, that is, all 
organizations that were reported as participating in response operations following the earthquake 
and tsunami. As Table 7 indicates, when categorized according to their source of funding, 591 or 
65.02% of the organizations were classified as public, 141 or 15.51% were classified as private, 
and 169 or 18.59% were classified as non-profit. This distribution confirms that public 
organizations played the dominant role in the administrative response to the tsunami. 
When categorized by level of jurisdiction, the distribution of the data revealed that 
Indonesia‟s administrative response system was populated by a diverse range of organizations. 
Of the organizations identified in the full system, 425 or 46.75% were classified as international, 
meaning they came from jurisdictions outside of Indonesia. These organizations included non-
governmental organizations such as the World Health Organization, and foreign governmental 
organizations such as the Government of Singapore and the United States Navy. The remainder 
of the organizations, 484 or 53.25%, were classified as domestic, meaning they originated from 
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inside Indonesia. Of these, 209 or 22.99% were national, 61 or 6.71% were provincial, and 214 
or 23.54% were local. Each of these classifications contained a variety of organizations. For 
instance, national organizations included the Office of the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Ministry of Health for the Republic of Indonesia. The provincial organizations included 
the Office of the Governor of North Sumatra Province and the Social Welfare Agency of North 
Aceh Province. Local organizations included the Medan Polonia Airport, the City of Sabang and 
the Cipto Magunkusumo General Hospital. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Organizations Identified in the Full System 
 
 
 
Source of Funding 
Public Private Non-Profit Special Interest Totals 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Le
ve
l o
f J
ur
isd
ic
tio
n International 282 31.02 48 5.28 93 10.23 2 0.22 425 46.75 
National 99 10.89 53 5.83 52 5.72 5 0.55 209 22.99 
Provincial 46 5.06 2 0.22 12 1.32 1 0.11 61 6.71 
Local 164 18.04 38 4.18 12 1.32 0 0.00 214 23.54 
Totals 591 65.02 141 15.51 169 18.59 8 0.88 909 100 
 
 
 
A similar pattern existed within the source of funding categories, where 282 or 47.71% of 
the 591 public organizations identified in the full system were classified as international. The 
number of international public organizations in the system is balanced by the number of 
domestic public organizations, at 309 or 52.28%. Table 7 also indicates that non-profit 
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organizations were well represented in the full system at 169 or 18.59% of all organizations. The 
majority of these, 93 or 55.02% were as international. Likewise, 141 or 15.51% of the 
organizations in the full system were private, of which 53 or 37.58% were national. Even though 
the results indicate a bias towards public organizations, the full system was clearly comprised of 
a heterogeneous collection of organizations. 
5.1.2 Core Administrative System 
After the non-critical organizations and interactions were removed from the full system dataset, 
560 distinct organizations remained. These organizations formed the core administrative system. 
As Table 8 indicates, the distribution of organizations in the core system closely matches the 
distribution of the organizations in the full system. In terms of their source of funding, 383 or 
68.39% of the organizations in the core system were classified as public, 62 or 11.07% were 
classified as private, and 109 or 19.46% were classified as non-profit. In terms of their level of 
jurisdiction, the distribution of organizations was relatively balanced, with 258 or 46.07% of the 
organizations classified as international, and 302 or 53.93% classified as domestic. These data 
confirm that many of the organizations that operated in the core system were international, and 
document that Indonesia received assistance from organizations from around the world. 
The core system was heavily populated with public organizations. Of the 383 public 
organizations, 166 or 43.34% were classified as international and 217 or 56.66% were classified 
as domestic. These data also indicate that domestic public organizations also had a significant 
presence in the core system. Interestingly, the balance between the domestic and international 
organizations was reversed for organizations classified as private. Of the 62 private 
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organizations, 22 or 35.48% of them were international. Examples of private organizations 
included multinational corporations like TNT Express World Wide and International Business 
Machines. Corporations based in Indonesia, for instance, PT Aceh Media Grafika or Garuda 
Indonesian represented 40 or 64.52% of the private organizations. Many of the private 
organizations that operated in the core system were involved in the transportation of relief 
supplies and personnel to the tsunami affected areas. A complete list of the organizations 
identified in the core administrative system is provided in Appendix H. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Distribution of Organizations Identified in the Core System 
 
 
  
Source of Funding 
Public Private Non-Profit Special  Interest Totals 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Le
ve
l o
f J
ur
isd
ic
tio
n International 166 29.64 22 3.93 68 12.14 2 0.36 258 46.07 
National 69 12.32 23 4.11 26 4.64 3 0.54 121 21.61 
Provincial 35 6.25 1 0.18 7 1.25 0 0.00 43 7.68 
Local 113 20.18 16 2.86 8 1.43 1 0.18 138 24.64 
Totals 383 68.39 62 11.07 109 19.46 6 1.07 560 100 
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5.2 RATE OF ENTRY INTO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
“One week after the tsunami, they started bringing in logistics, but the problem is [with] the 
logistics going into the airport in Medan. They have problems to bring logistics from Medan to 
Aceh because the roads were destroyed and they [do not have] trucks. [Even if they] have trucks, 
they have no road. All the bridges had been wiped out” (Respondent 5 2009). The remote 
location of the communities affected by the tsunami, as well as the damage to the transportation 
infrastructure in the tsunami affected regions, made it difficult for response organizations to 
access the disaster site. These findings represent the first of a series of longitudinal inquiries into 
the daily changes that occurred in the core system and its constituent sub-systems. 
5.2.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
A total of 302 organizations were identified in the domestic administrative sub-system. The entry 
of these organizations into the response system was plotted by date, by date and level of 
jurisdiction, and by date and source of funding. 
5.2.1.1 Entry by Date 
Figure 7 indicates that the rate at which organizations entered the domestic sub-system 
fluctuated. The most active day occurred on 27 December 2004, when 53 or 17.55% of the 
organizations entered the sub-system. The least active days occurred on the 8
th
, 12
th
 and 14
th
 of 
January 2005, when only 2 or 0.66% of the organizations entered. The trend line of the two 
period moving averages for these data has a downward slope, which indicates that the rate of 
entry for organizations was highest immediately after the tsunami, and then began decrease. 
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These data indicate that the domestic sub-system experienced three distinct periods of 
organizational entry. The first spanned from 26 December 2004 to 30 December 2004, when 150 
or 49.67% of the total number of organizations entered the sub-system. These organizations 
included initial responders, such as the Tentara Nasional Indoineais and Kepolisian Negara 
Republik Indonesia, which were concerned about conducting assessments of the affected 
communities and securing the impact areas. The second spanned the dates, 31 December 2004 to 
7 January 2005, when 104 or 34.44% of the total number of organizations entered the sub-
system. The third spanned the dates, 8 January 2005 to 16 January 2005, where 48 or 15.89% of 
the total number of organizations entered the sub-system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of New Organizations Entering the Domestic Sub-System by Date 
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5.2.1.2  Entry by Date and Level of Jurisdiction 
Further analysis considered the entry of organizations into the domestic sub-system by date and 
level of jurisdiction. These results are presented in Figure 8, which indicate that organizations 
from different levels of jurisdiction entered the sub-system on different dates and at different 
rates. The most active day for local organizations occurred on 27 December 2004, when 30 or 
9.93% of the total number of organizations were observed operating in the sub-system. The most 
active day for national organizations also occurred on this date, when 16 or 5.25% of the 
organizations were observed entering the sub-system. These data indicate that local organizations 
such as radio stations, military outposts, and hospitals were quick to respond to the disaster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Entry of New Organizations into the Domestic Sub-System by Jurisdiction  
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The access rates for organizations classified as local had three separate spikes. The initial 
spike occurred on 27 December 2004, when 30 local organizations, representing 9.93% of all 
domestic organizations, entered the system. The second and third spikes occurred on 30 
December 2004 and 5 January 2005, when the number of new local organizations identified 
entering the sub-system were 17 or 5.63% and 12 or 3.97% respectively. A similar access pattern 
is observed with organizations classified as national, where the detection rates of organizational 
access peaked on 27 December 2004, 30 December 2004 and 5 January 2005. During the six 
days that preceded the second spike, 56 or 46.28% of all national organizations, entered the sub-
system. These data show that there are common patterns, in terms of entry rates, among the 
response organizations classified as national, provincial and local. 
5.2.1.3  Entry by Date and Source of Funding  
Figure 9 indicates that the domestic sub-system was comprised of a large number of public 
organizations. These data indicate that public organizations did not enter the domestic sub-
system at the exact same time. The most active day for public organizations occurred on 27 
December 2004, where 41 or 13.57% of the total number of public organizations entered the sub-
system. The number of new public organizations peaked again on 5 January 2005, when an 
additional 18 organizations entered the sub-system. The final peak is of particular interest, given 
that it may suggest that the activities of the domestic sub-system may have changed, perhaps the 
result of a transition in focus from response activities to recovery activities. By comparison, the 
other three classifications of organizations entered the domestic sub-system at rates lower than 
the public organizations. The most active day for non-profits occurred on 30 December 2004. 
Even so, their numbers only represented 6 or 1.98% of all organizations identified in the sub-
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system. In a similar fashion, the access rate of private organizations, which peaked on 27 
December 2004, remained low during the period considered by this study. Organizations 
classified as special interest, which included political parties, were not represented in the sub-
system in high numbers, as they were not frequently observed in the source materials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Entry of New Organizations into the Domestic Sub-System by Funding Source 
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5.2.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
A total of 258 organizations were reported as participating in the international administrative 
sub-system. The entry of these organizations into the response system was plotted by date, by 
date and level of jurisdiction, and by date and source of funding. 
5.2.2.1 Entry by Date 
Figure 10 indicates that organizational entry into the international sub-system also fluctuated. 
The most active day was 27 December 2004, when 41 or 15.89% of the total number of newly 
identified international organizations entered the sub-system. The least active day occurred on 15 
January 2005, when only 1 or 0.38% of the total number of newly identified organizations 
entered the sub-system. The trend line of the two period moving averages for these data also has 
a downward slope, which indicates that the rate of entry for organizations in the sub-system was 
highest immediately after the tsunami. 
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Figure 10: Number of New Organizations Entering the International Sub-System by Date 
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5.2.2.2  Entry by Date and Source of Funding 
Figure 11 indicates that, like the domestic sub-system, public organizations made up the majority 
of the newly identified organizations in the international sub-system. Organizations classified as 
public accounted for 166 or 64.34% of all identified international organizations. The most active 
day for new public organizations occurred on 27 December 2004, where they represented 35 or 
20.08% of the all identified public international organizations. The other three classifications of 
organizations entered the sub-system at lower rates. Even so, peaks in organizational access rates 
were also observed for this classification of organizations. For example, the entry rate for newly 
identified non-profits was the highest from 2 January 2005 through 10 January 2005, when 40 or 
58.82% of all non-profit organizations were observed entering the sub-system. During this same 
time, private organizations were also active; with 15 or 68.18% of all new private organizations 
entering the sub-system. Again, organizations classified as special interest were not well 
represented in the international sub-system, accounting for only 2 or 0.07% of all organizations. 
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Figure 11: Entry of New Organizations into the International Sub-System by Funding Source 
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entered. Alternatively, the most active day for private organizations did not occur until 4 January 
2005, when 7 or 31.81% of all private organizations entered the sub-system. 
5.2.3 Core Administrative System 
A total of 650 organizations were identified in the core administrative system. The entry of these 
organizations into the response system was plotted by date, by date and level of jurisdiction, and 
by date and source of funding. 
5.2.3.1 Entry by Date 
Figure 12 indicates that the rate at which new organizations entered the core system also 
fluctuated. The most active day was 27 December 2004, when 94 or 16.79% of the total number 
of organizations were indentified entering the system. The least active dates occurred on 14 
January 2005 and 15 January 2005, when, on each date, only 6 or 1.07% of the total number of 
organizations were observed entering. The trend line for the data also has a downward slope, 
which indicates that the rate of entry for organizations in the core system was, like its two sub-
systems, the highest during the period immediately after the tsunami. These data also indicate 
that the core system experienced three distinct, but fluctuating periods of organizational entry. 
The first spanned from 26 December 2004 to 30 December 2004, when 250 or 44.64% of the 
total number of newly identified organizations entered the system. The second spanned from 31 
December 2004 to 7 January 2005, when 221 or 39.46% entered the system. The third period 
spanned from 8 January 2005 to 16 January 2005, when 89 or 15.90% entered the core system. 
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Figure 12: Entry of New Organizations into the Core System by Date 
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peak on 3 January 2005, the number of new provincial organizations remained relatively stable. 
These data indicate that new organizations entered the core system rapidly, with 250 or 44.64% 
of the organizations entering the system between 26 December 2004 and 30 December 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Entry of New Organizations into the Core System by Jurisdiction 
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occurred on 30 December 2004, and accounted for the entry of 17 or 12.40% of the total number 
of local organizations. The third occurred on 5 January 2005, and accounted for the entry of 12 
or 8.75% of the total number of local organizations. These three dates accounted for the entry of 
59 or 43.06% of the total number of local organizations in the core administrative system. 
5.2.3.3  Entry by Date and Source of Funding 
The entry rates for new organizations categorized by source of funding into the core system are 
presented in Figure 14. Organizations classified as public accounted for 387 or 68.39% of all 
organizations in the system. The most active day for new public organizations occurred on 27 
December 2004, when 76 or 19.84% of the total number of public organizations entered the 
system. Interestingly, the public organizations that joined the system on 27 December 2004 
accounted for 13.57% of all organizations identified in the system. Other classes of organizations 
entered at substantially lower rates. For example, entry rates for new organizations classified as 
non-profit were the highest from 2 January 2005 through 10 January 2005, when 57 or 52.29% 
of all non-profit organizations were observed entering the system. During this time private 
organizations were also active; with 32 or 51.61% of all new private organizations entering the 
system. Again, special interest organizations were not represented in significant numbers. 
Figure 14 also indicates that public organizations made up the majority of organizations 
identified in the core system. Public organizations were identified entering the system during two 
periods. The first occurred during the seven days after the tsunami, where 231 or 60.31% of all 
new public organizations entered. The second occurred during the next five days, when an 
additional 97 or 25.33% of public organizations entered. Although participating at lower overall 
rates, there were similarities in the number of non-profit organizations and private organizations 
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that responded to the event. For instance, during the three days after the tsunami, the number of 
non-profits in the system stood at 15 or 2.67% of all organizations. During the same period of 
time, the number of private organizations stood at 14 or 2.50% of all reported organization. 
These data suggest that private organizations, at least immediately after the tsunami, responded 
to the conditions generated by the tsunami just as quickly as their non-profit counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Entry of New Organizations into the Interacting System by Funding Source 
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5.3 GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
Once the Indonesian government opened up access to Aceh, thousands of response organizations 
immediately traveled to the tsunami-affected areas. In describing the organizational rush to 
provide disaster assistance, one respondent recalled that, “[organizations] just do what they do by 
their own. For example, when I stay in Aceh, a lot of groups on the first 7 or the first 14 days 
before the government set up [the] coordination, people just go spontaneously. I‟m not 
coordinated yet, [at that time] (Respondent 52 2009). While coordination may have been lacking 
in the days that followed the tsunami, the organizational “rush to respond” enabled the 
administrative response system that operated in Indonesia to grow in both size and capacity. 
5.3.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The 302 distinct organizations identified in the domestic sub-system did not become active at the 
exact same time. Grouping the data by week indicates that the majority of growth in the domestic 
sub-system occurred during the week after the tsunami. During the week after the tsunami, which 
included the day of the tsunami, there were 184 organizations, 60.93% of all domestic 
organizations identified, operating in the sub-system. During the second week, 78 new 
organizations, or 25.83% of all domestic organizations identified, entered the system. The 
numbers dropped substantially during the final week, where only 40 new organizations, or 
13.25% of all domestic organizations identified, entered the sub-system. 
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5.3.1.1 Daily Growth as Cumulative Total Number of Organizations 
The daily growth rate of the domestic sub-system, measured as the cumulative total number of 
organizations identified in the source materials, increased steadily over time. The data presented 
in Figure 15 indicate that the domestic sub-system experienced periods of rapid growth and 
periods of slow growth. For instance, from 26 December 2004 through 30 December 2004, a 
total of 150 organizations entered the sub-system. These five days represent the most active 
period of growth. Growth than began to slow over the next three days, when only 34 newly 
organizations entered the sub-system. After 3 January 2005, growth began to accelerate, and 53 
organizations entered the sub-system over the next three days. Around 11 January 2005, sub-
system growth began to slow, as the number of newly identified organizations began to plateau. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Growth of Domestic Sub-System as Cumulative Number of Organizations 
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5.3.1.2 Daily Growth as Cumulative Percentage of Organizations 
The number of new organizations considered as a cumulative percentage of the total number of 
organizations is presented in Figure 16, which reveals two dates of significance. The first 
occurred on 30 December 2004, when the domestic sub-system reached 49.67% of its total size. 
After this date, the sub-system began to grow at a steady, but ever-increasing, rate. The second 
occurred on 7 January 2005, when 246 or 81.46% of all domestic organizations were identified 
operating in the sub-system. Since the growth that occurred after 6 January 2005 was relatively 
flat, these data seem suggest that the study successfully identified the majority of organizations 
that participated in the domestic administrative sub-system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Growth of Domestic Sub-System as Cumulative Percentage of Organizations 
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5.3.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
A total of 258 organizations were identified in the international sub-system. Like the 
organizations in the domestic sub-system, these organizations did not become active at the same 
time. During the week after the tsunami, which included the day of the tsunami, there were 153 
organizations, 59.30% of all international organizations identified, operating in the sub-system. 
During the second week, 74 new organizations, or 28.68% of all international organizations 
identified, entered the sub-system. These numbers dropped during the third week, when only 31 
new organizations, or 12.02% all international organizations identified, entered the sub-system. 
5.3.2.1 Daily Growth as Cumulative Total Number of Organizations 
The daily growth rate of the international sub-system, measured as the cumulative total number 
of organizations, also increased steadily over time. The data presented in Figure 17 indicate that 
the sub-system also experienced periods of rapid growth and periods of slow growth. For 
example, from 26 December 2004 through 30 December 2004, a total of 100 organizations 
entered the sub-system. These five days represent the sub-system‟s most active period of growth. 
While the international organizations that were active in the sub-system at this time were 
busy preparing relief supplies, organizing financial assistance and logistics, many of them had 
yet to arrive in Indonesia. It was not until 30 December 2004 that the Indonesian government 
actually allowed international governmental and non-governmental organizations to enter Aceh. 
Nevertheless, many of the international organizations operated on the assumption that they 
would be provided access to the tsunami affected regions. This assumption worked to ensure that 
the international sub-system would continue to expand in both size and capacity, and the growth 
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rate of the sub-system continued over the next five days, albeit at a slower rate, when 89 new 
organizations entered the sub-system. The growth of the international sub-system did not begin 
to plateau until 10 January 2005, sixteen days after the tsunami. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Growth of International Sub-System as Cumulative Number of Organizations 
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to the change in policy by the Indonesian government towards international organizations, the 
sub-system began to grow at an increased rate. The second occurred on 6 January 2005, when 
208 or 80.62% of all new organizations were identified operating in the sub-system. Since the 
growth that occurred after 6 January 2005 was at a reduced rate, this finding suggests that the 
study identified the majority of organizations that participated in the international sub-system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Growth of International Sub-System as Cumulative Percentage of Organizations 
 
 
 
2%
18%
22%
30%
39%
44%
49%
59%
66%
73%
77%
81%
84%
87% 88%
93% 93%
95% 97%
99% 99% 100%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
2
/2
6
/0
4
1
2
/2
7
/0
4
1
2
/2
8
/0
4
1
2
/2
9
/0
4
1
2
/3
0
/0
4
1
2
/3
1
/0
4
1
/1
/0
5
1
/2
/0
5
1
/3
/0
5
1
/4
/0
5
1
/5
/0
5
1
/6
/0
5
1
/7
/0
5
1
/8
/0
5
1
/9
/0
5
1
/1
0
/0
5
1
/1
1
/0
5
1
/1
2
/0
5
1
/1
3
/0
5
1
/1
4
/0
5
1
/1
5
/0
5
1
/1
6
/0
5
T Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
112 
 
5.3.3 Core Administrative System 
A total of 560 organizational were identified in the core system. Again, these organizations 
entered the system on different dates and at different rates. During the week after the tsunami, 
which includes 26 December 2004, there were 337 organizations, 60.18% of all organizations 
identified, operating in the system. During the second week, 152 new organizations, or 27.14% 
of all organizations identified, entered the system. These numbers dropped during the final week, 
when only 71 new organizations, or 12.60% all organizations identified, entered the system. 
5.3.3.1 Daily Growth as Total Cumulative Number of Organizations 
The daily growth of the core administrative system also steadily increased over time. The data 
presented in Figure 19 indicate that response organizations flooded into core system immediately 
after the tsunami. During the three days that followed the tsunami, a total of 166, or 29.64% of 
all identified organizations, had already entered the core system. Over the next ten days, until 7 
January 2005, an additional 305, or 54.46% of all identified organizations, entered the core 
system. A large portion of this growth was the result of international organizations entering the 
system, especially after 30 December 2004. Like the domestic and international sub-systems, the 
growth of the core administrative system began to slow after 7 January 2005. 
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Figure 19: Growth of Core System as Cumulative Number of Organizations 
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5.3.3.2 Daily Growth as Cumulative Percentage of Organizations 
The number of new organizations as a cumulative percentage of the total number of 
organizations in the core system is presented in Figure 20. These data indicate that the core 
system experienced two dates of significance related to system growth. The first occurred on 1 
January 2005, when the system reached 53.04% of its total size. After this date, again perhaps 
due to the change in policy by the Indonesian government towards international organizations, 
the system began to grow at an increased rate. The second occurred on 6 January 2005, when 
454 or 81.07% of all organizations in the system had been identified. The growth that occurred 
after 6 January 2005 was at a reduced rate, indicating that the study successfully identified the 
majority of organizations that participated in the core administrative system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Growth of Core System as Cumulative Percentage of Organizations 
5%
22%
30%
36%
45%
49%
53%
60%
66%
72%
78%
81%
84% 86%
87%
91% 93%
95% 96%
97% 98%
100%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
2
/2
6
/0
4
1
2
/2
7
/0
4
1
2
/2
8
/0
4
1
2
/2
9
/0
4
1
2
/3
0
/0
4
1
2
/3
1
/0
4
1
/1
/0
5
1
/2
/0
5
1
/3
/0
5
1
/4
/0
5
1
/5
/0
5
1
/6
/0
5
1
/7
/0
5
1
/8
/0
5
1
/9
/0
5
1
/1
0
/0
5
1
/1
1
/0
5
1
/1
2
/0
5
1
/1
3
/0
5
1
/1
4
/0
5
1
/1
5
/0
5
1
/1
6
/0
5
T Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
115 
 
5.4 TRANSACTIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
According to an official from an international non-governmental organization, the initial wave of 
disaster assistance was limited, “[the government] sent medicines, and the military started 
cleaning up. It wasn‟t until the international NGOs came, that they actually brought help” 
(Respondent 36 2009). After the arrival of the international organizations, the administrative 
response system experienced an explosion of activity. This section identifies the activities that 
organizations were involved in after the tsunami. The transactions identified during the coding of 
the documentary sources were reviewed individually and classified according to whether they 
fell into one or more of the twenty transaction categories described in Appendix C. 
5.4.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The organizations identified in the domestic sub-system were observed participating in 466 
individual transactions and 1,037 transaction observations, which were grouped into transaction 
categories and tallied. The complete set of transaction tallies is presented in Figure 21. The most 
frequently identified category of transactions identified the domestic sub-system involved 
activities related to health, at 178 or 17.16% of all transaction observations. The next most 
frequently identified category involved activities related to assessment, at 160 or 15.43%. 
These results indicate that domestic organizations spent a large portion of their time 
working to resolve health related issues, for instance, the repair of medical facilities, the 
monitoring of infectious disease, and the delivery of doctors or medicine to affected populations. 
Domestic organizations also spent time accessing the damage caused by the disaster, the needs of 
the affected population, and the needs of the organizations that operated in the response system. 
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Of equal importance were the activities which fell into the transaction category of coordination 
and collaboration, at 146 or 14.08%, which indicates that domestic organizations did participate 
in activities related to the coordination of the response system. Of particular interest were the 
scores received for activities conducted in the areas of security, at 30 or 2.89%, and protection, at 
8 or 0.77%. These low scores seem counterintuitive, given that issues related to the security of 
disaster response personnel and the protection of vulnerable populations received substantial 
media attention after the tsunami. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Number and Category of Transactions Identified in the Domestic Sub-System 
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5.4.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
The organizations identified in the international sub-system were observed participating in 518 
individual transactions and 1,337 transaction observations. The complete set of transaction tallies 
is presented in Figure 22. The focus of the international organizations differed from their 
domestic counterparts. The three most frequently identified activities that occurred in the 
international sub-system related to transportation, at 197 or 14.73%, coordination and 
collaboration, at 195 or 14.58%, and logistics, at 143 or 10.70%. These three categories 
represented 535 or 40.01% of all the transaction observations in the sub-system. 
These data indicate that, unlike domestic organizations, international organizations were 
heavily involved in establishing the logistics component of the tsunami response system. 
Organizations such as the United Nations established logistics centers, not only for the nation of 
Indonesia, but for the entire Indian Ocean region. Helping to complete activities related to 
logistics were military units of foreign countries, which used their transportation equipment, for 
example, helicopters and amphibious landing craft, to distribute supplies to affected areas. 
International organizations, particularly the World Health Organization, were also focused on 
activities related to health, 153 at 11.37%, and were instrumental in the collection and 
distribution of medical supplies and the provision of health care services after the tsunami. Like 
their domestic counterparts, international organizations did not seem to be heavily involved in 
activities related to security, at 5 or 0.37%, or protection, at 9 or 0.67%. 
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Figure 22: Number and Category of Transactions Identified in the International Sub-System 
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well as, coordination and collaboration occurred between the Indonesian Ministry of Health, the 
World Health Organization and United Nation‟s Children Fund. The source materials indicated 
that these organizations were engaged in an extensive campaign to provide measles vaccinations 
and vitamin-A shots to vulnerable populations throughout the tsunami affected regions of 
Indonesia. Beyond the activities related to health and coordination, these data also indicate that 
the organizations in the core system were focused on the transportation of goods and supplies, at 
341 or 14.36%, and the assessment of the damage caused by the disaster, at 271 or 11.42%. 
The distribution of the number and frequency of transaction tallies for the organizations 
in the core system can be organized into three separate groups. The first group was the 
transactions that received the most attention from the organizations in the core system: 
coordination and collaboration at 341 or 14.36%; heath at 330 or 13.90%; assessment at 271 or 
11.42%; and transportation at 263 or 11.08%. The second group received a moderate amount of 
attention, and included eight categories with between 60 and 195 transactions. The most 
important of these transaction categories included logistics, at 195 or 8.21%, nutrition, at 141 or 
5.94%, and political affairs, at 81 or 3.41%. The third group received the least amount of 
attention, and included transaction categories such as: utilities at 9 or 0.38%; security at 35 or 
1.47%; and recovery and reconstruction at 58 or 2.44%. Again, even in the core administrative 
system, it is interesting to note how low the tallies are for security related transactions. 
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Figure 23: Number and Category of Transactions Identified in the Core System 
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5.4.4.1 Rate of Organizational Activity 
Figure 24 indicates that the daily number of transactions classified in the core administrative 
system evolved. After an initial spike on 27 December 2004, the organizations in the core system 
started to become involved in interactions that represented an increasing number of transaction 
categories, meaning that they were also becoming increasingly involved in a wider range of 
response activities. This rise in activity was not constant. After 5 January 2005, when the number 
of transactions identified in the source materials peaked at 200, the number of transactions 
actually began to decrease, reaching a low of 31 on 14 January 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Number of Daily Transactions Coded in the Core System 
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When the data for the core system was organized by sub-system, it became apparent that 
the organizations that participated in the international sub-system were involved in interactions 
that fell into more transactions categories than the organizations that were involved in the 
domestic sub-system. This suggests that the international organizations may have been more 
active, across a wider range of activities, than their domestic counterparts. Indeed, of the 2374 
transactions coded in the core system, 1337 or 60.77% fell into the international sub-system and 
1037 or 47.14 fell into the domestic sub-system. These findings confirm that international 
organizations played a critical role in the system that operated in Indonesia after the tsunami. 
5.4.4.2 Focus of Organizational Activity 
A comparison of sub-system activity by transaction category is presented in Figure 25. These 
data indicate that the sub-systems exhibited behavioral differences in terms of the types of 
activities in which their constituent organizations participated. The organizations involved in the 
international sub-system participated in interactions related to the management of the core 
system, for example, transportation, collaboration and coordination, logistics, and supplies and 
equipment. These data also indicate that international organizations were involved in transactions 
coded as nutrition, which involved the delivery of food to those affected by the tsunami. 
Alternatively, the organizations involved in the domestic sub-system participated in interactions 
that were less related to the management of the core system, but more directed toward 
information collection (assessment), the delivery of medicine and medical services (health), 
handling domestic and international relations (political affairs) and planning for the activities that 
would occur after the conclusion of the emergency response period (recovery and 
reconstruction). That the domestic and international sub-systems focused on different tasks after 
the tsunami should not be considered an indication of system failure. Rather, these data reveals 
that the organizations identified in the sub-systems simply contributed to the core administrative 
system according to their respective strengths and areas of expertise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Breakdown of Transactions Coded in the Core System 
 
 
 
The data presented in this chapter indicate that the administrative system that operated in 
Indonesia after the 26 December 2004 earthquake and tsunami was heterogeneous in its 
organizational composition and grew rapidly, especially in the days immediately after the 
tsunami. The data also indicate that distinctions can be drawn between the international and 
domestic sub-systems, for example, the organizations that operated in these two systems engaged  
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in different types of activities. While these findings provide insight into the character of this 
administrative system, they reveal little, if anything, about how the interactions exchanged 
among response organizations helped to structure the administrative system. Given the role that 
structural change plays in administrative resilience, the subsequent chapter considers the extent 
to which the interactions exchanged by response organizations facilitated the development and 
evolution of the structure of the administrative system and sub-systems under analysis. 
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6.0  STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
To improve the capacity of administrative systems that operate in conditions of uncertainty, the 
structural characteristics of such administrative systems must be analyzed. This chapter 
addresses the research question: to what extent did the interactions exchanged among response 
organizations after the earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 drive the structural 
evolution of the administrative response system? Five sub questions will also be addressed. First, 
to what extent did the density of the system evolve? Second, to what extent did the diameter of 
the system evolve? Third, to what extent did the number of components in the system evolve? 
Fourth, to what extent do Hamming distance statistics reveal structural evolution within the 
system? Finally, to what extent did organizations in the system shift the target of their 
interactions from one classification of organization to another? The analysis presented in this 
chapter considers how the structure of this system evolved on a daily basis. 
6.1 NETWORK DENSITY 
When contemplating the interactions exchanged by organizations during the month after the 
tsunami, an official from a non-governmental organizations stated, “[t]here were thousands of 
NGOs there, and they were all highly funded, they were all autonomous, because of their 
funding, and they didn‟t feel the need to collaborate” (Respondent 24 2009). This statement 
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indicates that the organizations that operated the tsunami response system may not have 
interacted as much as perhaps they could have. It is possible to evaluate the veracity of this 
statement, at least in terms of the structure of organizational interactions, by examining the 
density of the interactions detected in the administrative system during the period under analysis. 
According to Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust (1994, p. 101), a network‟s density 
is the “proportion of the possible [links] that are actually present in a [network].” This proportion 
will range between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that all of the nodes in the network are connected. 
A network with a density score close to 1 would be highly connected. A network with a density 
score close to 0 would be sparsely connected. The fact that an administrative system possesses 
extremely high or extremely low density scores does not, in isolation, indicate that the system 
was either effective or ineffective. Rather, the scores simply represent the prevalence of 
interactions with the system. To compare densities for the domestic and international sub-
systems, as well as the, and the core system across dates, the number of organizations in these 
systems was set at 302, 258 and 560 respectively (Friedkin 1981; Scott 2000). 
6.1.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The domestic sub-system‟s average daily density totaled 0.000515. While such a score does not 
suggest that there were insufficient interactions for the system to function, it does suggest that 
the number of interactions between domestic organizations was extremely low. These data 
indicate that the daily density scores were below 0.0005 on fifteen of the twenty-two days that 
followed the tsunami. The date of the highest density score occurred on 3 January 2005, when 49 
organizations engaged in 61 separate interactions, resulting in a density score of 0.001342. The 
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daily plots of the density scores for the domestic sub-system are reported in Figure 26, which 
indicates that the sub-system was not static in terms of organizational interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Daily Density Scores for the Domestic Sub-System 
 
 
 
 When the daily density scores were averaged by week, the density of the interactions in 
the domestic sub-system began to decrease. During the week after the tsunami, which includes 
the date of the event, the average density was 0.000627. During the subsequent week, the 
average density dropped to .000517. This decreasing pattern continued during the third week, 
when the averaged density dropped to 0.000272. These data indicate that, as the response 
unfolded, the organizations in the domestic sub-system were becoming less active, at least with 
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respect to their interactions with other domestic organizations. This finding runs counter to the 
notion that, following a disaster event, the number of interactions within the system should 
increase as response organizations share information and resources to facilitate the response. 
6.1.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
While low, density scores for the international sub-system were higher than the domestic sub-
system. This indicates that the international organizations were more active than their domestic 
counterparts. Overall, the average density score for the international sub-system was 0.002641. 
As Figure 27 indicates, international organizations were not interacting with other international 
organizations on 24 December 2004, the day of the tsunami. The respondents that participated in 
the semi-structured interviews suggested that this may have been due the lack of information 
about the tsunami event, or because international organizations were at reduced capacity due to 
the holiday. Once information about the size and scope of the disaster event became available, 
the international organizations became increasingly active. 
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Figure 27: Daily Density Scores for the International Sub-System 
 
 
 
The density of the international sub-system was higher during the second half of the 
period under analysis, indicating that international organizations increased their rate of 
interaction. Prior to 6 January 2005, the average daily density of the sub-system was 0.0007. 
After that point, the average daily density of the sub-system increased to 0.0049, and the shifts in 
density became more dramatic and regular in their occurrence. This appears to be an indication 
that the organizations in the international sub-system were not only becoming increasingly 
active, they were also beginning to synchronize their interactions. 
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6.1.3 Core Administrative System 
Similar patterns were present in the core administrative system. The average density score for the 
core system was 0.0009, which is again low, but higher than the density reported for the 
domestic sub-system. It appears as if the presence of the international system, and the 
interactions exchanged between domestic and international organizations, improved the overall 
density of the core system. These findings also indicate that, while there were a low number of 
interactions in the core system, the extent to which organizations interacted with each other 
evolved. This evolution is seen in Figure 28, which reveals that the core system experienced 
dramatic shifts in density, especially during the second week and a half. Interestingly, these 
patterns match those in the international sub-system. When density was considered as a weekly 
average, the density of the first week, which included the day of the tsunami, totaled 0.0004. The 
density of the second week then increased to 0.0011. The increased trend in average density 
scores also continued during the third week, where the core system‟s density increased to 0.0012. 
131 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Daily Density Scores for the Core System 
 
 
 
The shift towards increased density scores occurred on 6 January 2005, when 95 
organizations engaged in 405 separate interactions. The source materials revealed that a 
significant event occurred on this date, which may explain the increase in density for the core 
system. The event was the first of a regular series of coordination meetings organized by the 
Indonesian Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization. These meetings organized the 
actors in the health sector into four sub-groups: 1) hospital activities; 2) emergency and primary 
health care; 3) psychosocial and mental health activities; and 4) information and logistics. This 
series of meetings seemed to bind the organizations in the system together; enabling some 
organizations to increase their interactions with the organizations that they already had working 
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relationships with, while other organizations could start to interact with organizations with which 
they did not have previous working relationships. 
6.2 NETWORK DIAMETER 
Many of the respondents that participated in this study indicated that it eventually became easier 
to acquire information in the administrative system. One respondent explained that this was 
because, “people were proactively seeking information assistance from anywhere they could find 
it, they were being creative in thinking about where [they] could get expertise, where they could 
get stuff, both within the organization and externally” (Respondent 19 2009). This may indicate 
that, in their search for information and resources, the distance between the organizations in the 
administrative system may have become smaller as the system developed. The extent to which 
this occurred can be evaluated by scrutinizing the “diameter” of a system, or network, which is 
defined as “the length of the largest geodesic between any pair of nodes (n)” (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, p. 111). A network‟s diameter “can range between 1 (if the [network] is complete) to 
a maximum of [n]-1” (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 112). 
Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 112) provide a description of this measure: “the graph‟s 
diameter is important because it quantifies how far apart the two farthest nodes in the graph are. 
Consider a communications network in which the ties are the transmission of messages. Focus 
on the messages sent between all pairs of actors. Then, assuming messages always take the 
shortest routes (that is, via geodesics), we are guaranteed that a message can travel from any 
actor to any other actor, over a path of length no greater than the diameter of the graph.” The 
larger the diameter of the administrative system, the more difficult it might be for information 
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and resources to flow, both in terms of time and cost, to the interacting organizations that operate 
in the system. An administrative system that has a high diameter may have difficulties adapting 
in response to the uncertainties present in post-disaster environments. 
6.2.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The diameter of the domestic sub-system evolved during the period under analysis. Figure 29 
indicates that the diameter of the domestic sub-system ranged between 2 and 6. The average 
diameter of the sub-system was 3.50. Organizing these data into three weekly periods reveals the 
extent to which the diameter of the domestic sub-system evolved. During the week that ended 2 
January 2005, the average diameter of the sub-system was 3.86. During week that ended 9 
January 2005, the average diameter decreased to 3, meaning the organizations operating in the 
sub-system had become closer to each other. During the final week, this trend reversed, and the 
diameter of the domestic sub-system increased to 3.71. One might expect the opposite to occur; 
that the system would become smaller as organizations locate each other and begin to interact. 
While the diameter for the third week was not as high as the initial week, these findings indicate 
organizations were having difficulties integrating themselves into the domestic sub-system. 
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Figure 29: Daily Diameter Scores for the Domestic Sub-System 
 
 
 
6.2.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
Figure 30 indicates that the diameter of the international sub-system also evolved. Excluding 26 
December 2004, the sub-system‟s diameter ranged from 1 on 27 December 2004 to 7 on 6 
January 2005. The sub-system‟s average diameter was 3.82. Although change was also noted in 
the international sub-system, it differed from the change reported in the domestic sub-system. 
Where the diameter of the domestic sub-system contracted and then expanded, the diameter of 
the international sub-system expanded and then contracted. This pattern is clearly revealed in the 
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plot of the international sub-system‟s weekly average density scores. During the first week, 
which included the day of the tsunami, the sub-system‟s average density score was 3.43. During 
the second week, its average density score increased to 4.71, before dropping to 3.86 during the 
third week. While the organizations in the international sub-system were not able to constrain the 
growth of the sub-system‟s diameter immediately after the tsunami, these same organizations 
seemed to have adjusted their interactions and reduced the diameter of the sub-system and 
improved its capacity to distribute information and resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Daily Diameter Scores for the International Sub-System 
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6.2.3 Core Administrative Sub-System 
The diameter of the core administrative system also evolved, ranging from a low of 3 on 26 
December 2004 to a high of 11 on 12 January 2005. The system‟s average diameter was 6.77.  
Figure 31 indicates there was also a change in the system‟s daily diameter. The change observed 
in the core system is more gradual than that identified in the international sub-system. During the 
first week, the average diameter of the core system was 6.57. By the second week its average 
diameter had increased to 7.43, before dropping to 6.96 during the third week. Although the core 
system had wider variance in its diameter than both of its sub-systems, their integration seems to 
have enabled the core system to better accommodate the response organizations. A large part of 
this capacity appeared to be derived from the contributions of international organizations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Daily Diameter Scores for the Core System 
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6.3 NETWORK COMPONENTS 
When asked about collaboration after the tsunami, a respondent with local experience reported, 
“… [when] the tsunami happened, it was really massive, and more than 500 organizations 
operated here in Aceh. So, but after the tsunami, a lot of different coordination efforts were 
happening. Either between the local and international organizations and also among the 
international organizations, among the government organizations, or inter-governmental 
organizations. I mean, like, inter-between national, local and international, plus government, or 
only between international and governmental [organizations]” (Respondent 41 2009). This 
quotation suggests that organizational interactions occurred, not only within sub-systems, but 
also across sub-systems, and that such interaction may have unified the heterogeneous collection 
of organizations that operated in the post-tsunami environment. 
Whether such a unified structured existed in the administrative system under analysis can 
be evaluated using social network measures. A network that is not fully connected can be 
separated into sub-graphs called components. According to John Scott (p. 101), “[a] sub-graph, 
like a graph, is „connected‟ when all of its [nodes] are linked to one another through paths: all 
points in a connected sub-graph can „reach‟ one another through one or more path, but they have 
no connections outside the graph. Within a component, all points are connected through paths, 
but no paths run to [nodes] outside the components.” A single network can be composed of 
multiple sub-components, each of which possesses a different number of nodes and linkages. 
The presence of components in an administrative system can be interpreted in various 
ways. An increase in the number of components in a system could mean that sub-groups of 
organizations are becoming increasingly isolated. While the organizations within a single 
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component may be exchanging resources, information and personnel, and completing their 
respective responsibilities, they would be doing so without interacting with the organizations that 
are participating in other components. Such a system structure could preclude the organizations 
in one component from accessing information and resources that exist in another component. 
Alternatively, a decrease in the number of components could mean that the sub-groups of 
organizations are coming together to form a single, unified component. The overall capacity of 
the single component would be higher than the collection of smaller, distinct sub-components. 
6.3.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
A primary component operated within the domestic sub-system on each of the twenty-two days 
after the tsunami. The smallest number of components present in the sub-system was 2 and the 
largest number was 12. When the isolate organizations were excluded, these data indicate that an 
average of 24.09 organizations participated in an average of 5.23 components. The daily number 
of components identified in the sub-system is reported in Figure 32, which indicates that gaps 
separated domestic response organizations. When considered on a weekly basis, the average 
number of components present in the sub-system also evolved. During the first week, the sub-
system had an average of 28.37 organizations operating in 5 separate components. During the 
second week, this number increased to an average of 27.71 organizations operating in 6.57 
separate components. During the final week, the average number of components in the sub-
system dropped to an average of 15.57 organizations operating in 4.14 separate components. 
These findings indicate that organizations in the domestic sub-system interacted, but 
remained disconnected from each other as they operated in separate components. This suggests 
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that the information and resources possessed by the organizations in one component may not 
have been able to be transmitted to other components. Then, a structural change occurred in the 
sub-system, and the number of components began to decrease. While these data seems to 
indicate that organizations in the domestic sub-system managed to reach out to the organizations 
that were previously operating in separate components, the results may be due to the fact that the 
average number of interacting organizations identified in week three was actually lower than the 
average number of interacting organizations identified in week one (15.57 vs. 28.37). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Daily Number of Components Detected in the Domestic Sub-System 
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6.3.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
The international sub-system had substantially more components than its domestic counterpart. 
Excluding 26 December 2004, a primary component also operated in the sub-system on each of 
the twenty-two days after the tsunami. When the isolate organizations were excluded from 
consideration, the smallest number of components present in the system was 2 and the largest 
was 13. Figure 33 also confirms the presence of gaps between the organizations that operated in 
the sub-system, in which an average of 330.04 organizations participated in an average of 5.86 
components. The average number of components operating in the sub-system evolved on a 
weekly basis. During the first week, the international system contained an average of 20.75 
organizations operating in 5.63 separate components. This number then increased to an average 
of 38.29 organizations operating in 7.71 separate components during the second week. During 
the final week, the number of components decreased, with an average of 26.14 organizations 
operating in 4.29 distinct components. 
Like the domestic sub-system, these findings indicate that the international sub-system 
contained organizations that engaged in interactions with other organizations, but their 
interactions were isolated within separate components. In contrast to the domestic sub-system, 
these data indicate that organizations in the international sub-system did manage to reach out to 
some of the organizations that were previously operating in separate components. For example, 
the average number of components in week three were less than the number detected in week 
one (4.29 vs. 5.62), even though there were on average, more interacting organizations detected 
in week three than in week one (26.14 vs. 20.75). An alternative explanation for why the sub-
system came together could be because international organizations were more active, in terms of 
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their interactions, during the latter half of the period under analysis. Whatever the cause, the 
reduction in number of components would indicate that the international organizations may have 
improved their capacity to distribute information and resources throughout the sub-system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Daily Number of Components Detected in the International Sub-System 
 
 
 
6.3.3 Core Administrative System 
The core administrative system had substantially more components than both of its sub-systems. 
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consideration, when isolate organizations were excluded, the data indicated that an average of 
65.95 organizations participated in an average of 10.05 components. This finding also confirms 
the presence of gaps within the core system. As Figure 34 indicates, the smallest number of 
components identified in the system was 4, on 26 December 2004, when 15 organizations 
interacted. The largest number of components identified was 20, on 4 January 2005, when 90 
organizations interacted. When considered by week, the average number of components in the 
system evolved. During the first week, the system had an average of 60 organizations operating 
in 8.88 separate components. This number increased to an average of 83.29 organizations 
operating in 13.57 separate components during the second week. During the final week, the 
numbers dropped, with an average of 55.43 organizations operating in 7.86 components. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Daily Number of Components Detected in the Core Sub-System 
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Like the domestic and international sub-systems, these findings indicate that the core 
system contained organizations that were engaged in interactions with other organizations, but 
their interactions occurred within separate components. This would have created a situation 
where it would have been difficult for the information and resources contained in one component 
to have been transmitted to the other components in the system, thereby inhibiting the system‟s 
capacity to adapt to the uncertain conditions present in the post-tsunami environment. Then, on 
or about 6 January 2005, the average number of components in the core system began to 
decrease. This change is likely due to the influence of the international organizations, which 
increased their interactions after 6 January 2005. Another consideration is that the core system is 
comprised of the interactions between domestic organizations and international organizations, 
which may have bridged unconnected components that exited in their respective sub-systems. 
6.4 STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
The respondents indicated that change was a major theme in the post-tsunami environment, 
which reflected the willingness of response organizations to alter their activities, modify their 
decision making processes, and interact with organizations with which they did not have 
previous operational relationships. There is a growing literature on the evaluation of change 
within networks, and the methods used to evaluate such change include the use of the Hamming 
distance for binary networks (Hamming 1950; McCulloh and Carley 2008; Wasserman and Faust 
1994). This study employed the Hamming distance statistic to evaluate whether change occurred 
in the administrative system. The Hamming distance measures the extent to which two or more 
un-weighted networks share similar structural characteristics. The measure tallies the number of 
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modifications that need to be made, in terms of addition or subtraction of links, to make one 
network exactly like another. According to McCulloh and Carley (2008, p. 8), “a significant 
change in Hamming distance may indicate network change over time.” 
6.4.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The Hamming distance statistics for the domestic sub-system are reported in Figure 35, which 
indicate that the sub-system experienced a period of structural change and a period of structural 
stability. What is interesting about these data is the regular nature of the fluctuations identified in 
the first week and a half of the response. Although less drastic, the fluctuations are also present 
when a two-period moving average trend line is added to the Figure. These statistics indicate that 
the domestic sub-system underwent two distinct periods of change. The first occurred from 26 
December 2004 through 5 January 2005, when there were instances of dramatic, but regular 
change, likely the result of domestic organizations providing regular situation updates on the 
conditions that existed in the post-disaster environment. Indeed, there were a number of such 
updates contained within the source materials used to complete this study. After 5 January 2005 
the regular fluctuations stopped, and the sub-system entered a period of relative stability, 
meaning the addition or subtraction of links detected in the sub-system fell within a much 
narrower threshold. This may indicate that the organizations within the international sub-system 
may have taken over a significant portion of the coordination role for the system. The full 
Hamming distance statistics for the domestic sub-system are provided in Appendix I. 
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Figure 35: Daily Change of Hamming Score for the Domestic Sub-System 
 
 
 
6.4.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
The Hamming distance statistics for the international sub-system are reported in Figure 36, 
which indicate that the sub-system also experienced a period of structural change and a period of 
structural stability. These results differ from those reported for the domestic sub-system in two 
ways. First, the range in which fluctuations occurred in the sub-system is much wider, meaning 
that on a day-to-day basis, the international organizations increased or reduced their interactions 
in higher numbers than their domestic counterparts. That international organizations were more 
active in terms of their interactions, is also confirmed by the previously reported density results. 
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Second, the days in which the greatest fluctuations in the Hamming distance statistic occurred 
also differed. In the domestic sub-system, the fluctuations occurred before 6 January 2005. In the 
international sub-system, the fluctuations did not occur until after 6 January 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Daily Change of Hamming Score for the International Sub-System 
 
 
 
Like the domestic sub-system, the international sub-system can be separated into two 
distinct periods. The first period occurred from 26 December 2004 through 5 January 2005, 
when the fluctuations seem to reveal a relatively stable period of structural change, or more 
precisely, a period where the addition or subtraction of links never exceeded a very narrow 
threshold. Following 6 January 2005, the structural fluctuations became much more dramatic. On 
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6 January 2005, for example, the sub-system experienced an increase of 568 edges, or 284 
distinct interactions. It was on this date that the number of components in the international sub-
system began to decrease, meaning the system was beginning to coalesce. After 9 January 2005, 
there were days where the organizations were extremely active, and days where organizations 
were less active. During this period, these fluctuations in organizational activity appeared to be 
quite regular. Although much less dramatic, these fluctuations are also present in the two-period 
moving trend line contained in Figure 36. The trend line identifies the period when change most 
likely occurred in the sub-system, between 6 January 2005 and 8 January 2005. The full 
Hamming distance statistics for the international sub-system are provided in Appendix J. 
6.4.3 Core Administrative System 
The Hamming distance statistics for the core system are reported in Figure 37, which indicate 
that the core system also experienced periods of structural stability and structural change. More 
importantly, these data indicate that the international system played a significant role in the 
development of the core system. Like the international sub-system, the structural change 
observed in the system can be separated into two periods. The first occurred from 26 December 
2004 through 5 January 2005, when the fluctuations in the Hamming statistic are indicative of a 
relatively stable period of change and the structural change never exceeded a narrow threshold. 
Following 6 January 2005, the fluctuations became dramatic and regular, indicating that there 
were days where the organizations were extremely active, and days where they were less active. 
Similar patterns are also present in the two-period moving average trend line. 
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These data also indicate that organizations in the core system engaged in some type of 
synchronizing activity. The content analysis and semi-structured interviews indicate that two 
important events, both of which involved organizations in the international sub-system, occurred 
on, or around, 6 January 2005. The first was the initiation of a series of health sector 
coordination meetings, organized by the Indonesian Ministry of Health and the World Health 
Organization. The second occurred when the Secretary General of the United Nations ordered 
the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator for the Tsunami Relief Effort and the 
United Nations Development Program to coordinate the relief efforts for the Indian Ocean 
region. The full Hamming distance statistics for the core system is provided in Appendix K. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Daily Change of Hamming Score for the Core System 
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6.5 ORGANIZATIONAL TARGETS 
This findings presented in this chapter indicate that the network structure of the administrative 
system that operated in Indonesia after the tsunami earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 
2004 evolved. These findings also suggest that international organizations helped, at least 
structurally, to improve the core system‟s capacity to operate in uncertain conditions. While 
these findings indicate the presence of structural change, they say little about whether the 
organizations identified in one sub-system shifted the focus, or target, of their interactions, for 
instance, from working with domestic organizations to working with international organizations. 
If such patterns of adjustment were observed, it would provide additional support for the 
conclusion that international organizations played an increasingly critical role in the management 
and operation of the core administrative system, and more importantly, that the core 
administrative system experienced structural evolution. 
This analysis was guided by two assumptions. First, each transaction was assumed to be 
initiated by a single organization. Second, the initiating organization for each transaction was the 
first of the organizations listed in the documentary materials. For example, if the materials 
contained a transaction such as, “organization A (international organization) scheduled a 
meeting with organization B (domestic organization) and organization C (international 
organization),” then organization A would be coded as the initiating organization. Organizations 
B and C would be coded as the target organizations. The numbers of distinct target organizations 
identified in each transaction were then categorized by level of jurisdiction. These results were 
summed to compute the number of domestic and international organizations that were the target 
of a transaction on the dates under consideration, 26 December 2004 through 17 January 2005. 
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6.5.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
Figure 38 presents the results for the shifts in organizational targets for domestic organizations. 
These data indicate that domestic organizations preferred to target domestic organizations. Of the 
626 total organizational targets identified by this analysis, 461 or 73.64% were domestic 
organizations and 165 or 26.35% were international organizations. There were only three days 
where domestic organizations targeted international organizations more than their domestic 
counterparts. For instance, on 6 January 2005 and 8 January 2005, domestic organizations such 
as Tentara Nasional Indonesia contacted foreign militaries to coordinate the use of helicopters, 
the Indonesian Ministry of Health started a measles and vitamin A campaign with the World 
Health Organization and the United Nations Children‟s Fund, and the Indonesian Ministry of 
Education contacted the United Nations Children‟s Fund to request provisions for temporary 
classrooms for displaced children. The third date of interest, 14 January 2005, seems to be an 
anomaly related to data availability in that there were only 7 organizations targeted, 4 of which 
were international. On the remainder of the dates, domestic organizations elected to target other 
domestic organizations more than 55% of the time. 
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Figure 38: Shifts in Organizational Targets for Domestic Organizations 
 
 
 
As a percentage of all target organizations, domestic organizations gradually began to 
increase the extent to which they targeted international organizations. Figure 38 indicates that, on 
27 December 2004, only 3.33% of target organizations were international. This low number is 
due to the fact that international organizations had yet to arrive at the disaster scene in large 
numbers. Circumstances had changed by 8 January 2005, when international organizations were 
targeted by domestic organizations 63.16% of the time. This upward trend is also revealed by the 
average weekly target scores for domestic organizations. For instance, of the 252 organizations 
targeted during week one, which included the day of the tsunami, 15.87% were international. Of 
the 248 organizations targeted during week two, 33.87% were international. Even with the 
decrease in the number of interactions and transactions in the domestic sub-system, of the 126 
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organizations targeted by domestic organizations during week three, 32.53% were international. 
Although domestic organizations elected to work with other domestic organizations, they also 
demonstrated an increasing willingness to work with their international counterparts. 
6.5.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
International organizations differed in the types of organizations that they preferred to target. 
Figure 39 presents the data related to the shifts in organizational targets for the international 
organizations, which indicate that international organizations initially targeted domestic 
organizations, often to make initial contact or to make offers of assistance. For example, as a 
percentage of all target organizations, on the first day that international organizations were 
active, they elected to target domestic organizations 69.23% of the time. By 29 December 2004, 
international organizations elected to target international organizations 79% of the time. In fact, 
on all but three of the days covered by this analysis, international organizations showed a 
preference to target other international organizations. 
On the dates that international organizations preferred to target domestic organizations 
over international organizations, it was only by a thin margin. For example, domestic 
organizations were targeted 53.33% of the time on 31 December 2004, when international 
organizations such as the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
reached out to the Indonesian Ministry of Education to prepare an assessment mission to evaluate 
damage to schools. On 1 January 2004, when domestic organizations were targeted 54.35% of 
the time, international organizations were identified conducting logistics operations at local 
airports, delivering field hospitals, and using helicopters for rescue and relief operations. The one 
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exception was on 16 January 2005, when international organizations targeted domestic 
organizations 83.33% of the time. On this date, international organizations worked with domestic 
organizations by pledging funds for reconstruction activities, planning for additional food and 
supply distribution activities, and continuing a number of assessment activities. While it might 
seem as if this would represent a dramatic shift in target activity, there were very few 
interactions and transactions reported on 16 January 2005. 
The target data indicates that, while international organizations would target domestic 
organizations during their daily operational activities, they overwhelmingly elected to work with 
international organizations. Indeed, of the 863 total organizational targets identified by this 
analysis, 531 or 61.52% were international organizations and 332 or 38.47% were domestic 
organizations. Not only do these data support the previous finding that organizational 
interactions were not tightly integrated, it also supports the insights provided by the respondents, 
who reported that it was difficult for domestic organizations, especially those at the local level, 
to become actively involved in the operational networks of the international organizations. 
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Figure 39: Shifts in Organizational Targets for International Organizations 
 
 
 
6.5.3 Core Administrative System 
Figure 40 presents the results for the shifts in organizational targets for the organizations in the 
core system. On each of the three days after the tsunami, as a percentage of all target 
organizations, domestic organizations were the target of interactions over 80.37% of the time. 
The first change occurred on 29 December 2004, around the time that the Indonesian 
government invited international organizations to participate in the response. On that date, 
international organizations were targeted 66.15% of the time. In the days that followed, there 
was a steady rise in international involvement, so much so that, by 8 January 2005, international 
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organizations were targeted more than 72.31% of the time. On 9 January 2005, a shift occurred, 
and the preferred targets of interactions began to fluctuate between domestic organizations and 
international organizations for a few days, which may indicate that the nature of the activities 
occurring within the system was evolving. Although there were substantially fewer interactions 
identified in the third week, by 14 January 2005, the organizations in the core system once again 
elected to target international organizations 75% of the time. 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Shifts in Organizational Targets for All Organizations 
 
 
 
The continual rise in the percentage of international targets indicates the extent to which 
the organizations in the core system became increasing reliant upon the contributions of the 
international organizations. It was during this period of ever-increasing activity that international 
organizations became involved in activities related to the establishment of logistics, initiating the 
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mechanisms needed for information exchange, and establishing bases of operation. Many of 
these same organizations were also instrumental in reaching out to domestic organizations, 
creating working relationships for information collection, the repair of critical transportation 
facilities, and the delivery of relief supplies. This conclusion is also supported by the network 
findings discussed previously; that the interactions exchanged between the organizations in the 
domestic and international sub-systems improved the capacity of the core system. 
 The findings presented in chapter six indicate that the structure of the core system and its 
constituent sub-systems evolved in a various ways during the twenty-two days that followed the 
earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004. While these findings build upon those presented 
in chapter five, the empirical results presented by these two chapters do not identify the specific 
factors that drove this structural change. To understand why these systems experienced structural 
change, the subsequent chapter will review the operational opportunities and the operational 
constraints that were present in the administrative system after the earthquake and tsunami. 
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7.0  OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The respondents indicated that the constraints present in the post-tsunami environment were 
unlike anything they had ever experienced. Yet some of them also indicated that there were 
opportunities that could be found in the confusion that followed the earthquake and tsunami. 
This diverse spectrum of constraints and opportunities helped to create a dynamic operational 
environment for both domestic and international response organizations. This chapter addresses 
the study‟s third research question: to what extent did constraints and opportunities influence the 
administrative system that responded to the earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004? 
7.1 OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS 
Portions of the data used by this study were collected from fifty-one respondents, each of which 
possessed knowledge of the events that transpired in Indonesia after the tsunami. These 
respondents worked in forty-one distinct organizations, participated in forty-eight semi-
structured interviews and completed fifty-two surveys. Four respondents reported that they 
worked in multiple organizations during the period after the tsunami. These respondents 
completed two surveys, one from the perspective of each organization. Three respondents were 
not present in Indonesia at the time of data collection, and only completed the survey. 
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7.1.1 Organizational Data 
The organizations included in the sample varied in size. On the small end were local non-profit 
organizations, which were staffed by five or fewer individuals. On the high end were 
international public and non-profit organizations, which had thousands of staff members and 
significant resources. Almost 50% of organizations had fewer than fifty disaster management 
personnel on staff at the time of the tsunami. Table 9 indicates the distribution of the 
organizations in the sample according to their level of jurisdiction and their source of funding. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Number of Distinct Organizations Represented in Study 
 
 
 
Public Non-Profit Private Total 
N % N % N % N % 
International 8 19.5 7 17.1 1 2.0 16 39.0 
Domestic 20 48.8 5 12.2 0 0.0 25 61.0 
Total 28 68.3 12 29.3 1 2.0 41 100 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Individual Data 
The respondents who participated in this study were not homogeneous. First, in terms of their 
sex, the majority of the respondents, 41 or 80.40%, were male. Table 10 indicates that a similar 
distribution was present when the respondents were categorized according to their respective 
sub-systems. Out of a total of 22 subjects, males represented 72.73% of sample from the 
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international sub-system. A similar pattern was present in the domestic sub-system, where out of 
29 respondents, 86.20% were male. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Sex of Subjects 
 
 
 
Female Male Total 
N % N % N % 
International 6 11.8 16 31.4 22 43.1 
Domestic 4 7.8 25 49.0 29 56.9 
Total 10 19.6 41 80.4 51 100 
 
 
 
Table 11 indicates that the respondents also differed by age. Of the 45 respondents who 
reported their age, 38 or 84.44% indicated they were between 26 and 55 years old. The “26-35” 
and “46-55” categories were well represented, at 13 or 28.9% and 16 or 35.6% respectively. 
Only 9 or 20% of the respondents fell into the “35-45” category. When categorized by sub-
system, the domestic respondents followed a similar age distribution; and the “26-35” and “46-
55” categories were well represented, at 8 or 33.33% and 11 or 45.83% respectively. The ages of 
the international respondents were distributed more evenly. Other than the “21-25” category, 
which only had 1 or 4.76% of the international respondents, the other categories contained 5 or 
23.81% of the respondents. The majority of the respondents who fell into the “56-65” category 
were from the international sub-system, at 5 or 23.81%, as opposed to the 1 or 4.76% who 
represented the domestic sub-system. 
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Table 11: Age of Subjects 
 
 
 
21-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.2 5 11.1 5 11.1 5 11.1 5 11.1 21 46.7 
Domestic 0 0.0 8 17.8 4 8.9 11 24.4 1 2.2 24 53.3 
Total 1 2.2 13 28.9 9 20.0 16 35.6 6 13.3 45 100 
 
 
 
The respondents were also highly educated. indicates that 12 or 27.27% of the 
respondents who reported their level of education had a bachelor‟s degree, 18 or 40.91% had a 
master‟s degree, and 11 or 25% had a doctoral degree. The areas of expertise reported by these 
respondents also varied, having earned degrees in engineering, economics, soil science, biology, 
public administration and community development. In contrast, only 3 or 6.81% of the 
respondents had earned secondary or associate degrees. While it is likely that these findings 
reflect the recent professionalization of disaster management personnel, none of the respondents 
had received degrees in disaster management. The only major difference between sub-systems 
was found in the “doctorate” category, where 8 or 72.73% of the respondents who reported 
having earned a doctorate were found in the domestic sub-system. 
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Table 12: Subject’s Highest Level of Education 
 
 
 
Secondary 
(High School) 
University 
(Associate) 
University 
(Bachelors) 
University 
(Masters) 
University 
(Doctorate) Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.3 0 0.0 7 15.9 10 22.7 3 6.8 21 47.7 
Domestic 1 2.3 1 2.3 5 11.4 8 18.2 8 18.2 23 52.3 
Total 2 4.5 1 2.3 12 27.3 18 40.9 11 25.0 44 100 
 
 
 
Finally, Table 13 indicates that the respondents possessed different levels of disaster 
management experience. Interestingly, only 9 or 20% of the 45 respondents reported that they 
possessed eleven or more years of disaster management experience. What was the most 
surprising about the respondents was number of new disaster management practitioners. In fact, 
24 or 53.33% of the respondents reported that they had less than five years of disaster 
management experience. This means that, at the time of the earthquake and tsunami, many of the 
participants who participated in the response had little, if any, disaster management experience. 
Similar distribution patterns were present in both the domestic and international sub-systems, 
where respectively, 21 or 87.50% and 15 or 71.43% of the respondents reported ten or fewer 
years of experience. The respondents became disaster managers for various reasons. Some 
intentionally entered the field after college, while others entered the field after careers in conflict 
resolution, education, tourism and public health. 
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Table 13: Subject's Years of Disaster Management Experience 
 
 
 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 25+ Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 10 22.2 5 11.1 3 6.7 2 4.4 1 2.2 21 46.7 
Domestic 14 31.1 7 15.6 2 4.4 1 2.2 0 0.0 24 53.3 
Total 24 53.3 12 26.7 5 11.1 3 6.7 1 2.2 45 100 
 
 
 
7.2 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The respondents indicated that the administrative system that operated in Indonesia after the 
earthquake and tsunami experienced a variety of constraints. Table 14 reveals that 43, or 91.49% 
of 47 respondents, indicated that operational constraints had, at the very least, some effect on the 
administrative system. Of the respondents that represented the minority, only 3 or 6.38% 
reported that the constraints had “no effect” on their activities, while 1 or 2.22% reported that the 
question was “not applicable.” The respondents who reported that constraints had “no effect” on 
their activities all represented the domestic sub-system. Given that 23 or 48.94% of the 
respondents reported that operational constraints permeated the system at a “great extent or 
higher,” it is important to consider how these constraints differed, in terms of their substance and 
effect, for the organizations that operated in the domestic and international sub-systems. 
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Table 14: Tsunami Response Affected by Operational Constraints 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 5 10.6 5 10.6 8 17.0 2 4.3 1 2.1 21 44.7 
Domestic 3 6.4 2 4.3 8 17.0 10 21.3 3 6.4 0 0.0 26 55.3 
Total 3 6.4 7 14.9 13 27.7 18 38.3 5 10.6 1 2.1 47 100 
 
 
 
7.2.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The domestic respondents reported that their activities were subject to two major operational 
constraints. First, prior to the tsunami, Indonesia‟s government and communities lacked adequate 
disaster awareness and disaster regulations, which meant their disaster management system was 
not prepared to manage the post-tsunami environment. Second, after the tsunami, the lack of 
information in the domestic sub-system prevented domestic organizations from developing a 
comprehensive understanding of scope of the disaster, the needs of the affected population, and 
the steps that should be taken to meet those needs. 
7.2.1.1 Lack of Disaster Regulations and Disaster Awareness 
The most significant constraint reported by domestic officials was the extent to which Indonesian 
governments and communities were unprepared for the consequences of large disasters. This 
lack of preparedness was discussed at length by the respondents, none of whom indicated that the 
disaster regulations that had been adopted by Indonesia prior to the tsunami were adequate to 
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meet the needs of the community. When asked to elaborate, they could not identify specifics 
about the legal regulations and mechanisms that were in effect prior to the tsunami, but rather, 
would make general references to the BAKORNAS PBP, SATLAK and SATKORLAK 
coordination mechanisms. They did report that the legal framework at the time of the tsunami 
was vague, fragmented, and did not address the full cycle of disaster management (Respondent 
10 2009). The respondents also indicated that BAKORNAS PBP, the national disaster 
management institution, was nothing more than an ad hoc agency, which had neither the 
structure nor the capacity to manage large scale natural disasters. 
In describing how BAKORNAS PBP operated at the national level prior to the tsunami, a 
respondent that worked for an international organization elaborated on the shortcomings of the 
board. The respondent indicated that the board was nothing more than “a bunch of people from 
big organizations who try to coordinate stuff. They don‟t have their own budget line, they don‟t 
have power, well, they have a budget line for their own personnel, but to do anything, it is 
nothing. And, secondly, the disaster law [implemented at the time] is too vague” (Respondent 10 
2009). These shortcomings generated two problems for Indonesia‟s disaster management system. 
First, BAKORNAS PBP did not have the capacity or authority to direct the Indonesian line 
ministries to adopt more effective policies. Second, while BAKORNAS PBP would attempt to 
coordinate response activities following a disaster, they did not have the power to ensure that the 
line ministries would comply with the decisions made during the coordinating meetings. 
The problems generated by regulatory vagueness and the lack of a cohesive national 
policy also created problems for disaster management activities at the local level. A high ranking 
Indonesian government official indicated the nature and extent of the problems, “[During the 
period between 2000 and 2004] …the Satlak, Satkorlak, even the BAKORNAS…were clearly 
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mandated in disaster management. But Satlak and Satkorlak in the provincial and local levels 
were not that good. People, they just come and go. People do not have the power or the clear 
responsibility in disaster management” (Respondent 13 2009). The respondent continued by 
noting that the officials that staffed disaster management positions at the local and provincial 
levels would often accept such positions as a “side job” (Respondent 13 2009). Other 
respondents indicated that local officials were not “committed” to disaster management, and 
simply used their position as a transition point for career development (Respondent 52 2009). 
The administrative gaps in disaster management that existed in Indonesia prior to the 
tsunami were also influenced by factors other than shortcomings in legislation and policy. The 
respondents reported that Indonesia‟s governments and communities were just not aware of the 
risks and hazards posed by disaster. Prior to the tsunami, disasters were considered to be nothing 
more than “acts of God,” meaning that there was not much that community or government 
officials could do to prevent events such as floods or fires from occurring. If a disaster event did 
occur, then officials would generate a response to that specific event. 
In explaining the consequences of this perspective, one respondent stated, “the culture 
was, and this is by the government‟s own admission, the culture was „we have disasters.‟ They 
are a fact of life. When they happen, we will respond to them, and we have a structure to do that. 
And this was called BAKORNAS PBP. And BAKORNAS, as I understand it, was a bunch of 
government ministers with a small secretariat…that came together to coordinate the response. 
Very little happened apart from that” (Respondent 16 2009). This lack of awareness had 
consequences, particularly with the degree to which local governments and communities were 
prepared for disasters. Another respondent emphasized this point by stating “when the tsunami 
hit Aceh, we were like, oh my God, what the hell is this? They weren‟t prepared, we could see 
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that from how they managed, you know … the refugees, and how to check them, and what to do, 
and how to make their daily lives, their health. So, we were all helped by the national 
organizations and then other countries” (Respondent 43 2009). 
7.2.1.2 Confusion Generated by the Lack of Information 
The respondents also indicated that confusion permeated the domestic sub-system after the 
tsunami. During the initial response period, the Indonesian government experienced confusion, 
particularly about the scope and scale of the disaster. Although Jakarta had received reports that 
an earthquake had occurred off the island of Sumatra, the destruction of critical infrastructure 
prevented the government from receiving information about the tsunami. Even when information 
did arrive - the respondents estimated it took between 24 and 48 hours - the government 
underestimated the size of the affected population and the scope of the destruction. 
The respondents also reported that Indonesian government officials were confused about 
their capacity in the tsunami affected regions. One respondent indicated that the national and 
local governments, which had lost a large amount of personnel and resources, spent a month 
“trying to map their capacity on the ground” (Respondent 15 2009). This governmental 
confusion also had an impact on the organizations that participated in the administrative response 
system, particularly the non-governmental organizations that sought direction from government 
officials. Another respondent referred to confusion that existed by stating, “[y]ou had no system; 
no mechanism. That was a constraint. It was like there was no particular organization, that was 
one month, it was chaos because there was no mechanism, no standard operating procedures, so 
NGOs [were] like a ping-pong [ball] … they were confused (Respondent 14 2009). 
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Much of this “bouncing around” seems to have been caused by constraints in information 
collection. Almost all of the respondents discussed the need for information, which would have 
helped them to make effective decisions in a confusing situation. There were three areas of 
concern related to information collection, which influenced the extent to which organizations 
could determine the scope and scale of the disaster. The first related to the availability of 
baseline information. The respondents indicated that they needed a wide range of information, 
for example, the number of people living in the affected communities, and even more startling, 
information related to where some of the affected communities were even located (Respondent 
20 2009). Without such information, it was almost impossible for organizations to conduct 
accurate impact and damage assessments. A second concern related to the lack of consensus on 
the types of indicators that should be used for information collection purposes. One respondent 
reported that, after the tsunami, he could not find statistics on the number of people who rented 
homes in Aceh, or accurate information on the number of people who lived under the poverty 
level (Respondent 10 2009). The third concern related to the methodologies employed to collect 
information. For instance, a high ranking government official reported problems with the 
Environmental Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) methodology for 
conducting post-disaster damage assessments. In his own words: 
“[w]e tried to adopt the ECLAC, but it is very complicated, it is very difficult for 
the…not only for the local [governments], but also the central government. You 
know, the data reliability is very poor here, and you know the collection that we 
are doing is very difficult.  I don‟t think that we had the full effect of the ECLAC, 
it won‟t fit with the supply [of information].  That is why, for the personnel plan, 
we have been trying to do some modifications, what we call the Lite ECLAC.  
The reduced ECLAC methodology” (Respondent 48 2009). 
 
This statement indicates that the organization involved in the disaster assessment activities had to 
modify their procedures in order to collect information in the post-tsunami environment. While 
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no two disasters are exactly alike, identifying and refining the information collection 
methodologies before the occurrence of a system disrupting event can speed up information 
processes after a disaster and reduce confusion in uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. 
7.2.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
The international respondents also reported various operational constraints. The first was the lack 
of governmental and social infrastructure in the tsunami affected regions. The second was that 
international organizations did not have the linguistic and cultural skills needed to work in 
Indonesia. Together, these constraints worked to undermine the capacity of the international 
organizations, which had to conduct response activities in an unfamiliar environment. 
7.2.2.1 Lack of Governmental and Social Infrastructure 
The collapse of governmental and social infrastructure had a significant impact on the 
organizations in the international sub-system. When called upon to provide disaster assistance, 
international organizations typically work within domestic institutions. This was difficult to do in 
Indonesia, as the tsunami struck governmental institutions particularly hard, many of which had 
already been weakened by thirty years of conflict. Emphasizing this constraint, an international 
official reported, “the area of coverage was so big. It was in the northern part. It was in the 
western part. The northwest part. The local government was not there, so you had to work with 
what was left. Um, limited personnel from the local government” (Respondent 16 2009). Along 
with the collapse of the government was the loss of office space, vehicles, staff, equipment, and 
data that would have normally been used to support disaster response activities. 
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The respondents also indicated that there was a period of anarchy in Aceh, meaning the 
lack of governmental authority, while the national government took the steps to assess the 
damage caused by the disaster. Officials from domestic and international organizations reported 
that, even a week after the tsunami, the governmental structures in Aceh remained inoperable, 
and there was confusion about who was in command (Respondent 12 2009; Respondent 17 
2009). In response to this constraint, domestic and international organizations had to develop the 
administrative mechanisms to manage operations while the operations were being carried out. 
The disaster also had an impact on the social fabric of Indonesian communities. One 
respondent estimated that because of the tsunami, “80% of the public sector, in the sense of 
institutions, were dysfunctional” (Respondent 21 2009). But the damage was not just limited to 
institutions. A separate respondent suggested that the event disproportionally eliminated the 
professional class, many of which lived along the coast (Respondent 24 2009). Those who did 
survive the tsunami were in a state of shock. For instance, an official from a University in the 
Aceh who had worked with international organizations reported, “everyone, almost everybody, 
lost his or her family members, lost their house, and all their stuff. And ok, you can imagine, 
there were some friends of mine, many friends of mine, who used to be very good, you know, 
economically, they have a good house, cars, and so on. Then, after the tsunami, they lost 
everything…. This is what they had to face” (Respondent 37 2009). As they attempted to process 
what had just happened, entire segments of the affected population were unable to contribute to 
the response. The organizations that responded to the tsunami not only found themselves 
collecting information and delivering relief supplies, they also found themselves contemplating 
how to rebuild the social fabric of communities that had all but evaporated. 
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7.2.2.2 Lack of Language and Cultural Understanding 
Many respondents indicated that international organizations experienced difficulties bridging 
linguistic and cultural gaps. These gaps delayed the rapidity at which relief goods and services 
could be delivered, and created further confusion among response organizations. The linguistic 
gaps were particularly problematic during the period immediately after the tsunami. A domestic 
respondent, who recalled the arrival of the foreign doctors in Aceh, reported “it was good that 
they arrived, but they could not speak the local language. So, our people first worked as a 
translator for these doctors, who were checking on the people, and so on. So, it was very 
magnanimous, of them, [but] there was a big need for anyone who could speak English, and the 
local language, obviously” (Respondent 45 2009). 
The same respondent stressed how language problems made it difficult to accomplish 
tasks immediately after the tsunami. For instance, the procurement procedures of some of the 
international organizations required that assistance request forms be filled out in English. Many 
of the local organizations were unable to comply with these requirements. Consequently, there 
was a substantial demand for translators, who were in short supply. Another respondent, a bi-
lingual Indonesian medical doctor who worked for an international organization, reported on the 
pressure for her to act as a translator. There were “only limited translators. [There were] only 
three medical doctors, including me, who were national consultants. I don‟t want to be a 
translator. I have my own tasks. I have my own job. Why do I have to be a translator for them?  
It‟s a constraint” (Respondent 2 2009). The constraint of language meant that staff who worked 
for small organizations would often be “poached” by larger international organizations. 
 Equally problematic were the cultural gaps between the international responders and the 
tsunami affected populations, many of whom practice a conservative form of Islam. Westerners 
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arrived in Aceh wearing shorts and t-shirts, and would often interrupt populations at prayer with 
a convoy of loud trucks or talking during services. The cultural mistake that was the most often 
mentioned by the respondents was the direct importation of response plans that were not 
appropriate for Aceh. This resulted in problems such as the accidental delivery of pork products 
to Muslim populations by western relief organizations. Cultural constraints also affected the 
manner in which activities could be carried out. An academic who tracked the interaction 
between the domestic and international organizations indicated, “The culture of Aceh is very 
difficult. You have to respect the dead body. They do not allow you to just shovel the people… 
You can‟t just use the bulldozer. In other country, maybe you can do. Other places, maybe, in 
Indonesia, but not in Aceh… So you have to respect one by one. So, they cover. Even you don‟t 
have those bags; you have to cover with batik, or whatever. The culture is strong. This is the 
problem. The culture is strong and this is the difficulty that we found” (Respondent 52 2009). 
A local Acehnese respondent who worked for an international organization reported that 
the culture gap ran both ways, and the Acehnese also had difficulties adapting to western 
standards. For instance, when smoking was prohibited in inside western facilities, many 
Acehnese just continued to smoke. This respondent argued that response organizations, 
particularly those that come from the west, need to do more to explain their cultural norms to the 
local populations, “If you say to me, you are not allowed to smoke, but don‟t give me a reason, 
then there was no way that I am going to just stop smoking” (Respondent 35 2009). 
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7.2.3 Core Administrative System 
The core administrative system experienced three primary operational constraints. The first was 
the amount of resources that were available to response organizations, which often encouraged 
organizational competition. Second, the effectiveness of the activities conducted by the 
organizations in the core system was constrained by a lack of collaboration and coordination. 
Finally, the organizations in the core system had to manage a variety of logistical constraints. 
7.2.3.1 Resource Availability and Organizational Competition 
Some of the respondents indicated that the organizations in the core system were overwhelmed 
with resources, particularly financial resources. The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Report 
indicated that more than US$13.5 billion dollars was pledged and donated for both response and 
recovery activities (Telford, Cosgrave, and Houghton 2006, p. 80). The financial generosity of 
donor communities created various constraints. For example, non-profits are directly accountable 
for the manner and rate at which they spend the contributions of their benefactors. The 
respondents indicated that this placed non-profits in the difficult position of having to spend and 
deliver their resources as quickly as possible. While explaining the pressure on such 
organizations, an official from an international organization reported, “suddenly you had 
organizations that had five times their normal operational budget, globally, thinking, „crap, how 
are we going to get rid of this money in one year?‟ So, you had NGOs going in and claiming 
villages. „So, this is our village, we are going to rebuild it‟” (Respondent 15 2009). This “excess 
supply of money over demand” worked to “constrain opportunities for collaboration and 
cooperation,” which in turn, led to situations where communities would receive too much (or not 
173 
 
enough) food, blankets or medical supplies. In other instances, respondents reported physical 
confrontations between response personnel who attempted to exclude other organizations from 
communities and regions that had already been targeted for relief (Respondent 15 2009). 
Organizational competition could be directly observed through what some of the 
respondents referred to as “flag-raising,” or the promotion of political or organizational interests 
over the interests of the affected populations. A domestic respondent referred to Disneyland 
when she indicated that one of the major problems in the Indonesian response system were the 
volunteers from political parties. These organizations “[used] the conditions of the disaster to 
promote their political party… The problem is that when you go there during the first month, 
most of the relief or refugee camps are filled with all the banners. This is very disturbing to me” 
(Respondent 52 2009). A separate respondent, a westerner who worked for a local organization 
expressed frustration with organizational flag-raising amongst non-governmental organizations. 
Referring to coordination meetings that broke down due to differences in opinions as to where 
logos should be placed on t-shirts, he reported, “The organizations only care about their logo. I 
can see that. They couldn‟t give a shit about the program, how many people it is helping, how 
much money, what results are being generated in the field. All they care about is their logo 
visibility. That is all they care about. That I guarantee you” (Respondent 34 2009). 
7.2.3.2 Lack of Collaboration and Coordination 
The gaps in Indonesia‟s disaster management system also constrained the collaboration and 
coordination of response organizations. The lack of collaboration and coordination permeated all 
levels of the administrative response system, resulting in the duplication of efforts, delays in the 
distribution of relief supplies, and over the long term, the inability to complete projects and tasks 
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that required contributions from multiple organizations. There did not seem to be a single factor 
that caused the lack of organizational collaboration and coordination. Rather, it was the 
simultaneous interaction of multiple factors that reduced the ability, but not the desire, of 
organizations to work together in the post-tsunami environment. Perhaps the most important 
explanation for the lack of organizational coordination was the failure of the SATKORLAK 
system, particularly in Aceh. The result was a vacuum in government authority. As the national 
government contemplated how to respond to this vacuum, the affected regions became inundated 
with response organizations. The lack of coordination meant that there was no systematic 
oversight of these organizations, many of which lacked disaster management expertise and 
experience. According to an individual who was involved with coordination at the national level: 
“Some of the local NGOs don‟t help the emergency response plan. But it‟s more 
on the spontaneous, whenever there is a disaster, people just go. This is part of the 
humanity culture. They just go and give the help. For example, I notice a lot of 
small NGOs, small political party, they just go there. Even though they didn‟t 
know what to do, they just go there. If they don‟t have money, they don‟t have 
fund, they just give the skill helping them. They give the power, the human 
power. Something like that. But if they have money, they donate the money. 
Whatever their intention. People sometimes have their own intention. Something 
like that” (Respondent 52 2009). 
 
This excerpt indicates that the response system lacked a formal administrative structure, 
which meant that there was little guidance behind its development and operation. So why didn‟t 
organizations simply hold meetings to facilitate coordination? Interestingly, while the 
respondents indicated that such coordination meetings did occur, they also indicated that these 
meetings were not as effective as they could have been. 
The organizations in the response system also appeared unable to reach a consensus on 
how to define coordination. One respondent questioned whether organizations even knew what 
coordination was, “So, I think to having a proper coordination, is a dream of everyone, but what 
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is coordination? What exactly is it? Is it the same activity in the different places, or is it various 
activities in one place? What happened in Aceh, they want to coordinate the same activity in 
different places. That is what happened … the coordination is happening at the policy level, not 
at the ground level. What I don‟t see in Aceh, is that the coordination is happening at the ground 
level, where you coordinate … different activities in one place” (Respondent 10 2009). Another 
respondent, when asked about the effectiveness of the coordination meetings indicated that the 
meetings lacked the focus needed to guide policy. Rather, “people just reported what they did 
today. I mean, this morning, and what not. But not from a needs focus. So, it is like, what is the 
gap?  I don‟t know. I attended those meetings, but I don‟t know” (Respondent 8 2009). 
 The third explanation for the lack of organizational coordination stemmed from the fact 
that organizations distinguished between the organizations that they were willing to collaborate 
with, and those that they were not willing to collaborate with. This does not mean that 
organizations did not inquire about opportunities for collaboration, but rather, when an inquiry 
was made, it may not have been accepted. For instance, a respondent who worked on response 
activities in Aceh reported, “the big [organizations] have their own little, personal, internal 
arrangements, that sort of thing. The head of this one is friends with the head of that one, or this 
sort of thing. So we will sort of, work together. Whereas the smaller, slightly obscure 
[organizations] that you know, don‟t have the contacts in the top ranks… They just get shut out. 
Not interested” (Respondent 34 2009). Indeed, many of the respondents indicated that some of 
the organizations were large enough from the standpoint of their finances, resources and 
personnel, that they could conduct operations by themselves, without the collaborative assistance 
of other organizations. This reflects the findings presented in chapter six, which indicate that 
there were clusters of organizations that operated as isolated entities within the system. 
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7.2.3.3 Logistical Obstacles 
When asked about the nature of the constraints that existed in the response system, all of the 
respondents mentioned the challenges posed by logistics. The respondents distinguished between 
three categories of logistical obstacles: those caused by the physical environment; those caused 
by the regulatory environment; and those caused by the lack of personnel and equipment. 
The first category was caused by the physical environment. The damaged caused by the 
earthquake was not just limited to the coastline. Unlike the tsunami, the effects of the earthquake 
were felt inland, many kilometers from the shore, and they disrupted transportation and 
communication infrastructures throughout parts of the island of Sumatra. These disruptions 
increased the time it took response organizations to deliver disaster goods and personnel to 
transportation hubs, and once there, distribute them to communities before they became spoiled 
or were no longer of any utility. A respondent who delivered assistance immediately after the 
tsunami reported how the damage constrained his capacity to operate: 
“Logistics was a big mess. There was, you look at Aceh, people would receive in 
Banda Aceh. The destruction in the west coast, starting from Chalang, just totally 
gone. Mualabo, was totally gone.  Eh?  People transporting material to Banda 
Aceh, they have a problem, they have no road. Nothing. I was traveling to 
Chalang with [organization‟s name removed] in our car. A very good Toyota. 
Usually, it took me two hours. It took me about 20 hours. Usually, only two. 
Transport was really bad” (Respondent 10 2009). 
 
Another respondent used the word “paralysis” to describe the transportation system in the Aceh 
after the tsunami. These constraints were eventually overcome by organizations, for example, 
through the use of helicopters and amphibious landing craft. 
The second category of logistical obstacles was that certain types of critical equipment 
and specialized personnel either did not exist, or were used inappropriately. One respondent 
indicated that “…for us, no problem for logistics from Jakarta to Aceh. The problem one in 
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Aceh, [was] getting it out” (Respondent 12 2009). He explained that there were often goods 
scheduled to be delivered to airports, but their delivery had to be delayed due to the lack of air 
traffic controllers or the lack of the forklifts needed to unload the cargo. In other instances, there 
were not enough vehicles to transport goods from Banda Aceh to other districts. Still others 
reported that equipment was used inappropriately. An official from an international organization 
reported, “I mean, you know, I would say that 70% of what was done was pretty much on target. 
It was the 30% that was the problem. For example, hiring helicopters to carry bottled water 
around, when you could have used a tanker truck a day later for half the price. I mean, there was 
a lot of that sort of knee jerk stuff. Helicopters were wrongly used” (Respondent 18 2009). 
The third category of logistical obstacles was caused by Indonesia‟s regulatory 
environment. Although these issues were reduced in the months after the tsunami, respondents 
expressed concern with how difficult it was to get goods through Indonesian customs. Some 
respondents reported that the port in Medan was particularly challenging. According to one 
official who worked in a non-profit organization, the problem was, “the bureaucracy. The 
[customs in Medan] needed to provide requests to Jakarta, a hundred kilometers away. There is 
no authority for them to release [the goods] in Medan‟ (Respondent 27 2009). Some of the 
respondents even suggested that corruption may have played a role in delaying release of certain 
goods that had arrived in Medan, especially medical supplies. Whatever the source of the delay, 
the consequences soon became apparent, as goods piled up at port facilities, some of which 
expired before they could be utilized. 
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7.3 OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES 
Given the uncertain nature of post-disaster environments, administrative systems that respond to 
disruptive events will always experience constraints. Yet administrative systems often have the 
capacity to overcome these constraints. Even against almost insurmountable odds, response 
organizations managed to save lives, deliver supplies and initiate the process of reconstruction in 
post-tsunami Indonesia. This suggests that there were aspects of the administrative system that 
operated effectively, and in many instances, it managed to take advantage of the opportunities 
present in the post-tsunami environment. Table 15 indicates that 45 or 100% of the respondents 
reported that the opportunities had some effect on post-tsunami operations. Of these, 32 or 
71.11% reported the effects of opportunities at a “great extent or higher.” 
 
 
 
Table 15: Tsunami Response Affected by Operational Opportunities 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 3 6.4 5 10.6 9 19.1 3 6.4 1 2.1 21 44.7 
Domestic 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 10.6 15 31.9 5 10.6 1 2.1 26 55.3 
Total 0 0.0 3 6.4 10 21.3 24 51.1 8 17.0 2 4.3 47 100 
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7.3.1 Domestic Administrative Sub-System 
The domestic respondents reported that their ability to conduct operations was affected by a 
variety of opportunities, two of which were extremely beneficial. First, domestic leadership 
played an important role after the tsunami, ensuring that critical organizations had access to the 
disaster scene. Second, the domestic respondents also indicated that the international attention 
generated by the tsunami motivated the international community to provide assistance. 
7.3.1.1 Political Leadership 
Political leadership played an important role in the domestic sub-system. Many of the 
respondents acknowledged the professionalism of the members of the national government, 
many of whom had only entered office three months prior to the tsunami. Especially valuable 
was President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‟s decision to open the Aceh to foreign assistance and 
to relax the regulatory restrictions on the importation of relief supplies and the granting of visas 
to international disaster personnel. Given the political pressures to keep the Aceh closed, these 
decisions represented a critical turning point for the development of the response system. 
The respondents readily acknowledged the role of leadership as an opportunity. A 
respondent who worked with Indonesia‟s governmental institutions indicated that he experienced 
a feeling of relief when he realized that he would be dealing with a government that he could 
engage, and that he could have open and honest dialogue with senior government officials about 
operations (Respondent 17 2009). Other respondents singled out specific national organizations 
for their leadership efforts. For instance, a respondent who worked for an international non-profit 
organization acknowledged the Indonesian Ministry of Health for accepting a leadership role 
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when it realized that there was a gap in coordination and began to direct health related operations 
(Respondent 1 2009). Perhaps the most important aspect of political leadership was the fact that 
Indonesian government officials sought help from the international community, and let the 
response system unfold naturally, interjecting only when necessary. 
7.3.1.2 International Attention and the Desire to Assist 
The domestic respondents also noted that the tsunami directed a significant amount of 
international attention to towards their country, and that the images of the disaster created a huge 
desire on the part of individuals and organizations outside of Indonesia to provide assistance. An 
Indonesian university official noted how the “CNN effect” influenced the response. He 
continued, “CNN, Al Jazeera, and all televisions have a very great impact on international 
philanthropic activities in Aceh. Teams from famous countries had come to Aceh on the second 
or third day. A team from Japan was already there the second day of the disaster, as well as from 
Thailand. Germany came on the fourth or fifth day. After that the American Navy came. Yea, the 
Aceh disaster shows how the international cooperation develops because of mass information” 
(Respondent 5 2009). This attention encouraged international organizations to marshal large 
quantities of financial resources, technical expertise and personnel to the disaster area. 
The tsunami was, in many measures, one of the world‟s largest disasters, and everyone 
wanted to be seen involved in the response efforts. While this may have been the case for some 
organizations, one of the respondents suggested that the desire to provide assistance after the 
tsunami was fundamental to human nature, and reflected humanity‟s desire to assist those in 
need (Respondent 52 2009). Illustrating this point was an example provided by an official from a 
national official, who reported amazement when, during the response period, his office received 
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a check in the mail from someone in the United States for thirty dollars. Even though some 
respondents questioned the extent to which the media focused on the death and destruction 
wrought by the tsunami was appropriate, the attention created by the stories and images 
encouraged individuals and organizations to donate their time, goods and money, which ensured 
that the organizations in the domestic system had sufficient resources to respond to the tsunami. 
7.3.2 International Administrative Sub-System 
The international respondents reported that their response capacity was affected by two primary 
operational opportunities. First, international organizations possessed the authority to act as they 
felt necessary, and did not necessarily have to wait for approval from the central government 
centralized before implementing response strategies. Second, international organizations 
possessed the mechanisms that they needed to convert information into actionable knowledge. 
7.3.2.1 Authority to Act 
Most of the respondents reported that they were surprised by the amount of authority that the 
international organizations enjoyed during the month after the tsunami, meaning they were able 
to make decisions and implement programs without having to request approval from 
governmental officials. A respondent from an international organization recognized the freedom 
that was available to the international community when he stressed that, “You could go 
anywhere; you could do whatever you want. Because the government is having problems 
coordinating, you see, you have freedom” (Respondent 16 2009). This freedom action was 
especially helpful to the initial wave of organizations, which needed the autonomy to conduct 
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search and rescue operations and deliver relief supplies to rural areas. The broad granting of 
authority seemed to be caused by two separate factors. The first was the collapse of the local 
government. There was simply no one in a position of authority to exert control over the 
international organizations when they initially arrived. Second, even when the national 
government began to reestablish control, it “very sensibly, and very rapidly, realized that [it 
couldn‟t] try to keep all the rules and regulations” (Respondent 19 2009). 
7.3.2.2 Information Collection and Knowledge Utilization 
The second operational opportunity in the international sub-system was the extent to which 
organizations engaged in information collection activities and generated the knowledge needed 
to take effective action. A respondent indicated that international organizations were ready and 
willing to accept new information, “Well, I think if we did something well. We did this one well. 
We definitely have accepted new information. We had to find our role, in terms of where we [fit] 
in” (Respondent 7 2009). The availability and accuracy of information in the operational 
environment was critical to the decision making process. Another respondent stressed the need, 
not just for information exchange, but also for information accuracy, “I think that was really 
significant, as you know, the [operational] management [was] not always there. Right, I mean 
decision making can be made, based upon the [information contained in the] situation reports 
that we made. If it is false, then there will be a false decision” (Respondent 47 2009). 
 Organizations took various steps to ensure information accuracy. First, organizations 
deployed collaborative teams to collect information. In describing the information collection 
processes in his international non-governmental organization, one respondent indicated, “Well, I 
think roughly 150 people were involved, from government, local expertise and the international 
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community. In, I think, 12 different teams, that were looking at the classic sectors…, and so we 
had an environment team working with [organization name], working with local environmental 
experts, to assemble that information. But, there were teams [also] looking at health, and 
education, and housing, and infrastructure, and transportation, and so on” (Respondent 28 2009). 
Second, many organizations had trained their volunteers to use standardized information 
collection and assessment forms, which while sometimes difficult to employ, seemed to improve 
the quantity and quality of the information collected (Respondent 18 2009). Finally, 
organizations interacted to collect information about needs. One respondent indicated that the 
interaction was mutual; “they have troubles in customs. We make a phone call. So we were able 
to help with medicine and cleaning. We were able to provide Tupperware. So we [could] help 
direct organizations, what their needs were on the ground [were]” (Respondent 15 2009). 
 The information collected by organizations was converted into actionable knowledge and 
distributed throughout the system through a variety of means. Other than through interpersonal 
communication, the respondents indicated that international organizations used five mechanisms 
to share information. The first mechanism, the use of websites, represented the most indirect 
method of sharing information, especially for organizations interested in communicating directly 
with their benefactors (Respondent 47 2009). The second mechanism was the use of personal 
communication devices such as cell phone or satellite phones. According to one respondent, “We 
were able to communicate with our headquarters and potential donors as well. That‟s what [was] 
happening. Even the cell phone, you were able to send text messages. It was very nice in a sense. 
Satellite phone, we have to use it because it was in a remote area from the network. So we have 
to use satellite phones. Expensive, but very valuable” (Respondent 15 2009). 
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The third mechanism was the use of organizational situation reports. Distributed through 
hard copies and the internet, situation reports represented a critical component of the decision 
making process. Respondent 15 (2009) also elaborated on the use of situation reports, “Our … 
reports go to the President. We were able to get the government to put some pebbles on the street 
so that trucks could go to the tsunami area. It was bad, and you could not go there. [The 
information in these reports] were … distributed to other organizations, even the government. 
We were able to provide a timely response.” The fourth mechanism was the use of coordination 
meetings, which brought together a large number of organizations, for example, every night at 
the offices of government officials, for the purpose of sharing information and designing 
effective response strategies (Respondent 15 2009). The final mechanism, primarily reserved for 
the largest of the response organizations, were rudimentary decision-support systems, which 
integrated various forms of technology for the collection and dissemination of information. In 
describing how such a system worked, an individual from a major international organization 
reported, “teams would get secondary information, historical data, they would analyze the 
satellite imagery, and then do an internal analysis, which was then vetted, at least during the 
damage loss assessment, with … other governmental counterparts. [And] a website was set up to 
publicly disseminate the information that was being developed. I think that this was the most 
effective means of transmission” (Respondent 28 2009). These mechanisms represented a critical 
element of the international sub-system in that helped to ensure that the organizations that were 
connected shared a “common operational picture” of the post-tsunami environment. 
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7.3.3 Core Administrative System 
The respondents identified three opportunities that helped the system operate in the post-tsunami 
environment. The first opportunity was social networks, which provided organizational decision 
makers with the means to navigate the complex post-tsunami environment and to find solutions 
to a variety of operational constraints. The second opportunity was that, while difficult and 
imperfect, many of the organizations in the core system were willing to engage in activities 
based on collaboration and coordination. The final opportunity was that the organizations were 
flexible, and could adapt in response to the development of unforeseen constraints. 
7.3.3.1 Social Networks 
Social networks played an important role for the organizations in the response system. The 
respondents indicated that organizations utilized social networks in three ways: 1) to acquire 
access to local communities, 2) to facilitate their access to information, resources and expertise; 
and 3) to navigate Indonesia‟s regulatory processes. In describing the post-tsunami environment, 
one respondent indicated that it was, “all about interacting and exchanging and collecting 
information. It was done personally, and face to face. You will always find that there is a 
professional willingness to share information” (Respondent 6 2009). 
The first category of social networks was those that enabled response organizations to 
gain access to the local communities. The respondents stressed that the organizations with local 
connections, the result of having been embedded in the community prior to the tsunami, were 
often perceived to be the most effective. Examples of such organizations included the Indonesian 
Red Cross, CARE, religious organizations such as Muhammadiya, and local organizations that  
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had worked in the communities before the tsunami. These organizations, while headquartered in 
Jakarta, were able to contact their local branches, and where necessary, have their local staff 
mobilize their local partners. When their relief personnel and supplies finally arrived, these 
organizations found that their local partners had already used their local contacts to organize 
volunteers, transportation, and locate accommodations for the management of relief operations. 
As a result, organizations that were connected to local communities, and had developed their 
social networks, were in a better position to initiate relief operations than the organizations that 
had little, if any, experience working in Aceh, let alone Indonesia. 
The second category of social networks was those that enabled organizations to gain 
access to information, resources and expertise. Some of these social networks included 
formalized, pre-arranged ties between response organizations. Other social networks operated at 
the inter-personal level, and the respondents reported that it often only took a phone call or a text 
message to get access to critical information or get an important task completed. It was important 
to have access to such networks in the post-tsunami environment. An official from an 
international non-governmental organization recalled how an official with significant contacts 
used his social network to develop an effective disaster management team: 
“I think that is one of the more interesting stories of all this.  The way that, as far 
as I can recall, what happened with [name removed], we was not only the director 
of [Organization Name], but also the interim coordinator for [Organization 
Name].  His superior was out of the country, so he was in charge. I think that the 
first thing that he did was contact the government and pulled together very 
quickly an ad hoc disaster management team.  In the [Organization Name] there is 
this whole protocol, and that involves a whole set of things, but he pulled together 
a disaster management team meeting, and he was very clever about it, not only 
with the government or [Organization Name], but also with [Organization Name], 
and critically, the donors.  And, so then once he had all that, and once he had 
everybody lined up, you know, this is what we want to do, this is how we want to 
do it, um, he was able to get the authority more quickly.  So, donor A wants to do 
this, send food there, access there, get planes, whatever, helicopters, so he was in 
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a much better place to get that authority.  But, I think that really happened very 
quickly. And the next thing that he did, again with very high levels of 
government, the vice-president, he was down in Aceh was meeting with him, 
grabbing a plane, and checking things out” (Respondent 24 2009). 
 
Interwoven throughout this story are indications of the third category, that social 
networks enabled organizations to navigate Indonesia‟s complex regulatory processes. One area 
that was particularly problematic was customs, with Indonesian custom agents reportedly 
delaying the release of critical supplies such as food and medicine. A member of an international 
non-governmental organization reported that they “had stuff coming from the UK and the US. 
There are a lot of items that we brought in. I think maybe 40,000 pounds or so, [including] 
international assistance, medicine and food and a lot of stuff. Hygiene kits. We did not have 
problems. Some SATKORLAK, they try to give us problems. We faced them. We knew some 
people in the government who are able to get us through the customs” (Respondent 34 2009).  
The lesson is that social networks help individuals to complete tasks. The strongest 
example came from a respondent who reported how his boss utilized his social network: 
He had worked here for four years, and if you want an example of that, there was 
one day where one of my colleagues came in and said, „we need to get the Army 
to do this.” [He] said, „hang on a second,‟ and picked up the telephone and called 
the Indonesian Minister of Defense and said, „I need to see you now.‟ He put the 
phone down, looked at us and said, „ok, we are going to the Ministry of Defense.‟ 
We just sat there going, „how did you do that?‟  I think it was on day two. And I 
think the next day, he needed to ask the Vice-President about something and he 
said, „just a second,” and picked up the phone and called the guy‟s cell phone and 
said, „I need to see you.” He had positioned himself very well, so that we had 
access. It wasn‟t difficult, you know, given that he was sms‟ing the Vice-
President. [He] had the authority and the access” (Respondent 17 2009). 
 
While it may not be possible for all organizations to have direct cell phone access to the vice-
president of the country in which they operate, these stories convey another valuable lesson. It is 
important for organizations to have contacts in the field, and to know what these contacts can 
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bring to the table in terms of access, expertise, resources, finances and personnel. Organizations 
must not only collect and organize information about social networks before a disaster occurs, 
they must also take the time to develop relationships with the contacts that populate social 
networks. As was the case in Indonesia after the tsunami, organizations that take steps to develop 
their social networks may find that the solutions to their problems may just be a phone call away. 
7.3.3.2 Emphasis on Collaboration and Coordination 
The respondents also identified collaboration and coordination as an important opportunity in the 
core system. While the respondents indicated that there is always a need for improvement, the 
coordination and cooperation that did occur enabled response organizations to improve their 
capacity to deliver goods and services in unfamiliar environment. Coordination and cooperation 
were particularly helpful in two areas. First, they helped to facilitate the collection and 
dissemination of critical information. Initially, the organizations in the response system had to 
determine the extent of the damage and the quantity of assistance that needed to be provided. 
Almost immediately, organizations such as the World Bank and the Indonesian National 
Planning Agency began to work together to collect the information needed to complete the 
official disaster damage and loss assessment. At the same time, other organizations were actively 
involved in the collection of information they needed to conduct their own operations, many of 
which attempted to distribute this information throughout the system. The most prevalent 
example of information sharing was the daily situation reports or bulletins, which provided 
organizations and donors with critical updates. According to one respondent, the creation of the 
daily progress reports played an extremely important role for the organizations in the response 
system. The respondent elaborated on this process by stating that that: 
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“We got news from the UN system, the UNOCHA.  We update our reports on the 
website. Our progress reports went to the President. We were able to get the 
government to put some pebbles on the street so that trucks could go into the 
tsunami area…. Those information were able to be distributed to other 
organizations, even the government.  We were able to provide a timely response” 
(Respondent 15 2009). 
 
The sharing of information was a continual and iterative process. Another respondent reported 
that his organization established an office in a building in Medan, and that the organizations that 
shared this space would communicate with each other on a regular basis. The respondents 
indicated that the response system did not suffer from a shortage of coordination meetings. 
Second, efforts at coordination and cooperation also helped to improve the decision 
making processes of the response organizations. For example, non-profits worked with their 
donors on a collaborative basis to develop policies that would reflect their desires and goals. 
According to another respondent, coordination and cooperation enabled his organization to share 
ideas through a process of “give-and-take” (Respondent 10 2009). Organizations would also 
communicate about the areas that needed assistance, which response strategies worked, and the 
avenues of potential collaboration. Examples of collaboration were particularly apparent among 
international organizations, which helped them to strengthen their decision making capacity. One 
international official reported success in working with other organizations, “we had pretty good 
collaboration with the UN family and with the non-governmental community. I think that the 
decision making processes were as informed as they could have been, and thus, the decisions 
were as objective as they could have been” (Respondent 17 2009). 
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7.3.3.3 Organizational Flexibility and Adaptation 
The final opportunity reflected the capacity of the organizations in the core system to exhibit 
flexibility, which enabled them to adapt in the post-tsunami environment. Some respondents 
indicated that this flexibility was the result of the operational environment itself. In discussing 
the system‟s flexibility, an official from an international non-governmental organization noted, 
“I think the opportunity was that we all had an open environment. The government was 
open…and uh, the local people were open.  I think that the people were stunned by the openness. 
And that I think was the opportunity” (Respondent 18 2009). Other respondents reported that 
organizations took action to improve their flexibility. For instance, a respondent from a separate 
international non-governmental organization reported, “[w]e try to develop local capacity. We do 
not have expatriates. Uh, and you know, I have the opportunity to hire expats, but we do not go 
to that direction because we want to develop local capacity” (Respondent 15 2009). 
Whether due to the actions of the organizations, or their operational environment, the 
flexibility that existed in the core system enabled organizations to step outside of traditional 
operational patterns and develop unique solutions to unforeseen problems. There were two areas 
where organizational flexibility was particularly useful. First, organizations that demonstrated 
flexibility were able to adapt to the physical environment. The earthquake and tsunami destroyed 
infrastructure that inhibited organizations from using traditional forms of transportation. An 
international official who dealt with this problem indicated that the situation demanded that 
organizations be flexible. He stated, “[The organization‟s name] recognized that doing all that 
methodologically sound stuff was going to be very difficult. We got on U.S. helicopters. We 
flew down the west coast. We, actually, did lots of things that would be considered rather bad 
humanitarian practice. But in the absence of our capacity to do anything else, it was like, well, 
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this is the best we could do, so let‟s do it” (Respondent 17 2009). This ability to adjust was 
crucial for the organizations that participated in the initial response. A respondent from an 
Indonesian university gave an excellent example, “In our case, [our] rescue team, [our] medical 
response team, when they have to do operations, for example, you have to do it at the hospital in 
the sterilized operating room, right? But during the disaster, there is not sterilized operation 
room; they have to do it out of the tent. They adjust all those regulations (Respondent 5 2009). 
Second, flexible organizations were able to adapt to the needs of the affected 
communities. Many of the respondents made comparisons between governmental organizations 
and non-governmental organizations, noting that the governmental organizations were the least 
likely to adapt. For example, when asked which category of organizations were more flexible, a 
respondent indicated, “I‟d say that non-governmental organization [were] much more open to 
change compared to the government” (Respondent 5 2009). Although governmental 
organizations may have been less likely to change, they still demonstrated significant flexibility, 
especially considering that it was the government that allowed international organizations to 
access the disaster site (Respondent 5 2009; Respondent 19 2009). The need to adapt was 
particularly pressing for the non-governmental organizations, which quickly realized that they 
had to modify their procedures to fit the Indonesian context. An Acehnese resident who served as 
a tsunami volunteer explained the need for flexibility in non-governmental organizations: 
If [non-governmental organizations] want to do something, they may have a 
program and a procedure, but between they come to the community, the 
community says that no, you can‟t do that because it is against our local customs, 
and this is our way.  So, they sit together and talk about what‟s the problem, and 
how to solve it, and then they make the deal, because otherwise, they can‟t work” 
(Respondent 43 2009). 
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The processes by which organizations adapted and adjusted in the post-tsunami environment 
were not scripted. In many instances, the response organizations lacked standard operational 
procedures that covered the circumstances they encountered on the ground. When reacting to 
such situations, many organizations would simply develop an ad hoc procedure and then adjust 
that procedure as necessary. One Indonesian respondent described this evolutionary process as 
one of “mutual adjustment and change” (Respondent 51 2009). 
 This chapter indicates that the administrative system which responded to the Great 
Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004 managed to adjust to a variety of 
operational constraints and opportunities. These findings complement those presented in chapters 
five and six, which indicate that that the administrative system possessed the capacity to adapt 
and self-organize in uncertain and rapidly changing conditions. The subsequent chapter takes this 
analysis one step further, by evaluating the extent to which the core system and its sub-systems 
possessed the components of administrative resilience. 
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8.0  THE RESILIENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The data presented in the previous chapters indicate that the organizations that operated in the 
administrative system that emerged after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 
December 2004 experienced a variety of operational constraints and opportunities. The data also 
indicate that the structure of the interactions among organizations within this system evolved. 
Focusing on the factors that drove this structural change, this chapter addresses this study‟s 
fourth research question: to what extent did the administrative system that operated in Indonesia 
after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami possess the capacity for resilience? 
8.1 EVALUATING THE COMPONENTS OF RESILIENCE 
The qualitative data used in this study were collected from the transcripts of the forty-eight semi-
structured interviews conducted with experts that possessed knowledge of the events that 
transpired in Indonesia after the tsunami. These transcripts, coded using MAXQDA, indicate that 
the components and sub-components of the framework of administrative resilience were present 
in the system that operated in Indonesia following the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami. 
These components and sub-components, coded using an ordinal schema (1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 
and 3 = High), were evaluated using the data collected from the fifty-two surveys and the forty-
eight transcripts. By way of example, if the majority of respondents reported the presence of a 
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system characteristic as “great extent” or “significant extent,” the related sub-component would 
then receive a “high” score. While I recognize that this study‟s sample size is small, and that my 
analysis often resulted in the awarding of scores where small differences led to a shift in 
category, for example, from “low” to “medium,” this analysis is useful as a preliminary 
assessment of the framework of administrative resilience. Future research will strengthen this 
framework by refining its measures and increasing the sample size used for data collection. 
8.1.1 Environmental Component 
The framework of administrative resilience evaluates the level of pre-event preparedness through 
the environmental component, which represents the set initial conditions in the at-risk 
community. In the Indonesian context, this sub-component considers the effectiveness of the 
disaster management laws, regulations and policies in Indonesia at the time of the tsunami. The 
environmental component is comprised of the six sub-components presented in Table 16. 
 
 
Table 16: Description of Environmental Sub-Components 
 
 
Governmental 
Awareness 
Indications that Indonesia‟s governments were aware of 
the risks posed by disasters. 
Social 
Awareness 
Indications that Indonesian society was aware of the 
risks posed by disasters. 
Preparedness Indications that government and communities were 
prepared for risks posed by disasters. 
Laws and 
Regulations 
Indications of the quality of disaster management rules 
and regulations. 
Disaster 
Plans 
Indications of the quality of disaster management plans 
and procedures. 
Institutions Indications of the capacity of disaster management 
institutions. 
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The environmental sub-components for the core system and its sub-systems, received 
“low” scores. Prior to the tsunami, Indonesia‟s governments and communities were not aware of 
the risks posed by disasters. This lack of awareness had a substantial effect on Indonesia‟s 
overall level of pre-tsunami disaster preparedness, which impacted both the domestic sub-system 
and the international sub-system. As Table 17 indicates, the majority of the respondents reported 
that Indonesia was not prepared for a large-scale disaster event prior to December 2004. In fact, 
48 or 97.96% of the respondents indicated that Indonesia‟s pre-tsunami level of preparedness 
was at, or below, “moderate extent.” Of these respondents, 44 or 89.80% classified Indonesia‟s 
level of preparedness at, or below, “small extent.” The lack of preparation also had a severe 
impact on the response organizations that came to Indonesia. For instance, one of the initial tasks 
for responding organizations, in addition to providing assistance, was to identify the resources 
and responsibilities of the organizations that were already operating in the response system. 
Under normal circumstances, even in large scales disasters, there is typically is some pre-existing 
domestic capacity, which can be use to guide the development of the administrative response 
system. In Indonesia, this capacity was almost non-existent and the disaster response structures 
that developed after the tsunami were initiated on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Table 17: Level of Pre-Tsunami Preparedness 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 3 6.1 15 30.6 3 6.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 21 42.9 
Domestic 6 12.2 20 40.8 1 2.0 0 0.0 1 2.0 0 0.0 28 57.1 
Total 9 18.4 35 71.4 4 8.2 0 0.0 1 2.0 0 0.0 49 100 
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This lack of preparedness was also apparent in the extent to which Indonesia‟s regulatory 
system was designed to facilitate disaster management activities. Again, the majority of the 
respondents reported that there was little, if any, regulatory capacity for disaster management 
prior to the tsunami. As Table 18 indicates, of the 41 respondents who considered the question 
applicable, 100% ranked the adequacy of Indonesia‟s regulations at, or below, “moderate 
extent.” Of these, 35 or 85.37% ranked the adequacy at “small extent” or less. Although 
identified as a primary constraint for the domestic sub-system, both domestic and international 
respondents agreed about the inadequacy of Indonesia‟s disaster management regulations. 
 
 
 
Table 18: Adequacy of Pre-Tsunami Regulations 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 4 8.9 10 22.2 4 8.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 6.7 21 46.7 
Domestic 8 17.8 13 28.9 2 4.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.2 24 53.3 
Total 12 26.7 23 51.2 6 13.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 8.9 45 100 
 
 
 
Similar patterns were also apparent in the extent to which organizations had response 
plans that emphasized collaboration. The respondents reported that, prior to the tsunami; 
organizations did not have disaster response plans that emphasized collaboration. Table 19 
indicates that 32 or 71.11% of the respondents believed that the extent to which organization 
possessed such plans was at “small extent” or less. While it would not necessarily be surprising 
that the domestic respondents would provide such results, what was surprising was the extent to 
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which the international respondents reported similar concerns. This suggests that, even with their 
extensive disaster management experience, international organizations had not yet fully 
integrated inter-organizational collaboration into their operational plans prior to the tsunami. 
 
 
 
Table 19: Existence of Pre-Tsunami Plans that Emphasized Collaboration 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 3 6.3 10 20.8 5 10.4 3 6.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 21 43.8 
Domestic 8 16.7 11 22.9 3 6.3 1 2.1 1 2.1 3 6.3 27 56.3 
Total 11 22.9 21 43.8 8 16.7 4 8.3 1 2.1 3 6.3 48 100 
 
 
 
 The final environmental sub-component, institutional capacity, also received a “low” 
score. The respondents indicated that the Indonesian government did not have the institutional 
capacity to manage disaster events prior to the tsunami. At the national level, the disaster 
management agency, BAKORNAS PBP, was organized as a coordinating body, which was 
designed to manage disaster operations. Even though BAKORNAS PBP possessed the 
responsibility to shape policy, it lacked the authority to direct the actions of the line ministries. 
Indonesian institutions also disagreed on what constituted a disaster, and more importantly, 
whose responsibility it would be to respond to the events that did qualify as a disaster. These 
disagreements created deficiencies at the provincial and local levels, and SATKORLAK and 
SATLAK were often underfunded and understaffed. Many of the respondents also indicated that 
local officials had not received sufficient training prior to the tsunami, nor were they dedicated to 
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improving disaster management capacity in local communities. In an almost ironic fashion, it 
was the disruption of Indonesia‟s disaster management system, in conjunction with the collapse 
of government institutions, which improved the decision making capacity of the response system 
that developed. The results for the environmental sub-components are presented in Table 20. 
 
 
 
Table 20: Scores for the Environmental Sub-Components 
 
 
 
Domestic 
System 
International 
System 
Core 
System 
Su
b-
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Governmental Awareness Low Low Low 
Social Awareness Low Low Low 
Preparedness Low Low Low 
Laws and Regulations Low Low Low 
Disaster Plans Low Low Low 
Institutions Low Low Low 
 
 
 
8.1.2 Technological Component 
Technology can help decision makers to manage uncertain operational environments. The 
technological component of the framework of administrative resilience considers the nature of 
the technology employed in an administrative system, and the extent to which this technology is 
used to facilitate effective operations. In the context of the administrative system that operated in 
Indonesia after the tsunami, this component considers whether technology effectively supported 
disaster management operations during the month after the disaster. The technological 
component is comprised of the six sub-components described in Table 21. 
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Table 21: Description of Technological Sub-Components 
 
 
Availability Indications that technology was available for use by 
response organizations. 
Form Indications of the form (low / medium / high) of 
technology used by organizations. 
Adaptability Indications that organizations possessed expertise to 
utilize technology to adapt their activities. 
Collaboration Indication that technology facilitated collaboration by 
organizations in the system. 
Interoperability Indications that the technology used was interoperable. 
Integration Indications that technology was integrated in to a single 
decision support system. 
 
 
 
During the month after the tsunami, response organizations had a diverse range of 
technology at their disposal. The larger organizations deployed high technology, including 
satellite communications, GPS and GIS databases. Some of the smaller organizations used less 
sophisticated technology, including pens, paper and white boards. Tables 22 through 24 indicate 
that most organizations employed technology such as cell phones, radios, personal computers, 
and the internet. Other than the distinctions discussed below, there were few technological 
differences between the sub-systems. The impression among the respondents was that advanced 
technology was more readily available to, and brought to the response system by, international 
organizations. While the availability of technology was sufficient for the response, the 
respondents reported difficulties with technology after the response ended, especially when 
departing organizations donated equipment, but not the expertise, to operate and maintain the 
equipment. One respondent indicated that his sick infant son had died during the recovery period 
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because local medical staff could not operate the equipment that an international organization 
had left behind at a clinic in Banda Aceh, Indonesia (Respondent 36 2009). 
 
 
 
Table 22: Technology Reported Used in the Domestic Sub-System 
 
 
 
Used Not Used Total 
N % N % N % 
High Frequency Radio 8 38.1 13 61.9 21 100 
Low Frequency Radio 8 38.1 13 61.9 21 100 
Cell Phone 19 90.5 2 9.5 21 100 
Satellite Phone 10 47.6 11 52.4 21 100 
Satellite Observation 4 19 17 81 21 100 
Fax 13 61.9 8 38.1 21 100 
Email 14 66.7 7 33.3 21 100 
Websites 9 42.9 12 57.1 21 100 
GIS 4 19 17 81 21 100 
GPS 5 23.8 16 76.2 21 100 
Other 7 33.3 14 66.7 21 100 
 
 
 
The technology used by domestic organizations is reported in Table 22. Of interest is the 
prevalence of the cell phone, which 19 or 90.48% of the domestic respondents reported using. 
Although the cell phone system in parts of the island of Sumatra was disrupted by the disaster, 
public and private organizations were able to reestablish cellular communications with mobile 
cell phone towers. The reliance on the cell phone as a communication tool is explained by two 
factors. First, the cell phone generally, and sms messaging specifically, is the predominant form 
of communication technology used by Indonesians. Second, with basic infrastructure 
requirements, the cell phone is an extremely effective tool for promoting the rapid exchange of 
information. As indicated in chapter seven, cell phones were used by decision makers to call 
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upon their social networks. Other technologies were also extremely valuable for the response, for 
example, email, fax machines and satellite phones, which were reported used at 66.67%, 61.90% 
and 47.62% respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 23: Technology Reported Used in the International Sub-System 
 
 
 
Used Not Used Total 
N % N % N % 
High Frequency Radio 8 36.4 14 63.6 22 100 
Low Frequency Radio 6 27.3 16 72.7 22 100 
Cell Phone 19 86.4 3 13.6 22 100 
Satellite Phone 12 54.5 10 45.5 22 100 
Satellite Observation 7 31.8 15 68.2 22 100 
Fax 13 59.1 9 40.9 22 100 
Email 14 63.6 8 36.4 22 100 
Websites 8 36.4 14 63.6 22 100 
GIS 8 36.4 14 63.6 22 100 
GPS 7 31.8 15 68.2 22 100 
Other 6 27.3 16 72.2 22 100 
 
 
 
A similar pattern in technology usage is apparent with the organizations in the 
international sub-system. Table 23 indicates that international organizations also relied heavily 
on cell phones, at 19 or 86.36% of 22 respondents. Like the domestic respondents, the 
international respondents reported that their organizations also relied on email and fax 
technology, which were reported as used at 63.64% and 59.10% respectively. Slightly more 
international respondents reported the use of satellite phones, at 12 or 54.55% of 22 respondents, 
than their domestic counterparts, at 10 or 47.62% of 21 respondents. There were larger 
differences between sub-systems regarding the use of more advanced forms of technologies, for 
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example, Graphical Information Systems (GIS) or Global Positioning Systems (GPS). 
International respondents reported the use of these technologies at 36.36% and 31.82% 
respectively, while domestic respondents reported their use at 19.05% and 23.81% respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 24: Technology Reported Used in the Core System 
 
 
 
Used Not Used Total 
N % N % N % 
High Frequency Radio 16 72.7 27 62.8 43 100 
Low Frequency Radio 14 32.6 29 67.4 43 100 
Cell Phone 38 88.4 5 11.6 43 100 
Satellite Phone 22 51.2 21 48.8 43 100 
Satellite Observation 11 25.6 32 74.4 43 100 
Fax 26 60.5 17 39.5 43 100 
Email 28 65.1 15 34.9 43 100 
Websites 17 39.5 26 60.5 43 100 
GIS 12 27.9 31 72.1 43 100 
GPS 12 27.9 31 72.1 43 100 
Other 13 30.2 30 69.8 43 100 
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics related to technology usage in the core administrative system 
are reported in Table 24. Again, the cell phone was the form of technology most reported used 
by response organizations, at 38 or 88.37% of 43 respondents. What was perhaps more 
interesting was the extent to which certain technologies were not used. In particular, 
organizations in the core system did not employ three important categories of technology to the 
extent they perhaps could have. First, 32 or 74.42% of 43 respondents indicated that they did not 
use satellite observation technology to help them collect information that would guide their 
operations. While it not logical to assume that every organization would have access to satellites, 
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at the very least, the images generated by satellite technology should be made available to all of 
the organizations that participate in a response system. Second, many of the respondents, 31 or 
72.09% of 43, reported that their organizations did not utilize decision-support technologies such 
as GIS or GPS. Finally, 26 or 60.47% of the respondents indicated they did not use the internet 
to collect or disseminate information. These findings suggest that, while organizations had 
sufficient technology to conduct their operations, the use of alternative forms of technology 
might have improved the adaptive capacity of the core system. 
 
 
 
Table 25: Organizations had Sufficient Technology to Adapt their Activities 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 7 15.9 5 11.4 5 11.4 3 6.8 1 2.3 21 47.7 
Domestic 1 2.3 10 22.7 3 6.8 6 13.6 1 2.3 2 4.5 23 52.3 
Total 1 2.3 17 38.6 8 18.2 11 25 4 9.1 3 6.8 44 100 
 
 
 
Even though the respondents reported that the organizations in the response system relied 
on common forms of technology, they also believed that the organizations had sufficient 
technology to adapt their activities. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 25 support this 
conclusion. Indeed, 13 or 65.00% of 20 the international respondents who considered the 
question relevant rated the sufficiency of technology for adaptation at “moderate extent” or 
higher. In contrast, 10 or 46.62% of 21 domestic respondents reported similar results. Given this 
difference, and because the respondents reported that the organizations in the international sub-
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system were slightly more adaptive than the domestic counterparts, the international sub-system 
received a “high” score for adaptability. The core system received a “high” score, in large part, 
because of the presence and contributions of the international organizations. The domestic sub-
system received a “medium” for adaptability because 19 or 82.6% of 21 the respondents rated 
the sufficiency of technology for adaptation between “small extent” and “great extent.” 
 
 
 
Table 26: Organizations had Sufficient Technology to Collaborate 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 3 6.8 4 9.1 6 23.6 6 23.6 4 9.2 1 2.3 24 54.5 
Domestic 0 0.0 7 15.9 6 23.6 6 23.6 0 0.0 1 2.3 20 45.5 
Total 3 6.8 11 25 12 37.3 12 37.3 4 9.2 2 4.5 44 100 
 
 
 
The statistics reported in Table 26 suggest that technology also played a role in enabling 
collaboration amongst response organization. The domestic respondents indicated that 
technology facilitated collaboration in the post-tsunami environment somewhere between “small 
extent” and “moderate extent.” This may reflect the fact that organizations relied heavily on cell 
phone technology. In contrast, the responses provided by the international respondents were 
distributed across the available categories, indicating that there were differences in opinion as to 
how important technology was for collaboration. While most responses fell within the “moderate 
extent” and “great extent” categories, 4 or 17.39% of 23 relevant international respondents 
suggested that technology helped collaboration to a “significant extent.” At the other end of this 
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spectrum, 7 or 30.43% of 23 respondents indicated that technology only helped to a “small 
extent” or less. While the international organizations reported that they had sufficient technology 
to adapt their activities, this same technology did not seem to facilitate collaboration amongst 
organizations. This finding corresponds with the findings presented in chapters six and seven, 
where the data indicate that there were international organizations that operated in isolation. This 
means organizations had technology to support their own operations, but not necessarily the 
technology to support collaboration with other organizations. Given these results, the core 
system and its sub-systems received “medium” scores for the collaboration sub-component. 
The respondents did not report significant problems with the interoperability of the 
technology used after the tsunami. This is also likely because the response organizations relied 
heavily on standard technology, for example, cell phones and the internet. Consequently, the 
domestic and international sub-systems received a “medium” score for the interoperability sub-
component. The reason why this sub-component did not receive a “high” score was some of the 
respondents reported problems with the fusion of data that was stored in electronic databases, 
which created difficulties for organizations that sought to provide to such databases or retrieve 
information from such databases. Many of the respondents, especially those that worked for local 
non-governmental organizations in Aceh, reported that this problem continued to hamper 
operations, even years after the conclusion of the emergency response phase. 
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Table 27: Integration of Technology for Decision-Support 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.3 2 4.7 7 16.3 6 14 4 9.3 3 7 23 53.5 
Domestic 2 4.7 5 11.6 7 16.3 5 11.6 1 2.3 0 0.0 20 46.5 
Total 3 7 7 16.3 14 32.6 11 25.6 5 11.6 3 7 43 100 
 
 
 
The final sub-component considers the extent to which the technology employed in the 
post-tsunami environment was integrated into single decision-support system. Such systems are 
important in uncertain environments because they enable the organizations in administrative 
systems to develop a “common operating picture” of events as they unfold. The results presented 
in Table 27 indicate that the technology used during the response was partially integrated, which 
helped response organizations to develop a common operating picture of the disaster response 
system. When the respondents explained how the technology was integrated, many of them 
mentioned that they communicated information back to the local office, which would use the 
information to make decisions. The respondents did not mention whether their technology was 
also used to provide this information to the larger response community. 
While technological integration did occur in the administrative response system, it was 
typically rudimentary and used in specific organizations. Most of the integration occurred 
amongst the organizations in the international sub-system, which used technology to create 
standardized databases and communication mechanisms that enabled them to disseminate 
information to their partner organizations and financial donors. Some of the respondents 
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indicated that there were organizations that did not have access to such technical systems, or if 
they did, they had difficulties receiving information from these systems. The respondents also 
suggested that, while some steps were taken develop decision-support systems for specific 
organizations, or groups of organizations, these steps did not facilitate the development of a 
single decision-support system for the response system as a whole. Given that there were areas 
where the integration of technology could have been improved, the core system and the 
international sub-systems each received a “medium” score for the integration sub-component. In 
contrast, because of its reliance on international organizations, the domestic sub-system received 
a “low” score. The results for the organizational sub-components are presented in Table 28. 
 
 
 
Table 28: Scores for the Technological Sub-Components 
 
 
 
Domestic 
System 
International 
System 
Core 
System 
Su
b-
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Availability Low High Medium 
Form Medium Medium Medium 
Adaptability Medium High High 
Collaboration Medium Medium Medium 
Interoperability Medium Medium Medium 
Integration Low Medium Medium 
 
 
 
8.1.3 Interaction Component 
The interaction component considers the extent to which organizational interactions enabled the 
distribution of information, resources and personnel throughout the response system. This 
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component also considers whether the interactions among the organizations evolved after the 
disruptive event. This component is comprised of the six sub-components described in Table 29. 
 
 
 
Table 29: Description of Interacting Sub-Components 
 
 
Assistance Indications that organizations provided to, or received assistance 
from, other organizations. 
Information Indications that organizations exchanged information. 
Expertise Indications that organizations exchanged scientific expertise. 
Resources Indications that organizations exchanged resources. 
Personnel Indications that organizations exchanged personnel. 
Evolution Indications that the response system evolved over time. 
 
 
 
The respondents indicated that organizations in both sub-systems provided assistance to, 
and received assistance from, other organizations. For the core system, Table 30 reveals that 38 
or 88.37% of 43 respondents indicated that the provision of assistance occurred at a “moderate 
extent” or higher. This assistance came in many forms, including the provision of information, 
resources, technology and supplies. Similar findings are reported in Table 31, which reveals that 
organizations were also extremely likely to receive assistance from other organizations, 
especially when it came to the transmission of information. As indicated in chapter seven, both 
domestic and international organizations were willing to receive information that would help 
them to improve their understanding of the operational environment. When pressed for examples 
other than information exchange, the respondents indicated that their organizations were 
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primarily focused on providing assistance to affected communities, as opposed to other response 
organizations. Indeed, Table 30 and Table 31 reveal that organizations were more concerned 
with providing assistance than receiving assistance. For these reasons, the core system and its 
sub-systems received “medium” scores for the assistance sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 30: Organizations Provided Assistance to other Organizations 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.3 2 4.5 7 15.9 9 20.5 5 11.4 0 0.0 24 54.5 
Domestic 1 2.3 1 2.3 7 15.9 6 13.6 4 9.1 1 2.3 20 45.5 
Total 2 4.5 3 6.8 14 31.8 15 34.1 9 20.5 1 2.3 44 100 
 
 
 
Table 31: Organizations Received Assistance from other Organizations 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 5 11.4 9 20.5 9 20.5 1 2.3 0 0.0 24 54.5 
Domestic 2 4.5 4 9.1 5 11.4 4 9.1 4 9.1 1 2.3 20 45.5 
Total 2 4.5 9 20.5 14 31.8 13 29.5 5 11.4 1 2.3 44 100 
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Organizations in both sub-systems were heavily involved in information exchange. 
Indeed, all organizations worked to developed mechanisms for information exchange, whether 
through the use of daily situation reports, meetings or personal telephone calls. Organizations did 
this to identify needs, to navigate the Indonesian bureaucracy, and to coordinate activities. The 
importance placed on information exchange is revealed by Table 32, where 42 or 97.67% of 43 
relevant respondents indicated that such exchanges actually occurred. More importantly, of the 
43 relevant respondents, 33 or 76.74% reported that information exchange occurred at a “great 
extent” or “significant extent.” These findings indicate why the core system and its sub-systems 
a “high” score for the information sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 32: Organizations Exchanged Information in Response System 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.2 0 0.0 5 10.9 11 23.9 5 10.9 2 4.3 24 52.2 
Domestic 0 0.0 1 2.2 3 6.5 13 28.3 4 8.7 1 2.2 22 47.8 
Total 1 2.2 1 2.2 8 17.4 24 52.2 9 19.6 3 6.5 46 100 
 
 
 
Table 33 indicates that organizations also exchanged scientific expertise. The respondents 
suggested, however, that organizations focused primarily on activities such as search and rescue, 
debris removal, and corpse disposal, which did not require much scientific expertise. Indeed, 6 or 
13% of 46 respondents indicated that the exchange of scientific expertise was “not applicable” to 
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their operations. More specifically, 13 or 32.50% of 40 relevant respondents reported that the 
exchange of expertise occurred at a “small extent” or less. When such exchanges did occur, they 
related to the use of technology brought by international organizations. For these reasons, the 
core system and its sub-systems received a “low” score for the expertise sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 33: Organizations Exchanged Scientific Expertise in Response System 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.2 5 10.9 6 13 4 8.7 3 6.5 5 10.9 24 52.2 
Domestic 2 4.3 5 10.9 3 6.5 6 13 5 10.9 1 2.2 22 47.8 
Total 3 6.5 10 21.7 9 19.6 10 21.7 8 17.4 6 13 46 100 
 
 
 
There was less of a difference in the extent to which organizations exchanged resources. 
Table 34 indicates that organizations actively exchanged resources. Of the 41 respondents who 
considered the questions relevant, 31 or 75.61% reported that resources were exchanged at a 
“moderate extent” or higher. The data retrieved from the semi-structured interviews, however, 
suggests that the respondents may have over reported the exchange of resources in the surveys. 
For example, the respondents indicated that the exchange of resources was not as high of a 
priority as the exchange of information. They also suggested that their mission was to provide 
resources to the affected populations, not to other response organizations. When resources were 
exchanged between organizations, the interactions were geared towards directing the resources to 
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the affected communities. Other examples of resource exchange reflected the need for 
transportation and major pieces of equipment. For these reasons, the core system and its 
constituent sub-systems received a “low” score for the resource exchange sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 34: Organizations Exchanged Resources in Response System 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 2 4.3 4 8.7 5 10.9 5 10.9 4 8.7 4 8.7 24 52.2 
Domestic 0 0.0 4 8.7 8 17.4 6 13 3 6.5 1 2.2 22 47.8 
Total 2 4.3 8 17.4 13 28.3 11 23.9 7 15.2 5 10.9 46 100 
 
 
 
With respect to the exchange of personnel, 40 or 95.24% of the 42 respondents that 
considered the question applicable indicated that such exchanges occurred. There were 
differences between how the domestic and international respondents reported on such exchanges. 
As Table 35 reveals, of the 21 domestic respondents that fell into the applicable category, 17 or 
80.95% classified the exchange of personnel at “moderate extent” or higher. In contrast, only 11 
or 52.38% of the 21 international respondents who considered the question applicable felt the 
same way. This may have been because international organizations had to rely upon the domestic 
organizations for personnel who could speak local languages. The international results also 
indicate that 10 or 47.62% of the 31 respondents reported that personnel were exchanged at only 
a “small extent” or less. The respondents reported that most international organizations either 
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brought the personnel they needed to conduct operations with them, often from foreign offices, 
or they took steps to hire the personnel they needed as necessary. When pressed, the respondents 
could not provide many examples of where organizations exchanged personnel. Rather, the focus 
seemed to be on collaboration, where one organization might assign personnel to assist another 
organization for collaborative purposes, but the affiliation of the personnel would not change. 
For these reasons, the response systems received a “low” score for the personnel sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 35: Organizations Exchanged Personnel in Response System 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 2 4.3 8 17.4 4 8.7 6 13 1 2.2 3 6.5 24 52.2 
Domestic 0 0.0 4 8.7 6 13 10 21.7 1 2.2 1 2.2 22 47.8 
Total 2 4.3 12 26.1 10 21.7 16 34.8 2 4.3 4 4.3 46 100 
 
 
 
According to chapters six, the core system and its sub-systems underwent significant 
structural evolution after the tsunami. Most evident was the extent to which the structures of 
these sub-systems differed, as indicated by the density, diameter and component results, which 
revealed that the international sub-system appeared to become more consolidated and stable in 
terms of organizational interactions. The data also indicated that the international organizations 
contributed to the development and structural evolution of Indonesia‟s administrative response 
system. This was especially the case with respect to the manner in which organizations targeted 
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certain classifications of response organizations. Domestic organizations initially preferred to 
target other domestic organizations, but as the system developed, they began to increasingly 
target international organizations. In contrast, international organizations strictly preferred to 
target other international organizations. Given that the network data suggests that the domestic 
sub-system evolved away from a stable state, the domestic sub-system received a “low” score for 
the evolution sub-component. In contrast, the international sub-system and core system received 
“high” scores. The overall results for the network sub-components are presented in Table 36. 
 
 
 
Table 36: Scores for the Interacting Sub-Components 
 
 
 
Domestic 
System 
International 
System 
Core 
System 
Su
b-
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Assistance Medium Medium Medium 
Information High High High 
Expertise Low Low Low 
Resources Low Low Low 
Personnel Low Low Low 
Evolution Low High High 
 
 
 
8.1.4 Information Component 
Decision making processes must be supported by information. The more that information is 
available, the more likely that decision makers will make good decisions. The framework of 
administrative resilience employs the information component to evaluate extent to which 
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information is available to, and utilized by, the organizations in an administrative system. The 
information component is comprised of the six sub-components presented in Table 37. 
 
 
 
Table 37: Description of Information Sub-Components 
 
 
Needs Indications that the information needs of the organizations 
in the response system were met. 
Quality Indications of the quality of the information in the 
response system. 
Availability Indications of the availability of information in the 
response system. 
Importance Indications of the importance placed on information by 
the organizations in the response system. 
Search Indications of information search and acquisition by 
organizations in the response system. 
Acceptance Indications that new information was accepted by the 
organizations in the response system. 
 
 
 
For both sub-systems, the scores for the information sub-components ranged between 
“medium” and “high.” The three sub-components that received “medium” scores were needs, 
quality and availability. The respondents indicated that organizations had an extreme need for 
information during the month after the tsunami. In many situations, these needs were not initially 
met, and decision making was constrained due to the lack of information related to culture, 
language and the quantity and quality of resources available. Most problematic was the lack of 
demographic information, which undermined the ability of the response organizations to identify 
the most critically affected populations. With respect to quality and availability, many of the 
respondents indicated that some of the information they received was inaccurate. For example, 
there were problems with the number of reported deceased, as well as the number and location of 
216 
 
displaced persons. In some cases, organizations responded to problems in information quality by 
restricting information dissemination or spending time on information verification. There were 
also issues of information availability. Especially immediately after the tsunami, when 
organizations struggled to determine the nature and scope of the disaster. Although there were 
many difficulties with these three sub-components, they were scored as “medium” because the 
respondents indicated that organizations made it a priority to develop mechanisms to overcome 
the deficiencies in information quality and availability. 
 
 
 
Table 38: Organizations Exchanged Information 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.2 0 0.0 5 10.9 11 23.9 5 10.9 2 4.3 24 52.2 
Domestic 0 0.0 1 2.2 3 6.5 13 28.3 4 8.7 1 2.2 22 47.8 
Total 1 2.2 1 2.2 8 17.4 24 52.2 9 19.6 3 6.5 46 100 
 
 
 
The other three sub-components, importance, search, and acceptance received “high” 
scores. There were two reasons why organizations placed a “high” importance on information. 
First, many organizations had little experience conducting operations in Indonesia. Second, it 
was impossible to conduct effective operations without knowing the location and needs of the 
affected populations. An official from a local non-governmental organization with international 
funding indicated just how critical information was to their operations in Aceh, “We, yea, rely 
entirely on the information that other organizations provided to us” (Respondent 34 2009). The 
217 
 
statistics reported in Table 38 provide an indirect measure of the extent to which organizations in 
the response system searched for information. When asked about the exchange of information in 
the response system, 41 or 95.35% of the respondents who considered the question relevant rated 
information exchange at “moderate extent” or higher. Of these respondents, 31 or 75.61% rated 
information exchange at “great extent” or higher. The willingness to exchange information 
suggests that there was an extremely high demand for information in the administrative system. 
 
 
 
Table 39: Willingness of Organizations to Accept New Information 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 3 7 3 7 11 25.6 5 11.6 2 4.7 24 55.8 
Domestic 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 9.3 11 25.6 4 9.3 0 0.0 19 44.2 
Total 0 0.0 3 7 7 16.3 22 51.2 9 20.9 2 4.7 43 100 
 
 
 
Organizations were also willing to accept new information. As Table 39 indicates, of the 
41 respondents who considered the question relevant, not one indicated that organizations 
refused to accept new information. Indeed, 38 or 92.68% of 41 respondents ranked willingness to 
accept information at “moderate extent” or higher. Of these, 22 or 57.89% ranked willingness to 
accept information at “great extent.” An official from an international organization indicated that 
“people were proactively seeking information assistance from anywhere they could find it, they 
were being creative in thinking about where I can get expertise, which I can get stuff. Both 
within the organization and externally” (Respondent 19 2009). The respondents who ranked 
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willingness to accept new information as “small extent” were from international organizations. 
The results for the information sub-components are presented in Table 40. 
 
 
 
Table 40: Scores for the Information Sub-Components 
 
 
 
Domestic 
System 
International 
System 
Core 
System 
Su
b-
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Needs Medium Medium Medium 
Quality Medium Medium Medium 
Availability Medium Medium Medium 
Importance High High High 
Search High High High 
Acceptance High High High 
 
 
 
8.1.5 Organizational Component  
To respond to uncertain environments, decision makers must be flexible in how they approach 
problems. Their goal should not be to identify the one perfect solution, but rather, identify good 
solutions that can be rapidly implemented. This process is included in the framework of 
administrative resilience through the organizational component, which represents rapidity and 
adjustment and considers the extent to which organizations had the operational plans, personnel, 
training, authority and resources that enabled them to engage in adaptive activities. The 
organizational component is comprised of the six sub-components described in Table 41. 
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Table 41: Description of Organizational Sub-Components 
 
 
Operational 
Plans 
Indications that organizations had plans necessary for 
adaptation and collaboration. 
Authority Indications that organizations had the authority to adapt their 
activities without approval. 
Personnel Indications that organizations had personnel necessary for 
adaptation and collaboration. 
Training Indications that organizations had training necessary for 
adaptation and collaboration. 
Resources Indications that organizations had personnel necessary for 
adaptation and collaboration. 
Mistake 
Correction Indications that organizations corrected their mistakes. 
 
 
 
Regarding the effectiveness of their operational plans, the respondents reported that 
domestic organizations were limited in terms of their level of preparedness. This was related to 
the fact that, prior to the tsunami, the disaster management activities of domestic organizations 
were limited in scope and focus. This meant that domestic organizations did not typically engage 
in disaster management planning or collaboration activities. While there were larger domestic 
organizations, for example the Indonesian Red Cross, which had taken steps to prepare for 
collaboration, the international respondents reported that their organizations were slightly better 
prepared than their domestic counterparts. As Table 42 indicates, of those who considered the 
question applicable, 17 or 77.27% of the international respondents rated the effectiveness of their 
operational plans at “moderate extent” or higher. Likewise, 13 or 68.42% of the domestic 
respondents reported the effectiveness of their operational plans at “moderate extent” or higher. 
What is surprising is that 11 of 40, or 25% of the respondents who considered the question 
relevant rated the effectiveness of their operational plans at “small extent” or less. This is a clear 
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indication that many organizations were not prepared for response activities. This difference also 
explains why the core system received a “medium” rating for this sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 42: Effectiveness of Operational Plans 
 
  
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 4 9.1 1 2.3 8 18.2 5 11.4 4 9.1 2 4.5 24 54.5 
Domestic 3 6.8 3 6.8 2 4.5 10 22.7 1 2.3 1 2.3 20 45.5 
Total 7 15.9 4 9.1 10 22.7 15 34.1 5 11.4 3 6.8 44 100 
 
 
 
The respondents also indicated that there were differences in terms of the authority 
possessed by the organizations in the sub-systems. The respondents were asked about the extent 
to which that their organizations possessed the authority to adapt their activities without approval 
from governmental authorities such as BAKORNAS PBP or the Indonesian military. As 
indicated in chapter seven, the Indonesian government provided international organizations with 
a wide amount of latitude regarding the activities they undertook during the month after the 
tsunami. This latitude provided international organizations with an extensive amount of 
flexibility, enabling them to develop collaborative relationships with other organizations. In 
contrast, domestic respondents did not experience the same freedom. Table 43 confirms this 
difference. Of the international respondents that found the question relevant, 13 or 68.42% of 
them rated their authority at “great extent” or higher. In contrast, only 7 or 33.33% of the 
domestic respondents felt the same way. In fact, a larger portion of the domestic respondents, 10 
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or 47.61%, reported that their authority to adapt was only “small extent” or less. Contrasting the 
“high” authority in the international sub-system with the “low” authority in the domestic sub-
system, the core system received a “medium” score for the authority sub-component. 
 
 
 
Table 43: Organizations had the Authority to Adapt Activities 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 2 4.5 4 9.1 12 27.3 1 2.3 2 4.5 21 47.7 
Domestic 3 6.8 7 15.9 4 9.1 5 11.4 2 4.5 2 4.5 23 52.3 
Total 3 6.8 9 20.5 8 18.2 17 38.6 3 6.8 4 9.1 44 100 
 
 
 
Response organizations experienced constraints in other areas, for example, within the 
personnel sub-component. Although most organizational needs were met in terms of personnel, 
the core system and its sub-systems were awarded a “medium” score for the personnel sub-
component because, during the initial days of the response, organizations had difficulties getting 
personnel to the disaster scene. The problem was not so much related to constraints in 
transportation, which there were certainly many of, but rather, the fact that many of the most 
critical personnel were traveling for the holiday when the tsunami struck. This meant that these 
individuals had to return home and report to their offices before they could be deployed for 
disaster operations. The respondents indicated that, in some instances, it took a day or two before 
the critical personnel had returned from holiday. A separate problem reported by the respondents 
was the need for personnel who could speak local languages and had knowledge about the 
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geography and culture of the tsunami affected regions. Respondents indicated that, in some 
sectors, as many as fifty percent of the volunteers were of little utility due to constrains in 
language (Respondent 2 2009; Respondent 3 2009). There were also shortages of certain types of 
personnel, for example, the respondents mentioned the lack of air traffic controllers immediately 
after the tsunami. As the response system became increasingly organized, the organizations in 
the system were able to locate sufficient personnel to overcome these constraints. 
 
 
 
Table 44: Effectiveness of Training 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 6 13.6 4 9.1 4 9.1 7 15.9 2 4.5 1 2.3 24 54.5 
Domestic 2 4.5 6 13.6 3 6.8 8 18.2 0 0.0 1 2.3 20 45.5 
Total 8 18.2 10 22.7 7 15.9 15 34.1 2 4.5 2 4.5 44 100 
 
 
 
The training sub-component for the core system and its sub-systems also received a 
“medium score.” Although the respondents reported that training prior to the tsunami was 
inadequate, they indicated that those who worked for response organizations had sufficient 
training to complete their missions. In fact, many of the respondents from larger organizations 
indicated that their personnel had received disaster management training. The training results are 
presented in Table 44. When asked if the individuals in their organizations had sufficient training 
to enable collaboration, 24 or 57.14% of 42 respondents who considered the question relevant 
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rated the effectiveness of the training at “moderate extent” or higher. In contrast, 18 or 42.86% 
of these 42 respondents rated at the effectiveness of the training at “small extent” or less. 
 
 
 
Table 45: Sufficiency of Resources 
 
  
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.3 1 2.3 5 11.4 8 18.2 8 18.2 1 2.3 24 54.5 
Domestic 0 0.0 6 13.6 4 9.1 6 13.6 2 4.5 2 4.5 20 45.5 
Total 1 2.3 7 15.9 9 20.5 14 31.8 10 22.7 3 6.8 44 100 
  
  
  
Also critical to the collaborative process was the level of resources. As indicted in Table 
45, the majority of respondents indicated that resource availability enabled collaboration at a 
level of “moderate extent” or higher. While 6 or 13.6% of 18 domestic respondents who 
considered the question relevant rated the sufficiency of resources at only “small extent,” this 
seemed to be the exception to the rule. Typically, the respondents expressed astonishment at the 
availability of resources. One international respondent reported, “I [had] a forklift, we had our 
own cars, we had a really huge generator, and a portable tank, really good equipment, satellite 
phone, v-sat, everything. It was like heaven. We had everything” (Respondent 10 2009). In terms 
of the sufficiency of resources, the core system and its sub-systems received “high” score. 
 
 
 
224 
 
Table 46: Organizations Corrected Their Mistakes 
 
  
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 0 0.0 7 16.3 6 14 6 14 3 7 2 4.7 24 55.8 
Domestic 0 0.0 1 2.3 8 18.6 6 14 4 9.3 0 0.0 19 44.2 
Total 0 0.0 8 18.6 14 32.6 12 27.9 7 16.3 2 4.7 43 100 
  
  
  
The final organizational sub-component that received a “high” score was mistake 
correction. Table 46 shows that 80.48% of the 41 respondents who considered the question 
applicable reported that mistake correction occurred at a “moderate extent” or higher. Some 
respondents referred to the delivery of relief supplies that, due to religious practices, were 
inappropriate for the recipient populations. When such mistakes were identified, organizations 
took steps to remedy the situation and to prevent the mistakes from occurring again. The most 
compelling example of mistake correction was undertaken by the Indonesian government, which 
decided to prohibit the extraction of children from the disaster area. This decision was taken, not 
only to keep children with their surviving family members, but also to prevent them from being 
diverted to the sex trade. Table 47 presents the results for the organizational sub-components. 
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Table 47: Scores for the Organizational Sub-Components 
 
 
 
Domestic 
System 
International 
System 
Core 
System 
Su
b-
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Operational Plans Low High Medium 
Authority Low High Medium 
Personnel Medium Medium Medium 
Training Medium Medium Medium 
Resources High High High 
Mistake Correction High High High 
 
 
 
8.1.6 Cultural Component  
To make effective decisions, decision makers must have the experience to identify similarities 
between the problems that they encounter and the problems they have previously encountered. 
The cultural component of framework of administrative resilience represents pattern-matching, 
and evaluates the extent to which organizations in an administrative system understand the risks 
they confront and have the experience and capacity to solve unique and unexpected problems. 
The cultural component is comprised of the six sub-components described in Table 48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
Table 48: Description of Cultural Sub-Components 
 
 
Organizational 
Awareness 
Indications that organizations were aware of the risk of 
disaster and its consequences. 
Experience Indications that organizations had experience necessary 
to respond to disaster. 
Community Indications that organizations worked in the interest of 
the affected community. 
Review Indications that organizations were willing to review 
their actions. 
New Methods Indications that originations were willing to adopt new 
methods of problem solving. 
Trust Indications that organizations trusted the decisions of 
others. 
 
 
 
The domestic organizations received “low” scores for the awareness and experience sub-
components. When considering the awareness of Indonesian organizations prior to the tsunami, 
many domestic organizations were not attentive to the risks posed by disaster. The respondents 
provided a variety of explanations for this lack of awareness, two of which were emphasized the 
most. First, the lack of awareness by organizations was a reflection of the lack of awareness that 
permeated the Indonesian government and society. While organizations such as the Bandung 
Institute of Technology had implemented training programs prior to the tsunami, these programs 
were limited in scope and geared principally towards government officials. Second, there were 
few organizations working in Aceh prior to the tsunami. The organizations that were present 
addressed issues related to the conflict and disaster management did not fall within their 
operational parameters. The lack of disaster awareness also explains why domestic organizations 
lacked disaster management experience. In contrast, international organizations, while they did 
not have experience working in Indonesia, brought with them significant amounts of disaster 
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management experience. The international organizations used their experience to quickly assess 
the post-tsunami environment and initiate the development of the information collection and 
exchange mechanisms needed to conduct response operations. 
 
 
 
Table 49: Willingness of Governmental Organizations to Review Actions 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 2 4.5 8 18.2 7 15.9 2 4.5 0 0.0 2 4.5 21 47.7 
Domestic 4 9.1 6 13.6 4 9.1 4 9.1 4 9.1 1 2.3 23 52.3 
Total 6 13.6 14 31.8 11 25 6 13.6 4 9.1 3 6.8 44 100 
 
 
 
Table 50: Willingness of Non-Governmental Organizations to Review Actions 
 
 
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 2 4.5 8 18.2 7 15.9 3 6.8 0 0.0 1 2.3 21 47.7 
Domestic 1 2.3 3 6.8 4 9.1 5 11.4 6 13.6 4 9.1 23 53.2 
Total 3 6.8 11 25 11 25 8 18.2 6 13.6 5 11.4 44 100 
 
 
 
The domestic and international sub-systems began to converge in terms of the willingness 
of their constituent organizations to assist the community, as well as their willingness to review 
their actions. The sub-systems both received “medium” scores for these two sub-components. As 
228 
 
also indicated in chapter seven, the respondents believed that the majority of the organizations 
that participated in the tsunami response did so to provide assistance the communities affected by 
the disaster. Although most organizations had pure intentions, there was evidence that some 
organizations pursued religious or political interests. The respondents indicated that such pursuits 
created organizational tension and competition. Problems also existed with some of the 
individuals who responded to the disaster scene. Referred to as “disaster cowboys,” the 
respondents indicated that some individuals participated in the response simply to fulfill their 
personal desire to experience the chaos and excitement generated by a disaster event. 
The other cultural sub-component that received a “medium” score was review, which 
represents the willingness of organizations to review their actions. The specific question used to 
evaluate the willingness of organizations to review delineated between non-governmental and 
governmental organizations. These results are presented in Table 49 and Table 50. Table 49 
indicates that governmental organizations did not review their actions immediately after the 
tsunami. The overwhelming focus of these organizations was directed primarily towards the 
completion of response activities such as corpse and debris removal. In contrast, Table 50 
indicates that the respondents believed that non-governmental organizations were more likely to 
review their actions. For example, of those who indicated that the willingness to review was 
“moderate extent” or higher, the results favored non-governmental organizations, at 25 or 
64.10% of 39 respondents, over governmental organizations, at 21 or 51.22% of 41 respondents. 
Interestingly, the domestic respondents were more disposed than their international counterparts 
to rate the willingness of non-governmental organizations to review as “great extent” or higher. 
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Table 51: Organizations Adopted New Methods of Problem Solving 
 
  
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 1 2.3 2 4.7 9 20.9 6 14 3 7 3 7 24 55.8 
Domestic 1 2.3 1 2.3 3 7 10 23.3 4 9.3 0 0.0 19 44.2 
Total 2 4.7 3 7 12 27.9 16 37.2 7 16.3 3 7 43 100 
 
 
 
There were also similarities between the sub-systems in terms of the willingness of 
organizations to adopt new methods of problem solving and to trust the decisions of others. Both 
sub-systems received “high” scores for these sub-components. With respect to problem-solving, 
Table 51 indicates that when organizations encountered situations where their activities were not 
working, they were willing to step outside their traditional operational procedures. Of the 40 
subjects who addressed the question on methods of problem-solving, 35 or 87.5% indicated that 
such procedural shifts occurred at a “moderate extent” or higher. The domestic respondents 
indicated that they were more willing to adopt new methods than their international counterparts. 
This may be because domestic organizations lacked experience, and unlike the international 
organizations, had to engage in a period of active learning after the tsunami. 
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Table 52: Organizations Trusted the Decisions of Others 
 
  
 
No 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Significant 
Extent 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
International 2 4.7 1 2.3 10 23.3 8 18.6 0 0.0 3 7 24 55.8 
Domestic 2 4.7 2 4.7 7 16.3 8 18.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 19 44.2 
Total 4 9.3 3 7 17 39.5 16 37.2 0 0.0 3 7 43 100 
 
 
 
Many of the constraints that existed in the post-tsunami environment could be managed 
because the organizations trusted the decisions of others. The sub-systems also received a “high” 
score for this sub-component and the respondents indicated that trust played a substantial role in 
response operations. As indicated by Table 52 of the international respondents who considered 
the question applicable, 18 or 85.71% indicated that reported that organizations trusted the 
decisions of others at “moderate extent” or higher. Likewise, 15 or 78.95% of the domestic 
respondents reported the levels of trust in the domestic response system at “moderate extent” or 
higher. It is important to recognize, however, that the trust that existed within the response 
system was not absolute. Indeed, that the respondents indicated that there was always the need to 
verify information that circulated throughout the administrative response system. The results for 
the cultural sub-components are presented in Table 53. 
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Table 53: Scores for the Cultural Sub-Component 
 
 
 
Domestic 
System 
International 
System 
Core 
System 
Su
b-
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Organizational Awareness Low High Medium 
Experience Low High Medium 
Community Medium Medium Medium 
Review Medium Medium Medium 
New Methods High High High 
Trust High High High 
 
 
 
8.2 EVALUATING THE CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The remainder of this chapter employs the framework of administrative resilience to classify the 
character and structure of the tsunami response system. This analysis addresses two questions. 
First, should the system be classified as auto-adaptive, operative adaptive, emergent adaptive or 
non-adaptive? Second, should the system be classified as a highly stable system, a highly flexible 
system, or a balanced system? The answers to these questions will help to elucidate why, under 
extra-ordinary conditions, the organizations that participated in this administrative response 
system were able to adjust and self-organize in post-tsunami environment. 
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8.2.1 Character of Tsunami Response System 
The indicators for the framework for administrative resilience, which are identified in Table 54, 
can be used to classify the extent to which resilience is present in an administrative system. 
Along the “x-axis” are the six components of resilience. Along the “y-axis” are the system 
typologies, which represent the continuum of resilient administrative systems. At the low end of 
the resilience continuum are non-adaptive systems, which possess low scores across all the 
resilience components, including environmental awareness, information exchange, 
organizational flexibility, cultural openness, technical capacity and network interaction. 
Emergent adaptive systems possess low scores for technical capacity and network interaction, 
but receive medium scores for environmental awareness, information exchange, organizational 
flexibility and cultural openness. Operational adaptive systems possess medium levels of 
environmental awareness, information exchange, organizational flexibility, cultural openness, 
technical capacity and network interaction. These three typologies represent systems that are 
highly reactive, meaning they emerge to respond to disruptive events. While emergent adaptive 
systems and operational adaptive systems may demonstrate self-organization, they do not exhibit 
the pro-active learning needed to facilitate system-wide policy change (Comfort 1999). 
At the other end of the continuum are auto-adaptive systems, which are high on 
environmental awareness, information exchange, organizational flexibility, cultural openness, 
technical capacity and network interaction. Unlike the other three system typologies, auto-
adaptive systems are proactive and exhibit high levels of creativity and pro-active learning 
processes in uncertain environments. The higher a system‟s rank along this continuum, the better 
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able it is to “adapt to sudden change, reallocate its resources and energies in response to a major 
threat … without losing its basic capacity for performance” (Comfort 1999). 
 
 
 
Table 54: Cognitive Resilience Indicators 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Component 
Information 
Component 
Organization 
Component 
Cultural 
Component 
Technology 
Component 
Interaction 
Component 
Auto-
Adaptive High High High High High High 
Operative 
Adaptive Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Emergent 
Adaptive Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low 
Non-
Adaptive Low Low Low Low Low Low 
 
 
 
To determine where the system under analysis ranked along this continuum, this section 
reviews the scores awarded in the previous section of this chapter. The final scores for the 
components of the framework of administrative resilience were derived from the average of the 
scores of its sub-components. After their averages were computed, the sub-components were 
classified according to the following schema: average scores that fell within [1 to 1.66] were 
classified as “low”; average scores that fell within [1.67 to 2.33] were classified as “medium”; 
and average scores that fell within [2.34 to 3.00] were classified as “high.” 
These findings are presented in Table 55, which indicates that there were differences in 
the manner in which the components of the framework of administrative resilience were scored 
for the system and sub-systems under analysis. Some of the components received the same score 
for all three systems. For example, at the “low” end was the environmental component, which 
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received a score of 1. This score is reflective of a non-adaptive system, which has very little 
capacity to learn in uncertain operational environments. At the “high” end was the organizational 
component, which was awarded scores of 2.50. By way of further explanation, these scores are 
reflective of an auto-adaptive system, which represents a system that has the highest learning 
capacity of all, and the organizations that participate in such a system can automatically adapt in 
response to the constraints and opportunities present in uncertain environments. 
 
 
 
Table 55: Average Component Scores for the Framework of Administrative Resilience 
 
 
 
Domestic System International System Core System 
Score Category Score Score Category Score 
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
Environmental 1.00 Low 1.00 Low 1.00 Low 
Information 2.50 High 2.50 High 2.50 High 
Cultural 2.00 Medium 2.67 High 2.33 Medium 
Organizational 2.00 Medium 2.67 High 2.50 High 
Technological 1.50 Low 2.33 High 2.17 Medium 
Interaction 1.50 Low 1.83 Medium 1.83 Medium 
 
 
 
The scores awarded to the remainder of the components, which considered the cultural, 
organizational, technological and interaction aspects of the Indonesian tsunami response system, 
differed by sub-system. The domestic sub-system, for example, received lower scores than the 
international sub-system. The largest difference was reported in the technological component, 
where the domestic sub-system and international sub-systems were awarded scores of 1.50 or 
“low” and 2.33 or “high” respectively. This difference is explained by the forms and availability 
of technology used during the response, which was slightly more advanced for the international 
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organizations. The difference is also due to the fact that international organizations brought the 
technology and the experience they needed to operate in the post-tsunami environment. 
The differences between the scores awarded for the other components were less 
considerable, but it was within the interaction component where the domestic sub-system was 
particularly constrained. While organizations in domestic sub-system exchanged information 
with, and provided assistance to, other organizations, the findings presented in chapters five and 
six indicated that the domestic actors had a difficult time structuring their interactions to promote 
the effective distribution of information, expertise, resources and personnel. Rather, when plotted 
longitudinally, the interactions detected among domestic organizations became increasingly 
erratic and diffused. Moreover, unlike the international sub-system, the diameter of the network 
in the domestic sub-system expanded rather than contracted. Consequently, the domestic sub-
system received a score of 1.50 or “low” for the interaction component. In contrast, because the 
interactions in the international sub-system became more regular and consolidated, the sub-
system was awarded a score of 1.83 or “medium” for the interaction component. 
These findings indicate that the administrative system that operated in Indonesia 
following the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami was a system of sub-systems. These 
findings also indicate that the core system and its sub-systems possessed different degrees of 
administrative resilience. With respect to the domestic sub-system, there were three components 
that received “low” scores, environmental, technological, and interaction, two components that 
received “medium” scores, cultural and organizational, and only one component that received a 
“high” score, information. Even though its information component was “high,” at most, the 
domestic sub-system can only be categorized as an emergent adaptive system. This means that 
the sub-system did not possess the adaptive capacity needed to manage the uncertainty present in 
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the post-tsunami environment. In contrast, other than the environmental and information 
components, the international sub-system received higher scores than its domestic counterpart. 
The sub-system was particularly strong in the information, cultural, organizational and 
technological sub-components, each of which just managed to cross the “high” score threshold. 
Consequently, the international sub-system was categorized as an operational adaptive system, 
which may demonstrate the capacity to adapt in limited circumstances. 
The preceding chapters indicate that the international sub-system influenced the 
resilience of the core administrative system. While the core system received “high” scores for the 
information and organizational components, the primary constraint for organizations was the 
“low” environmental score, which indicates the extent to which Indonesian governmental 
institutions and communities were inadequately prepared, in terms of disaster awareness, disaster 
preparedness and disaster regulations, prior to the tsunami. The remainder of the components 
scored for the core system, cultural, technological and interaction, received “medium” scores.  
The most striking thing about these findings is how the inclusion of the international 
organizations into the core system worked to strengthen the capacity of the domestic sub-system. 
A comparison of the component scores awarded to the core system to against those awarded to 
the domestic sub-system reveals that the average scores of four components, cultural, 
organizational, technological and network, increased with the inclusion of the international 
organizations. Three of these components, organizational, technological and network, actually 
jumped from one category to another, for example, “medium” to “high.” The respondents 
alluded to such a finding during their interviews. While there were constraints created by 
allowing international organizations access to the disaster site, the consensus of the respondents 
was that the international organizations improved the operational capacity of the system. These 
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organizations brought to the system the expertise, technology, resources and experience that the 
domestic sub-system would not have otherwise possessed. The component scores awarded to the 
core system indicate that it was an operational adaptive system, and possessed the capacity to 
adapt in uncertain operational environments. Unlike an auto-adaptive system, however, 
Indonesia‟s core administrative system was characterized by its reactive nature. 
8.2.2 Structure of the Tsunami Response System 
When complex adaptive systems encounter disruptive stimuli, they have the capacity to maintain 
critical system functions through adaption and self-organization. To be effective, such systems 
must strike a balance between order and disorder. When this occurs, the system operates along 
“the edge of chaos,” which is the point where the actors in the system can exchange information 
and identify a successful course of action. In this study, the respondents were presented with a 
continuum and were asked rate and discuss the manner in which administrative authority was 
structured in the response system. One side of the continuum represented structure, or order in 
complex adaptive system theory, and the respondents were provided the options to rate the 
system as “somewhat structured” or “highly structured.” The other side of the continuum 
represented the lack of structure, or disorder in complex adaptive systems theory, and the 
respondents were provided the options to rate the system as “somewhat unstructured” or “highly 
unstructured.” In the middle of the continuum was a category classified as “balanced.” The 
results of this structural inquiry are presented in Table 56. 
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Table 56: Distribution of Authority in Response System 
 
 
 
Highly 
Unstructured 
Somewhat 
Unstructured Balanced 
Somewhat 
Structured 
Highly 
Structured 
Not 
Applicable Total 
N % N % N % N N % N % N % N 
International 3 6.3 7 14.6 2 4.2 7 3 6.3 7 14.6 2 4.2 7 
Domestic 8 16.7 10 20.8 3 10.4 5 8 16.7 10 20.8 3 10.4 5 
Total 11 22.9 17 35.4 5 25 12 11 22.9 17 35.4 5 25 12 
 
 
 
The responses provided by the international respondents were somewhat evenly 
distributed. Of 21 international respondents, 14 or 76.19% classified the system as falling 
between “somewhat unstructured” and “somewhat structured.” In contrast, 18 or 69.23% of the 
responses provided by the 26 domestic respondents who considered the question relevant fell 
within the “highly unstructured” or “somewhat unstructured” categories. This reflects the 
discussions contained in chapters four and seven, which report that disruption of Indonesia‟s 
disaster management institutions, particularly at the provincial and local levels in Aceh, created a 
vacuum in structural authority that national and international organizations had to replace. 
The lack in structural authority is also apparent when these data  are considered from the 
perspective of the core system, where 28 or 59.57% of the 47 respondents who considered the 
question relevant categorized the response system as either “highly unstructured” or “somewhat 
unstructured;” 14 or 29.79% categorized the response system as either “highly structured” or 
“somewhat structured;” and only 5 or 10.64% categorized the response system as “balanced.” 
Almost two out of three respondents categorized the core system as unstructured. The 
categorization of the system as lacking in structural authority did not necessary represent a 
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conclusive judgment about its effectiveness. Indeed, some respondents thought that the lack of 
structural authority was positive, as it provided organizations with the independence they needed 
to meet the demands of the affected populations. Other respondents disagreed, and cautioned that 
this independence created chaos, at least with respect to the activities of the non-governmental 
organizations. The conclusion advanced by this section is that, in terms of how authority was 
structured in the Indonesian tsunami response system, the core system and its sub-systems 
displayed more flexibility than stability during twenty-two days that followed the tsunami. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Classifications of the Administrative Response Systems under Analysis 
 
 
 
It is now possible to situate the core system and its sub-systems within the framework of 
administrative resilience. As Figure 41 reveals, there were differences in terms of where the 
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systems were situated along the continuum. The domestic sub-system was the most disordered, 
and many of the organizational actors were confused by the chaos caused by the disruption of the 
governmental structures within the affected communities. In contrast, the international sub-
system was more closely situated towards the „edge of chaos,‟ and its organizations were able to 
take advantage of the operational flexibility granted to them by the Indonesian government. 
The classification of the core system as an operational adaptive system means that its 
constituent organizations collected and disseminated information, possessed the authority to 
adapt, were willing to explore alternative methods of problem solving, utilized technology, and 
were willing to collaborate with other organizations in the response system. The core system‟s 
classification reflected the relative strengths and weaknesses of its component sub-systems. For 
example, the inclusion of the organizations from the international sub-system improved the 
capacity of the domestic sub-system and helped the core system achieve a higher level of 
resilience. While Indonesia‟s tsunami response system did not operate along the desired „edge of 
chaos,‟ the support provided by the international organizations, in particular the use of 
information technology to collect and disseminate information, helped the core system to 
manage the uncertain and rapidly changing conditions present in the post-tsunami environment. 
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9.0  FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Policy-makers have long sought to manage the administrative challenges generated by disruptive 
and uncertain events. Contemporary approaches to this problem have emphasized the creation of 
increasingly detailed operational plans, the reformation of pre-determined organizational 
relationships, and increasing the frequency of organizational interactions across fixed channels of 
exchange. The implementation of such strategies can actually undermine an administrative 
system‟s capacity to operate in uncertain conditions. This chapter reviews the findings of this 
study, which indicate that it is possible to develop resilience in administrative systems, thereby 
ensuring an administrative system can adapt in response to disruptive and uncertain events. 
9.1 MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This study investigated the resilience of the administrative system that operated in Indonesia 
after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami, and was guided by four research questions: 
1. To what extent did the organizations that conducted operations in Indonesia after the Great 
Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004 facilitate the development of the 
administrative response system? 
 
2. To what extent did the interactions exchanged among response organizations after the Great 
Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004 drive the structural evolution of the 
administrative response system? 
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3. To what extent did constraints and opportunities influence the administrative system that 
responded to the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004? 
 
4. To what extent did the administrative response system possess the capacity for resilience 
after the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004? 
 
A summary of this study‟s major findings are presented in the following sub-sections. 
9.1.1 Composition and Development of Administrative System 
A total of 560 organizations were involved in the critical interactions that represented the 
foundation of the core administrative system. When these organizations were reviewed by their 
sources of funding and levels of jurisdiction, it was apparent that the response system was 
unprecedented in its size and complexity. In terms of the rate in which organizations accessed the 
system, the data indicate dynamic change, with multiple organizations entering the system during 
the days immediately after the tsunami. In terms of its rate of growth, the data indicate that the 
system grew rapidly, and that there were three significant dates related to the system growth. The 
first occurred on 31 December 2004, after which, the growth of the response system increased. 
The second occurred on 10 January 2005, when the growth rate began to plateau. Finally, the 
system reached 80% capacity on 6 January 2005, about two weeks after the tsunami. 
9.1.2 Structural Evolution of Administrative System 
The administrative system experienced periods of structural stability and structural change. The 
low overall density scores in the core system and its sub-systems indicate that response 
organizations did not engage in as many interactions as they perhaps could have. Even so, some 
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organizations became increasingly active as the response system developed. When other 
structural indicators were evaluated, it was revealed that the diameter of the domestic sub-system 
experienced brief period of contraction before expanding towards the end of week three. In 
contrast, the core system and the international sub-system displayed a different pattern, 
experiencing a brief period of expansion before beginning to contract during the third week. The 
Hamming distance statistics indicate that the structure of the core system likely changed on 6 
January 2005, the day that the United Nations began to coordinate regional relief operations and 
the Indonesian Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization held their initial 
coordination meeting. After 6 January 2005, the organizations adopted what appeared to be 
regular patterns of interaction. The most significant finding is that, in terms of its structure, the 
international sub-system seemed to possess a higher capacity to manage the conditions of the 
post-tsunami environment. The fact that domestic organizations increasingly elected to target 
international organizations after the tsunami supports this conclusion. 
9.1.3 Constraints and Opportunities in the Administrative System 
The respondents indicated that the core administrative system experienced various constraints. 
Some of the most significant constraints included: the confusion generated by the lack of 
information; the lack of language and cultural understanding; and resource availability and 
organizational competition. The respondents reported that the core system benefited from 
opportunities that included: the international attention and the desire of the international 
community to provide assistance; the fact that organizations had the capacity to collect 
information and transform it into usable knowledge; and the emphasis that organizations placed 
244 
 
on collaboration and coordination. The respondents also revealed that organizations in both the 
domestic and international sub-systems had difficulties collecting the information they needed to 
understand their operational environment. The organizations in the international sub-system, 
which had significant disaster management experience, overcame this problem by establishing 
mechanisms that facilitated information exchange throughout the administrative system. 
9.1.4 Resilience of Administrative System 
The framework of administrative resilience indicated that the domestic sub-system was an 
emergent adaptive system and the international sub-system was an operational adaptive system. 
While both the sub-systems received “low” scores for the environmental component, the 
domestic sub-system was also constrained by “low” scores for the technological and interaction 
components. Due to the inclusion of the international organizations, the core system was also 
classified as an operational adaptive system. Although it received slightly lower component 
scores than the international sub-system, the core system possessed the resilience needed to adapt 
in the post-tsunami environment. The capacity of the core system was influenced by the 
inclusion of the international organizations, which helped to improve the capacity of the 
domestic sub-system. In terms of the system structure, the core system and its constituent sub-
systems displayed more flexibility than stability. While this analysis indicated that this 
administrative system did not reach the desired „edge of chaos,‟ it did possess sufficient 
resilience to react to the constraints and opportunities that existed in uncertain post-tsunami 
environment through adaptation and self-organization. 
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9.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: PROMOTING ADMINISTRATIVE 
RESILIENCE 
These findings indicate that the administrative system that responded to the Great Sumatran 
Earthquake and Tsunami possessed sufficient resilience to manage the uncertainties present in 
the post-tsunami environment. Given these results, it is important for policy-makers to consider 
how to strengthen the adaptive capacity of administrative systems. The data reported in this 
study indicate that there are four primary ways that policy makers can strengthen administrative 
capacity: 1) develop a database of baseline information to support administrative action: 2) 
strengthen administrative policies and institutions; 3) strengthen community infrastructure and 
warning capacity; and 4) promote the development of international administrative resilience. 
9.2.1 Develop a Baseline Database to Support Administrative Action 
This study indicates that many of the constraints that were present in the post-tsunami 
environment were generated by the lack of basic information about the communities that were 
affected by the disaster. Many of these communities were located in rural areas, and were so 
small that there were not even identified on official government maps. Some of the respondents 
reported that the only way they could determine if a community had been located at a particular 
site was to see if there were pylons standing in the coastal waters. Even assuming that a 
community could be located, there was insufficient information about those who lived there. In 
many instances, the initial wave of response organization could not even determine how many 
people lived in an affected community. As a result, response organizations could often do 
nothing more than make educated guesses about the needs of those in affected communities. 
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Operations were also constrained by a lack of information about the organizations that 
responded to the disaster event. The respondents reported that they often struggled to acquire 
information about which organizations had actually begun to access the disaster area. More 
importantly, there was a lack of information about which organizations were doing what 
activities, in which communities, and with what resources. These information deficiencies 
created various problems.  For example, in some communities, there was an over-distribution of 
relief supplies such as water, clothing and food. Other communities suffered from an under-
distribution of even the most basic supplies. The development of a comprehensive database for 
the storage and distribution of baseline information about at-risk communities and the 
organizations that respond to disaster events would help to overcome these problems. 
A real-time information database that stores baseline information is an important first 
step in the development of administrative resilience. In the context of disaster management, the 
database must contain two general categories of information. The first category would focus on 
the at-risk communities, and would contain information about the at-risk populations, 
community infrastructure and the natural environment. This information should be stored using a 
Geographic Information System platform to ensure that it can be rapidly analyzed and 
disseminated after a disaster. The most significant type of information that can be collected is the 
number of people who live in at-risk communities. Such information can be collected through a 
regularly scheduled census, which could also gather data related to age, sex, education level, 
socio-economic status, cultural affiliation, language usage and religious affiliation. With respect 
to information related to the infrastructure and the natural environment, at the very least, the 
location of the community must be identified by longitude and latitude. This would ensure that 
the community can be located after a disaster. Information about a communities‟ transportation 
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system, critical lifelines, and public facilities, including government offices, schools, hospitals, 
and public spaces should also be identified. The final items that should be stored in the database 
would be the nature and location of hazards, evacuation routes and safe zones. 
The second category of information would focus on the organizations that assist 
communities affected by disasters. Even though the United Nations made attempts to gather 
information about the organizations that operated in Indonesia, many of the respondents 
indicated that these efforts were not sufficient. These respondents suggested that the following 
information should be collected from response organizations and distributed, perhaps through the 
internet or email, to all of the organizations involved in the response system. First, the name of 
the organizations must be recorded so that a detailed record is available of which organizations 
have responded to the disaster. Second, the location of the organizations‟ base of operations 
should be identified, as well as the names and telephone numbers of the individuals responsible 
for acting as liaisons with the community or other response organizations. Third, the 
organizations should report their primary areas of operational expertise, whether it is heath care, 
child protection, education, logistics or community development. Equally critical is the need for 
response organizations to identify the language they use to conduct day-to-day operations (e.g., 
English, French or Mandarin), as well as the language spoken by its volunteers in the disaster 
area. Fifth, the organizations must report their capacity and needs in relation to their resources, 
technologies, personnel, areas of expertise and levels funding. Finally, the organizations should 
provide descriptions of the response activities in which they are engaged, paying particular 
attention to identifying the location where these activities are located. 
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9.2.2 Strengthen Administrative Policies and Institutions 
Another way to promote the resilience in administrative systems is to strengthen administrative 
policies and institutions. Such developments should be proactive, meaning they should be 
implemented before the occurrence of a system disrupting event. As with the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security in the United States, most attempts to strengthen 
administrative policies and institutions are reactionary, and are implemented after the occurrence 
of a system disrupting event. Equally important, any changes in administrative policies and 
institutions should facilitate flexibility, moving away from hierarchical command and control 
structures employed in contemporary administrative systems.  
The Indonesian government has made significant progress in the development of its 
disaster management policies and institutions. The first major change occurred in 2006, when the 
national government adopted the National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction: 2006-2009. This 
plan was the Indonesian government‟s written commitment to shift the policy focus of disaster 
management activities from that of reaction to prevention, thereby bringing Indonesian disaster 
management closer to that envisioned by the international communities‟ Hyogo Framework for 
Action. According to the National Plan, this paradigm shift would have three components: 1) 
“instead of focusing on emergency response, disaster management now represents all aspects of 
risk management;” 2) “protection against disaster threats must be provided for by the 
government, not out of obligation, but for the fulfillment of the basic rights of the people;” and 
3) “responsibility for disaster management lies no longer with the government alone, but with a 
shared responsibility of all elements of the society” (Republic of Indonesia 2006, pp. I2-I3). 
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 The second major change in Indonesian policy occurred after the government began to 
support the National Plan with legislation that was intended to transform the ad hoc and 
reactionary disaster management system that existed prior to the tsunami into a flexible 
administrative system, which not only embraced the full disaster management cycle as a matter 
of public policy, but would be able to respond to a wide range of natural and man-made threats. 
Described briefly in Appendix L, some of the most important pieces of legislation include: 
Disaster Management Law No. 24/2007; Presidential Regulation No. 8/2008; Government 
Regulation No. 21/2008; and Government Regulation No: 22/2008. 
Notwithstanding the significance of these developments, the Indonesian disaster 
management system has not yet reached its full potential. While the paradigm shift will take time 
to develop, the emerging legal framework for disaster management has created the potential for 
tension between the national and local governments. To overcome this problem, compromise 
must be reached as to where final political authority lies with respect to disaster management. 
The data presented in this study suggest that the question should not be whether final disaster 
management authority resides with the central government or local governments, but rather, 
whether authority can be distributed in such way that the administrative system responsible for 
disaster management activities has both the structure to promote sustained policy change and the 
flexibility to promote organizational adaptation and self-organization. 
The need for such compromise, or at least clarification, was made clear by the 
respondents, who reported that even with the new legal framework, many of Indonesia‟s 
communities will continue to function as they did prior to the tsunami. One of the respondents 
elaborated on this point by suggesting that, while new laws have been passed, the individuals 
that work in local disaster management offices remain inexperienced and will not be able to 
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advance disaster management as a policy priority (Respondent 51 2009). Given the gaps that 
continue to exist in Indonesian disaster management policy, it is also recommended that disaster 
practitioners, particularly those from Indonesia‟s academic and non-profit sectors, continue to 
educate local communities about the threats posed by natural and man-made disasters. By 
educating those who live in at-risk communities on topics such as the signs of an impending 
natural disaster, evacuation routes, and the location of pre-established safe zones, disaster 
management practitioners can empower the citizens of such communities to take self-directed 
action in response to the disruptive events that will inevitably occur. 
9.2.3 Strengthen Community Infrastructure and Warning Capacity 
The resilience of administrative systems can also be developed by strengthening infrastructure. 
While this recommendation includes the infrastructure needed to conduct operations after a 
disrupting event, for example telecommunication and transportation systems, it also means 
infrastructure that can provide policy makers with a warning that a disruptive event might 
actually occur. The Indonesian government has made process in the development of disaster 
detection and early warning systems that can provide its administrative systems and at-risk 
communities with information about pending natural disasters. Given that Indonesia is located in 
a region of high seismic activity, one of the primary areas of focus has been on the development 
of a tsunami early warning system. Initiated while the government was still responding to the 
Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami, the Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (INA-
TEWS) sought to revolutionize the detection of tsunami events within the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. Subsequent seismic events, such as the Nias earthquake of March 28, 2005, the Java 
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earthquake of May 27, 2006, the Java tsunami of July 17, 2006, and the devastating earthquake 
that struck the coastal community of Padang in September 30, 2009, reminded the Indonesian 
government that early warning systems could reduce the consequences of disasters. 
Obstacles have prevented INA-TEWS from reaching its potential. In terms of technical 
hurdles, the respondents indicated that the data collection system is not fully operational. For 
example, many of the sensor devices used by the system are unable to transmit real-time data to 
the national center. Of the sensors that can transmit data to the national center, much of data 
cannot utilized because of problems with data standardization (Respondent 48 2009). 
Furthermore, some of the ocean buoys, which have been deployed at great expense, are non-
operational due to technical failures or vandalism (Respondent 48 2009). Equally problematic 
has been what is referred to as the “the last mile” of the warning system. The Indonesians have 
learned that it is difficult to get at-risk populations to evacuate, even when a tsunami warning is 
issued from the national center. These problems were reviewed in a presentation delivered by an 
official from BMKG after earthquakes near Padang, Indonesia on 12 and 13 September 2007. 
The government‟s “lessons learned” report indicated that it was not clear how many people 
received the tsunami warning through official channels, the community of Padang lacked 
standard-operating-procedures to guide activities after the warning, and the community‟s 
reaction to the warning was ad hoc in nature rather than coordinated (Fauzi and Vidiarina 2007). 
9.2.4 Promote International Administrative Resilience 
There is an emerging consensus on the need to improve the administrative capacity of nations 
that are threatened by disasters. Indeed, significant progress has been made in this policy area, 
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especially in the years since the United Nations designated the 1990s as the International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction. At the local level, citizens have become aware of threats in their 
communities, and have started to take action, often on their own, to mitigate the potential 
consequences of disaster. At the national level, governments have started to adopt legislation that 
calls for the creation of national and sub-national policies and institutions to address disaster 
management issues. The international community has also made progress, not only by agreeing 
to come together to discuss disaster management issues, but by also recognizing the transnational 
character of disaster. More importantly, nations have recognized that the reduction of disaster 
risk will require cooperation and collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries. Even with this 
progress, the lack of a cohesive administrative and technical framework has impeded the 
development of administrative resilience at the international level. Stressing this point, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations indicated in 2007 that the international community will 
be unable to meet its goal of reducing disaster losses by 2015 (United Nations 2007). 
The need for resilient administrative structures at the international level was evident in 
the response to the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami. After the disruption of the formal 
disaster management system in Aceh, hundreds of organizations rushed to the disaster scene, 
many of which had little experience with either disaster response activities or the affected 
regions. Although these organizations came together to form a scalable and heterogeneous 
administrative system, the operational constraints that were present in the post-tsunami 
environment prevented decision makers from leveraging the full capacity of the response system. 
The fact that response organizations broke off into separate components indicates that decision 
makers not only struggled to identify the needs of the affected population, they also struggled to 
match the needs of these populations with the available resources. 
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The international community can begin to manage these constraints by developing the 
foundations for a resilient administrative system that can support national administrative systems 
if they become constrained or disrupted. The development of international administrative 
resilience requires a socio-technical approach that not only recognizes “the relationships and 
interrelationships between the social and technical parts of [a] system,” but also that these 
relationships can enhance organizational knowledge and administrative effectiveness (Coakes, 
Willis, and Clark 2002, p. 5). For this approach to work in the disaster management context, 
policy makers must integrate the system‟s social components, represented by the organizational 
actors, the availably of resources, and the needs of the citizens living in communities exposed to 
the risk of disaster, with the system‟s technical component, represented by technical systems that 
will help policy makers to translate knowledge into effective action after a disruptive event. 
With respect to the social component, the international community should continue to 
support national governments in their efforts to implement disaster management legislation. A 
significant contribution to this effort could come from the development of a single disaster 
management treaty that would not only strengthen the Hyogo Framework for Action, but also 
replace the current patchwork of bi-lateral, regional and multilateral agreements that do little for 
the emergence of a cohesive and comprehensive legal framework for international disaster 
management. This comprehensive legal framework needs to specify when the international 
community can intervene in the domestic affairs of nation whose administrative systems have 
been disrupted. The framework must also ensure that, when assistance is requested by a national 
government, the international community has the authority to conduct response and relief 
operations without excessive interference from the national authorities. This does not mean that 
the international community will have cart blanch authority, but rather, the flexibility they need 
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to adapt and self-organize their response activities according to the nature of the disaster event. 
Finally, the international community needs to develop standardized disaster management policies 
and procedures, perhaps through by a series of international certification requirements, which 
would help policy makers to identify and manage the non-governmental organizations that 
populate the international disaster management arena. 
With respect to the technical component, national governments must support the design 
and implementation of technical systems that can facilitate the transfer of information and 
resources, not only during the response period that follows a disaster, but also during the 
mitigation, prevention and recovery phases of the disaster cycle. This will require a database of 
baseline information on population size, demographics, building locations, and the distribution of 
resources for communities around the world. Moreover, a properly designed technical system 
would ensure that information flows and feedback loops function among the organizations that 
participate in such administrative systems (Comfort 2005; Comfort et al. 2001). 
The sociotechnical system that is used to promote administrative resilience must possess 
a number of basic characteristics. First, in the disaster management context, the system would 
benefit from a “plug-and-play” capacity, meaning its design is standardized and available to all 
disaster management personnel and organizations. The standardized design would enable 
organizations to integrate the system into their operational schemas. The idea would be that, once 
a disruptive event occurs, domestic and international response organizations would arrive on 
scene, plug into the national level system, and utilize the data available in the system to initiate 
and coordinate their response activities. Second, regardless of the location of the disaster event, 
the data stored in the system should be scalable, meaning that decision makers can change the 
resolution of the data they receive by level of jurisdiction (e.g. city, county, provincial, national 
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and international). Third, the information available must be presented using a graphical interface, 
which makes it easy to understand and analyze. The key is to provide decision makers with 
information that will enable them to make “good” decisions, rather than having them wait for the 
arrival of information, which may never come, that is sufficient to make the “best decision.” 
The fourth requirement is that the data that are available in the system should be stored in 
a format that provides response organizations with the capacity to query the database for the 
information they need to conduct their operations. This would ensure that organizations only 
receive “relevant” information, and would not be overwhelmed by information of little, if any, 
utility. Fifth, the system must also enable participating organization to input information back 
into the system in real-time. By providing organizations with the means to provide the 
administrative system with updates related to the information they collect from the field, or the 
activities that they initiate, the organizations themselves would serve as feedback loops and 
promote the flow of information that is needed to facilitate the adaptation and self-organization 
of the administrative system. Finally, the system should be sufficiently comprehensive to cover 
all of the various phases of a disaster event. The earlier that a disaster event can be detected, the 
earlier that response activities can begin, for example, with the evacuation of vulnerable 
populations, the pre-positioning of personnel and resources, and the organization of search and 
rescue teams. An administrative system with these characteristics would promote international 
resilience, by enabling information to be transformed into the knowledge that policy makers need 
to take effective action in uncertain conditions. While the development of a resilient 
administrative system would provide a significant improvement over the capacity of 
contemporary systems of public administration, the challenge is for policy makers to identify the 
appropriate mix of incentives that would convince organizations, especially non-profit and 
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governmental organizations, that their participation in such a system would not only improve 
their operational capacity, but it would also help them to fulfill their organizational missions. 
9.3 THEORETICAL QUESTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This inquiry into administrative resilience has revealed an assortment of theoretical questions. 
These questions, considered from the perspective of administrative systems that respond to 
disaster events, can be situated within the broader field of public administration. This inquiry has 
also revealed a variety of research questions, which if addressed, can expand our empirical and 
theoretical understanding of administrative resilience. Some of the most important theoretical 
questions and research questions identified by this study are discussed below. 
9.3.1 Theoretical Questions 
The findings generated by this study provide policy makers with the knowledge they need to 
improve the capacity of the administrative systems that operate in uncertain conditions. The 
organizations that responded to the tsunami demonstrated the capacity to enter an unfamiliar 
operational environment, to scale up response operations, and to quickly identify the means to 
provide assistance to those affected by the disaster. In the weeks after the tsunami, this 
heterogeneous and scalable system of organizations completed these tasks by exhibiting some of 
the characteristics of administrative resilience. Yet the focus of this study calls into question the 
extent to which the findings are applicable to administrative systems outside of Indonesia. There 
are four categories of theoretical questions upon which future research might proceed. 
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The first category considers the organizational composition of resilient administrative 
systems. For example, to what extent do specific types of organizations influence the adaptive 
capacity of administrative systems? In other words, to what extent do resilient administrative 
systems possess a common organizational typology? In the Indonesian context, the findings 
indicate that, in terms of their sources of funding, the response organizations were 
overwhelmingly public in character. But is this true of all resilient administrative systems? 
Indeed, when affected by a disruptive event, many communities may not have the public 
capacity to manage response operations. When a disaster strikes such a community, what would 
be the character of the organizations that seek to fill this administrative void? Would the 
responding organizations tend to be public organizations from outside the affected community, 
for example the United Nations, or would domestic non-profit organizations play the 
overwhelming role in response and recovery activities? Similar theoretical questions exist about 
the jurisdictional level of the organizations that respond to such events. For example, will all 
resilient administrative systems be bolstered by the presence of international organizations? 
The second category considers the emergence and development of resilient administrative 
systems. For example, to what extent does the emergence and development of resilient 
administrative systems follow common patterns or trends? In the Indonesian context, two growth 
related findings were of particular interest. First, there was an extremely rapid period of growth 
in the days immediately after the disaster. This period of growth was followed by a momentary 
pause before the system once again started to increase in size. Second, the growth of the system 
reached a plateau after two weeks. Are these examples of system growth unique only to the 
Indonesian context, or do they represent patterns common to resilient administrative systems in 
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general? If so, what factors would explain their occurrence, and can they be manipulated by 
policy makers to accelerate the growth of resilient administrative systems? 
The third category considers the structural characteristics of resilient administrative 
systems. For example, to what extent do different resilient systems, which may have emerged in 
response to different types of disruptive events, share common structural characteristics? While 
administrative systems may operate in different countries and in different operational 
environments, it may be the case that the density of interactions detected in resilient 
administrative systems, regardless of their size and location, will remain relatively low. Further 
analysis might also reveal that the most central actor in any resilient administrative system will 
always be a national organization, which could serve as an intermediary between the 
international and domestic organizations. Moreover, shifting to temporal issues, to what extent 
do resilient systems exhibit commonalties in terms of their structural evolution? It may be that, 
from a structural perspective, the organizational interactions present during the first week after a 
disruptive event differs substantially from the organizational interactions present during the third 
week. If such structural similarities or differences are found, the important question is why.  
The final category considers whether there are linkages between the nature of the 
organizational interactions that occur in an administrative system and that administrative 
system‟s capacity for resilience. The research conducted in this study is based upon the 
proposition that such linkages exist. Yet to what extent does the nature of the organizational 
interactions that occur in resilient administrative systems provide empirical support for this 
proposition? It may be that certain types of interactions have the most influence on an 
administrative system‟s capacity to respond to disruptive events. Likewise, the method of 
interaction might also be influential in ways not considered by this study. In the Indonesian 
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context, many of the respondents reported that the communication tool which was the most 
effective for facilitating action was the cell phone, especially after the rehabilitation of the 
communication infrastructure. This seems to compliment the idea that the resilience of an 
administrative system can be improved through a unified information support system. 
As future research address these theoretical questions, it may become possible to identify 
the fundamental premises by which resilient administrative systems operate. For policy makers 
concerned with improving the resilience of administrative systems, the identification of such 
premises would have two implications. First, they would enable policy makers to design 
administrative systems that take better advantage of organizational diversity, which can improve 
the ability of these systems to adapt in response to conditions of uncertainty. Second, they may 
indicate that there are limits to the government‟s capacity to design administrative systems that 
can respond to disruptive events. For instance, the findings generated by future research might 
indicate that there will always be a delay between the occurrence of a disruptive event and the 
point at which a resilient administrative system becomes fully operational. Such findings would 
help policy makers to determine how to best allocate scarce resources. 
9.3.2 Future Research: Expanding the Indonesian Analysis 
To advance knowledge of the adaptive capacity of resilient administrative systems, future 
research must extend the analysis of the Indonesian response system. The first avenue of 
research would explore the extent to which the resilience of the system differed by jurisdictional 
level. For example, did the organizations categorized as local possess a better adaptive capacity 
than organizations at the national or provincial levels? Moreover, to what extent were certain 
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categories of response transactions initiated or received by organizations that operated within 
certain jurisdictional levels? These lines of inquiry might help policy makers to better distribute 
scarce resources or to improve the resilience of specific jurisdictions.  
The second avenue would examine how the cumulative network structure of the 
Indonesian response system changed after January 6, 2005, the date the Hamming distance 
statistic indicted that a major structural change occurred within the system. As chapter six 
revealed, it was on 6 January 2005 that the World Health Organization and the Indonesian 
Ministry of Health initiated tri-weekly coordination meetings. To explore the extent to which 
these meetings had an impact on the cumulative structure of the response system, the daily 
network data would be aggregated into two separate matrices, which would be comparatively 
evaluated using the measures evaluated by chapter six. This would allow for a comprehensive 
“before and after” analysis of the structure of Indonesia‟s tsunami response system. 
The third avenue of research would take an in-depth look at the network structures 
identified in the Indonesian response system. For example, which resources were needed to 
complete which response activities, and more importantly, did the organizations that engaged in 
certain activities actually possess, or have access to, the resources they needed to complete these 
activities? Exploring such questions would require that distinctions be made among the types of 
interactions reported in the response system. In the present study, the interactions used to 
complete the network analysis were not organized into distinct categories. Future research can 
organize the interactions into categories that relate to: 1) the type of task completed by the 
interaction; 2) the knowledge required to complete the interaction; and 3) the resources required 
to complete the interaction. As Table 57 indicates, such categories would enable researchers to 
analyze the emergence and development of organizational capacity and institutional support 
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networks (Carley 2003). In contrast, this study was limited to the inter-organizational network 
that developed in Indonesia after the tsunami. 
 
 
 
Table 57: Categories of Meta-Matrices for Dynamic Network Analysis7 
 
 
 People Knowledge/ Resources 
Events/ 
Tasks Organizations 
People Social 
Network 
Knowledge 
Network 
Attendance 
Network 
Membership 
Network 
Knowledge/ 
Resources  
Information 
Network 
Needs 
Network 
Organizational 
Capacity 
Events/ 
Tasks   
Temporal 
Ordering 
Institutional 
Support 
Network 
Organizations    Inter-Organizational 
Network 
 
 
 
9.3.3 Future Research: Moving Beyond Indonesia 
Cultural and contextual differences suggest that countries such as Thailand and India 
experienced the tsunami differently than Indonesia. It is also likely that there were differences in 
the manner in which the administrative systems in these countries operated. To explore whether 
                                                 
7
 A full discussion of these categories and the forms of analyses that can be conducted utilizing dynamic network 
analysis methods can be found in Carley, Kathleen M. 2003. Dynamic Network Analysis. In Dynamic Social 
Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers, ed. Ron Breiger, Kathleen M. Carley and 
Philippa Pattison: 133-145. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council. 
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such differences existed, and whether these differences promoted or undermined administrative 
resilience, future research must move beyond the context of Indonesia. 
The success of this research agenda, however, depends upon whether the measures for 
determining the presence and degrees of resilience within systems of public administration can 
be refined. Four improvements would strengthen the empirical results generated by the 
framework of administrative resilience. First, the structural analysis of administrative systems 
can be strengthened by expanding the coding schema used to classify the organizations that 
participate in such systems. This study revealed that the community of organizations that 
responded to the Indonesian tsunami was heterogeneous. The organizational coding schema 
employed by this study, however, was highly generalized, which restricted the type of data that 
was included in the analysis. That is, this study assumed that all non-profit organizations shared 
the same structural and operational characteristics. Yet not all non-profit organizations were 
alike. Some were small, and completely dependent upon volunteers and the financial 
contributions of the public. Others were self-sufficient, and had a permanent staff and budget. As 
research moves forward, the coding schema must better capture such organizational differences. 
Second, the components and sub-components employed by the framework must be 
expanded to include the structural and social categories of resilience. For example, the revised 
framework would not only incorporate data that reflect the extent to which the life-lines and 
buildings in a community are protected against disaster, structural resilience, but also data related 
to the demographic, educational and socio-economic characteristics of the community, social 
resilience. Third, the coding schema must be refined beyond the simple “low,” “medium,” and 
“high” options employed in this study. Expanding the range of scoring options would improve 
the precision and reliability of the conclusions generated by the framework, as well as the policy 
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recommendations that could be provided to policy makers. Finally, it is necessary to consider 
how the construct of administrative resilience can be framed as a dependent variable through 
which adaptive capacity can be measured and evaluated. For instance, the development of a 
“resilience variable” would enable the use of statistical methods to evaluate the validity of the 
constructs that underlie the framework of administrative resilience. 
Once these refinements are made to the framework of administrative resilience, the next 
phase of the research will begin with a series of analyses on the other countries that were 
affected by the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami, three of which would be of particular 
interest: Sri Lanka, Thailand and India. An in-depth analysis of the response networks that 
developed in these countries would be conducted, on a day-by-day basis, for a period of three 
weeks. The data would be collected through a careful review of primary source materials that 
include newspaper articles and daily situation reports. Once the coding is complete, network 
matrices would be created, which would enable structural and evolutionary comparisons to be 
made between the countries. One important area of focus might be whether the administrative 
systems of the other countries developed at a faster rate than the Indonesian system. If such a 
finding were observed, it may indicate that the systems possessed a higher degree of resilience. 
This conclusion could only be reached after a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
experts in each of the affected countries. Equally interesting would be whether differences could 
be detected between the administrative systems that formed in each of these countries at specific 
levels of jurisdiction. For example, were the interactions exchanged between organizations 
detected at a higher rate at the local level of jurisdiction in Thailand than in Indonesia? 
It would also be possible to create a unified network matrix that combines all of the 
interaction data coded for the response period under analysis. This would include the data that 
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has been collected from all four systems under analysis: Indonesia; Sri Lanka; Thailand and 
India. Separate matrices would also be created for each of the sub-categories of interaction data, 
including resources, information and knowledge. The data contained in these unified matrices 
could then be used for two purposes. These data could be used to identify the system components 
that are isolated and unable to acquire the information, personnel or resources needed to 
complete their response activities. Assuming that the policy modifications are implemented, 
these data could be used as a baseline to determine whether, after a future disaster, the resilience 
of the administrative system actually improved following policy modifications. 
 The challenges of the twenty-first century, many of which are created by the uncertain 
and rapidly changing conditions that permeate the increasingly interconnected international 
system, will require new administrative solutions. To overcome these challenges, policy makers 
will need to implement sociotechnical infrastructures that will enable their administrative 
systems to take advantage of the dynamic and non-linear interactions exchanged among 
heterogeneous communities of organizational actors. Only then will it be possible for policy 
makers to harness the complexity of such systems, and to take advantage of the adaptive capacity 
of resilient administrative systems. While the Great Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami was an 
event of horrific consequences, it did contain a silver lining (Clarke 2006). As the data in this 
study indicate, the event demonstrated that administrative systems can operate effectively in 
uncertain conditions without relying upon hierarchy and rigid operational procedures. In 
referring to why the administrative response system that formed in Indonesia after the tsunami 
managed to overcome unimaginable constraints, an official from a Indonesian university stated, 
“I think [that] what we can say that we had, [was] the willingness to work together without any 
formal structure, [it was] networks of people with good intentions” (Respondent 50 2009). 
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APPENDIX A Semi-Structured Interview and Survey Instruments 
Demographic 
 
1 What is your age? 
 
   21-25   26-35   36-45 
      
  46-55   56-65   65+ 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Demographic 2 What is the highest level of formal education that you attained? 
  
   No Formal Education  University (Associate) 
      
   Primary (Elementary)  University (Bachelors) 
      
   Secondary (High School)  University (Masters) 
      
   Vocational (Trade School)  University (Doctorate) 
  
If you attained a University degree, in what discipline did you concentrate?   
 
 
Demographic 3 How many years of experience do you have in disaster management? 
 
   0-5   6-10   11-15    
            
  16-20   21-25   Over 25    
        
 
 
 
   
Demographic 
 
4 In terms of number of disaster management personnel, how would you rate 
the size of your organization? 
 
   1-10  11-50   51-100  
 
  101-500  501-1000   Over 1000  
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Background 
 
5 What were the primary missions and responsibilities of your organization 
before and after the 26 December 2004 tsunami? 
 
Before? 
 
 
After? 
 
 
Background 
 
6 What was your role in your organization’s operations during its response to 
the 2004 Earthquake and Tsunami?   
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
and 
Cultural 
 
7 To what extent were Indonesia's governments and communities prepared to 
respond to the risks presented by disasters such as the tsunami before and 
after 26 December 2004? 
 
  
Before December 2004 
 
 Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
Currently 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Environmental 
 
8 To what extent did the rules, regulations and procedures enacted by the 
Indonesian government before and after the 26 December 2004 guide the 
operation of the tsunami response system? 
 
  
Before 2004 
 
 Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
Currently 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways? Please explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizational 
 
9 To what extent did response organizations have emergency response plans 
that emphasized collaboration with other organizations, particularly those 
that operated in other jurisdictions?  
 
  
Before December 2004 
 
 Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
 5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
  
Currently 
 
 Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways? Please explain. 
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Organizational 
 
10 To what extent did response organizations have the training, scientific 
expertise, resources, technology and authority to adapt their emergency 
response activities to the demands of the tsunami event?  
 
 Training 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Scientific Expertise 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Resources 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Technology 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Authority 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
How did changes, if any, occur in practice?  Please explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
Decision 
making 
11 What steps did the Indonesian government institutions and organizations 
take in response to the 26 December 2004 Earthquake and Tsunami? 
 
  Immediately after the tsunami. 
 
 
 One week after the tsunami. 
 
 
 One month after the tsunami. 
 
 
Decision 
making 
12 Did these steps differ from those taken by International, National and Local 
non-governmental organizations?  If so, in what ways? 
 
  Immediately after the tsunami 
 
 
 One week after the tsunami 
 
 
 One month after the tsunami 
 
 
Decision 
making 
13 To what extent were these steps affected by constraints and opportunities 
that existed in the post-tsunami disaster environment? 
 
 Constraints 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Opportunities 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Cultural 14 To what extent were governmental and non-governmental organizations 
willing to review their actions, and if necessary correct mistakes, during the 
month that followed the tsunami?   
 
 Governmental Organizations 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology 15 What types of technologies did your organization use to collect and 
disseminate information after the tsunami? 
 
Please number from 1 to 10 in order of frequency of use, with 1 the most 
frequently used. 
 
   High Frequency Radio   Fax Machine 
 
  Low Frequency Radio   E-mail 
 
  Cellular Phone   Satellite Phone 
 
  GIS   GPS 
 
  Satellite Observations   Website 
 
  Other - please specify:   
 
Please explain who used these technologies for what purposes. 
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Technology 16 To what extent were these technologies integrated and used to create a 
common operating picture for the management of response operations?  
 Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3  2 1 9 
 
 
Please explain the impact, if any, that these technologies had upon the 
management of response operations. 
 
 
Interaction 17 To what extent did your organization collaborate and exchange information, 
scientific expertise, resources and personnel after the tsunami? 
   
 Information 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Scientific Expertise 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Resources 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Personnel 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Interaction  
and 
Decision 
making 
18 To what extent did collaboration, or lack of collaboration, affect decision 
making in and among response organizations during the month that followed 
the tsunami?  
 
 Collaboration 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Lack of Collaboration 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
 
 
Authority 19 Which best describes the distribution of command and control authority 
throughout Indonesia’s tsunami response system, before December 2004 and 
currently?   
 
  
Before December 2004 
 
 Highly 
Unstructured 
Somewhat 
Unstructured Balanced 
Somewhat 
Structured 
Highly 
Structured N/A 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9 
  
Currently 
 
 Highly 
Unstructured 
Somewhat 
Unstructured Balanced 
Somewhat 
Structured 
Highly 
Structured N/A 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9 
 
  
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Interaction 20 Which three organizations were the most helpful to your organization’s 
operations during the month that followed the tsunami? 
 
  
1. 
   
 
2. 
   
 
3. 
   
  
 
  
In what ways?  Please explain. 
 
 
 
Interaction 21 Which three organizations could have helped to improve your organization’s 
operations during the month that followed the tsunami? 
 
  
1. 
   
 
2. 
   
 
3. 
   
 
 
   
In what ways?  Please explain. 
 
 
Organizational 
and 
Interaction 
22 To what extent did your organization provide assistance to, or receive 
assistance from, other response organizations, particularly those in other 
jurisdictions, during the month that followed the tsunami? 
 
 Provide Assistance To: 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Receive Assistance From: 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Organizational 23 To what extent did the following initial conditions enable your organization 
to collaborate with other organizations during the month after the tsunami, 
especially those in other jurisdictions? 
  
 Operational Plans 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Training 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Resources 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Expertise 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Technology 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Cultural 24 To what extent did your organization update its disaster response plans, 
training activities, resources, scientific expertise and technology as a result of 
the lessons that it learned during the tsunami disaster? 
 
 Operational Plans 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Training 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Resources  
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Expertise 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Technology 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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Cultural 25 To what extent did your organization accept new information, adopt new 
methods of problem solving, trust the decisions of others, and correct 
mistakes made in conducting response activities? 
 
 Accept New Information 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Adopt New Methods of Problem Solving 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Trust Decisions of Others 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
Correct Mistakes 
 
Significant 
Extent 
Great 
Extent 
Moderate 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
No 
Extent N/A 
5 4 3 2 1 9 
 
 
In what ways?  Please explain. 
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APPENDIX B Coding Rules for Organizations 
Variable Value Definition 
Name Name Official name for the organization. 
Acronym Acronym Acronym for the organization. 
Date of Entry 
System 
Number 
Each organization receives a distinct system number, which records the date the organization 
was initially detected as an actor within the system, as well as the order it entered the system. 
Order of Entry 
Level of 
Jurisdiction 
International Organization not based within Indonesia. 
National Organization based within Indonesia that primarily operates or governs at the national level. 
Provincial Organization based within Indonesia that primarily operates or governs at the provincial level. 
Local Organization based within that operates or governs at the municipal level or lower. 
Source of 
Funding 
Public Organization has an executive, legislative, judicial or administrative governmental function. 
Non-Profit Organization has a non-commercial function. 
Private Organization is privately owned and has a commercial function. 
Special Interest Organization has a political purpose. 
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APPENDIX C Coding Rules for Interactions and Transactions 
Variable Value Definition 
Date Date The date that the interaction occurred. 
Initiator Initiator The organization that initiated the interaction. 
Recipient Recipient The organization(s) that received the interaction. 
Transaction Transaction A description of the interaction that took place between the Initiator and the Recipient. 
Function 
Assessment Involved activities related to the assessment of damage or response tasks. 
Health Involved activities related to the health of the survivors (i.e. medicine, or disease control). 
Transportation Involved activities related to the actual movement of goods and supplies. 
Coordination and Collaboration Involved the coordination and collaboration of organizations. 
Personnel Involved personnel related to the response (i.e., movement of staff or doctors). 
Financial Involved contributions, donations, or financial assistance (i.e. donations or debt relief). 
Supplies / Equipment Involved equipment and supplies (generators, tents, cots, etc.). 
Logistics Involved activities related to the arrangements needed to move goods and supplies. 
Nutrition Involved the delivery of food and nutrition items to the survivors. 
Shelters / Displaced Persons Involved shelters or displaced persons (e.g. tents, missing family members, etc.). 
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Involved water, sanitation and hygiene (e.g. water treatment or hygiene kits). 
Political Affairs Transaction was political in nature (e.g. government letters of condolences, etc.). 
Recovery and Reconstruction Involved recovery and reconstruction (e.g. planning or actual). 
Security Involved security (e.g. protection of relief personnel or conflict between GAM and TNI). 
Communication Involved communication technology (e.g. assessment, repairs or infrastructure). 
Search, Rescue and Evacuation Involved search, rescue and evacuation activities. 
Protection Involved the protection of vulnerable populations (e.g. child services). 
Education Involved education (e.g. the repair of schools, or the movement of teachers). 
Utilities Involved the repair of community lifelines such as electricity, communication and water). 
Other Involved some other form of activity. 
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APPENDIX D Coding Schema for Interview Transcripts 
Code 
I 
Missions and 
Responsibilities 
Represents the missions, responsibilities and activities reported by 
organizations involved in the post disaster environment. Each opportunity 
will be identified individually, and will have four sub-codes. 
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Organizational 
Typology 
Indication of types of organizations involved in the semi-structured interviews 
and surveys. 
Governmental 
Activities 
Indication of activities (steps) conducted by government actors (immediately, 
week and month) after tsunami. 
Non-Governmental 
Activities 
Indication of activities (steps) conducted by non-government actors (immediately, 
week and month) after tsunami. 
Preparedness Indication of whether organizations were prepared for disasters such the tsunami. 
Code 
II Opportunities 
Represents the extent to which opportunities affected decision making in the 
post disaster environment. Each opportunity will be identified individually, 
and will have four sub-codes. 
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Opportunity 
Typology Indication of the type of opportunity. 
Affected Decision 
making Indication of how the opportunity affected decision making. 
Consequences Indication of the consequences (social or organizational) of the opportunity. 
Management Indication of how the opportunity was managed. 
Code 
III Constraints 
Represents the extent to which constraints affected decision making in the 
post disaster environment. Each constraint will be identified individually, 
and will have four sub-codes. 
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Constraint 
Typology Indication of the type of constraint. 
Affected Decision 
making Indication of how the constraint affected decision making. 
Consequences Indication of the consequences (social or organizational) of the constraint. 
Management Indication of how the constraint was managed. 
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Code 
IV 
Decision making 
Process 
Represents the decision making processes used by organizations within the 
post-tsunami environment.  As necessary, there will be multiple distinct 
elements coded under each of the respective sub-codes. 
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Process Indication of the processes used by organizations for decision making. 
Collaboration Indication of organizational collaboration with respect to decision making. 
Evolution Indication of specific events that caused the system to evolve. 
Lessons Learned Indication of the lessons learned by organizations that participated in the tsunami 
response system. 
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APPENDIX E Components of Administrative Resilience 
Code I Environmental Component 
Represents the initial environmental conditions, and considers the extent to which 
effective disaster management laws, regulations and policy existed in Indonesia at the 
time of the tsunami. 
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Governmental Awareness Indications that Indonesia's governments were aware of risks posed by disasters. 
Social Awareness Indications that Indonesian society was aware of the risks posed by disasters. 
Preparedness Indications that government and communities were prepared for risks posed by disasters. 
Laws and Regulations Indications of the quality of disaster management rules and regulations. 
Disaster Plans Indications of the quality of disaster management plans and procedures. 
Institutions Indications of the quality of disaster management institutions.  
Code II Information Component 
Represents information, and considers the extent to which information directed the 
action of the organizations within the system.  
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Needs Indications of information needs of organizations in the system were met. 
Quality Indications of the quality of information in the system. 
Availability Indications of the availability of information in the system. 
Importance Indications of the importance placed on information by organizations in the system. 
Search Indications of information search and acquisition by organizations in the system. 
Acceptance Indications that new information was accepted by organizations in the system. 
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Code III Cultural Component 
Represents pattern matching, and considers the extent to which organizations 
understood the risks they confronted as well as the ability solve problems using 
previous disaster management experiences.   
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Organizational Awareness Indications that organizations were aware of the risk of disaster and its consequences. 
Experience Indications that organizations had experience necessary to respond to disaster. 
Community Indications that organizations worked in the interest of the affected community. 
Review Indications that organizations were willing to review their actions. 
New Methods Indications that originations were willing to adopt new methods of problem solving. 
Trust Indications that organizations trusted the decisions of others. 
Code IV Organizational Component 
Represents rapidity and adjustment and considers the extent to which organizations 
had the operational plans, personnel, training, and resources to engage in adaptive 
and collaborative activities. 
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Operational Plans Indications that organizations had plans necessary for adaptation and collaboration. 
Authority Indications that organizations had the authority to adapt activities without approval. 
Personnel Indications that organizations had personnel necessary for adaptation and collaboration. 
Training Indications that organizations had training necessary for adaptation and collaboration. 
Resources Indications that organizations had resources necessary for adaptation and collaboration. 
Mistake Correction Indications that organizations corrected their mistakes. 
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Code V Technological Component 
Represents technology, and considers the nature of the technology used to conduct 
disaster operations, and whether the technology effectively supported the disaster 
management system.   
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Availability Indications that technology was available for use by response organizations. 
Form Indications of the form (high / medium / low tech ) of technology used by organizations. 
Adaptability Indications that organizations possessed technology that enabled them to adapt. 
Collaboration Indication that technology facilitated collaboration by organizations in the system. 
Interoperability Indications that the technology used was interoperable. 
Integration Indications that technology was integrated in to a single decision support system. 
Code VI Interaction Component 
Represents interaction, and considers the extent to which organizational interactions 
enabled the distribution of information, resources and personnel throughout the 
system.   
Su
b-
C
od
es
 
Assistance Indications that organizations provided to, or received assistance from, other organizations. 
Information Indications that organizations exchanged information. 
Expertise Indications that organizations exchanged scientific expertise. 
Resources Indications that organizations exchanged resources. 
Personnel Indications that organizations exchanged personnel. 
Evolution Indications that the response system evolved over time. 
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APPENDIX F Indonesian Disasters: 1983 - 20038 
State Date Location Type Total. Affected 
00/03/1983 Lampung Province Epidemic - 
3/4/1983 Banda Aceh (North Sumatra ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 100 
28/06/1983 Halmahera Island Volcano 2500 
00/07/1983 Banggai Flood 2000 
14/07/1983 Unauna Isl. (central Sula ... Volcano 7101 
9/9/1983 - Volcano 6334 
00/10/1983 Aceh, Sumatra Flood 5000 
00/12/1983 Java, Yogyakarta Flood 410497 
00/00/1983 - Mass movement wet - 
10/1/1984 Mamuju (Central Sulawesi) ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 89 
27/04/1984 West Java Flood 2700 
25/05/1984 North Surawasi province Volcano 6000 
27/08/1984 Pahae Jae sub-district (N ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 1858 
5/9/1984 Siau Isl (North Sulawesi) ... Volcano 17000 
00/12/1984 Cilicap district (Central ... Epidemic 4000 
3/12/1984 Bandung Region (West Java ... Flood 37500 
3/2/1984 Central, East, West Java, ... Flood 320000 
15/06/1984 Dukuh, Srumbung, Sawangan ... Volcano 5000 
00/00/1984 Kyrim, Irian Jaya Drought 2000 
4/2/1985 Northern Sulawesi Flood 300 
00/02/1985 Bandung region Storm 10000 
19/02/1985 Central and East Java, Ea ... Flood 2000 
30/06/1985 West coast of Sumatra Flood 2000 
30/07/1985 Ntb Prov. Volcano 1078 
15/09/1985 Paniai District (Eastern ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 7 
1/1/1986 Sulawesi Epidemic 500000 
15/04/1986 West Java Flood 38000 
00/08/1986 West Sumatra Epidemic 700 
24/10/1986 Bengkulu, Lampung provinc ... Flood 20000 
16/01/1986 Timor province (Java) Flood 19000 
6/3/1986 
 
Flood 50000 
00/00/1986 Kurima (Irian Jaya) Drought 1000 
23/02/1987 Esatern Java Flood 26000 
26/04/1987 Tarutung (North Sumatra) Earthquake (seismic activity) 15001 
00/05/1987 Bengkulu (South Sumatra) Flood - 
4/5/1987 Padang Panjang (West Suma ... Mass movement dry 701 
26/11/1987 South Pantar Isl.(Timor) Earthquake (seismic activity) 17100 
14/12/1987 West Sumatra Flood 884 
                                                 
8
 Source: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database www.emdat.be - Université Catholique de 
Louvain - Brussels - Belgium" 
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State Date Location Type Total. Affected 
25/12/1987 Esp. Polmas, Pinrang (Sul ... Flood - 
28/12/1987 Flores Isl. Volcano 13000 
00/11/1987 Aceh province (North Suma ... Flood 2000 
00/00/1987 Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara ... Drought - 
6/2/1988 Java Mass movement wet - 
9/5/1988 Moluccas Volcano 10000 
17/07/1988 Makian Isl. Volcano 1570 
20/12/1988 Central & West Java, Suma ... Flood 100000 
6/11/1988 Flores IsL. Flood - 
16/01/1989 Solok, Sawahlunto Sijunju ... Mass movement wet 11601 
8/3/1989 Molucca passage Earthquake (seismic activity) 5500 
1/8/1989 Irian Jaya, Jayawijaya di ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 17196 
23/04/1989 Noongan Volcano 3000 
3/6/1989 Madiun Regency (East Java ... Flood 29000 
14/07/1989 Alor (Timor) Earthquake (seismic activity) 197 
20/06/1989 Ambon (Malucu Isl.) Flood 32500 
26/01/1990 Semarang, Temanggung, Bat ... Flood 21000 
10/2/1990 East Java Volcano 10265 
18/04/1990 Minahassa Peninsula (Sula ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 7036 
00/12/1990 Moluccan Isl. Epidemic - 
15/11/1990 Bangkejeren, Kutacane, Me ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 2172 
6/7/1990 Kuningan, Majalenga, Sume ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 103 
4/4/1990 Bogor (Jakarta) Flood - 
16/01/1991 Java Mass movement wet - 
00/03/1991 Aceh province (North Suma ... Epidemic 6000 
20/06/1991 Gorontalo area (Minahassa ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 1000 
00/04/1991 Aceh province (North Suma ... Epidemic 9000 
4/7/1991 Kalabahi (Alors district, ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 16191 
1/8/1991 Borneo, Sumatra Isl., Kal ... Wildfire 8 
24/10/1991 Minahasa (Tomohon distric ... Volcano 7679 
6/6/1991 Kalimatan province Flood - 
00/01/1991 - Epidemic - 
15/01/1991 Java Epidemic - 
00/08/1991 Sumatra Centrale Epidemic - 
16/12/1991 Riau, Jambi, Lampung prov ... Flood 240000 
8/10/1992 Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, Garu ... Mass movement wet 37000 
12/12/1992 Sikka, East Flores, Ende, ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 92103 
4/2/1992 Brebes area (Java, Sulawe ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 7501 
00/08/1992 Trenggalek (East Java) Flood 265553 
2/2/1993 Northern coast from Indra ... Flood 259553 
21/01/1993 Maluku Province Volcano 3012 
25/01/1993 Sangir Talaud Island Volcano 452 
26/12/1993 Tanggerang, Serang and Le ... Flood 8000 
21/01/1994 (1) Irian Jaya region(2) ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 200040 
16/02/1994 Liwa, Lampung Province (S ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 49399 
12/1/1994 City of Bandung (West Jav ... Flood 30000 
3/2/1994 Eastern Java Volcano 2000 
2/6/1994 Purwoharjo, Sarongan, Teg ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 8720 
23/04/1994 Simalungun District Flood 1000 
12/10/1994 Riau Province Flood 60000 
00/10/1994 - Wildfire 3000000 
9/10/1994 North Maluku (Obi Isl.) Earthquake (seismic activity) 2437 
3/11/1994 Lombok (West Nusa Tenggar ... Volcano - 
22/11/1994 Java Isl. Volcano 2722 
23/03/1994 Ngawi, Tuban, Bojonegoro, ... Flood 187131 
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State Date Location Type Total. Affected 
20/11/1994 Maluki, Irian Jaya, North ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 67 
2/12/1994 Pesisir Selaten (West Sum ... Flood 640 
12/7/1994 West Nusa Tengarra provin ... Flood 50000 
11/1/1995 Riau Flood 3000 
3/2/1995 Java, Sumatra Flood 36000 
1/5/1995 Tapanuli, Labuhan distric ... Flood 17500 
7/5/1995 Bengkulu (Northern Sumatr ... Flood 2200 
14/05/1995 Dili, Maliana, Mauraba (E ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 176 
19/05/1995 Parigi, Palu, Poso (Sulaw ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 1538 
7/10/1995 Airhangat, Danaukerinci, ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 90218 
28/12/1995 North Aceh Provinces Flood 201472 
1/1/1996 North of Palu (Sulawesi I ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 13000 
17/02/1996 Biak (Iran Jaya) Earthquake (seismic activity) 25638 
9/2/1996 Jakarta Flood 556000 
27/03/1996 SUlu Musi district, Lahat ... Flood 527 
00/01/1996 Java Isl. Epidemic 5373 
3/10/1996 Batam Isl. Mass movement wet 4 
20/10/1996 Banyumas, Cilacap, Kebume ... Flood 5007 
13/12/1996 Piddie, Utara & Blora Dis ... Flood 10000 
00/01/1996 Jakarta Flood 252965 
17/01/1997 Boyolali, Klaten, Magelan ... Volcano 3000 
00/09/1997 Sumatra & Kalimantan Wildfire 32070 
28/09/1997 Parepare (city) Level 1 = ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 3105 
4/6/1997 Kalimatan Epidemic - 
5/11/1997 Irian Jaya Epidemic - 
00/09/1997 Irian Jaya Province Drought 1065000 
00/01/1998 Irian Java, Maluku Epidemic - 
00/03/1998 Kalimatan Province (Borne ... Wildfire 2000 
13/05/1998 N.A. on the source Epidemic 32665 
11/7/1998 Jawa Tengah and Yogyakar ... Volcano 6000 
2/8/1998 East Kalamatan = Kaliman ... Flood 100000 
29/11/1998 Halmahera Tengah (Sula Is ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 6448 
28/09/1998 Malang area (Jawa) Earthquake (seismic activity) 500 
5/1/1999 Sulawesi, Java Flood 16000 
7/1/1999 Bali Isl. Mass movement wet 2 
00/06/1999 Sumatra, Kalimantan Wildfire 
 
2/3/1999 Flores Island, Level 1 = ... Epidemic 267 
00/03/1999 South central Timor, Tala ... Epidemic 627 
21/12/1999 Karyasari, Pandelang Dist ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 16920 
9/12/1999 Dberang Pallinggam (Sumat ... Mass movement wet - 
00/00/1999 - Epidemic 3751 
22/02/2000 Brebes District (Java Isl ... Mass movement wet - 
00/01/2000 Jakarta Epidemic 1516 
00/02/2000 Riau Province (East coast ... Wildfire 
 
4/5/2000 Bangga,  Totikum, Tinangk ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 52770 
16/05/2000 Malaka Tengah, Malaka Bar ... Flood 50000 
4/6/2000 Bengkulu province (Sumatr ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 204714 
00/05/2000 Ngada district (Flores Is ... Epidemic 203 
12/7/2000 Ciranggon (West Java Isl. ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 4124 
24/06/2000 Banngai Mass movement wet 520 
29/10/2000 Cilacap, Banyumas (Centra ... Mass movement wet 56210 
5/11/2000 Purworejo, Purbalingga, K ... Mass movement wet 19 
25/10/2000 Pandelang, Lebak, Serang Earthquake (seismic activity) 5500 
7/6/2000 Southern Sumatra Earthquake (seismic activity) 3000 
28/11/2000 Aceh, Riau, Jambi (Tanah ... Flood 386021 
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00/09/2000 Phetchabun Flood 12500 
3/12/2000 Bitung, Bolang Mongondow, ... Flood 39852 
8/2/2001 Cipinas, Lebak district ( ... Mass movement wet 23000 
22/01/2001 North Sulawesi province Mass movement wet 
 
4/2/2001 Jember (East Java provinc ... Flood 80000 
31/07/2001 Nias Isl. (North Sumatra ... Flood 3694 
28/06/2001 Jawa Barat province Earthquake (seismic activity) 12512 
30/10/2001 Seling village (Sadang di ... Mass movement wet 310 
23/10/2001 Ayah district Mass movement wet 600 
14/02/2001 Bengkulu (Sumatra) Earthquake (seismic activity) 
 
17/12/2001 Sentani (Papua province) Flood 
 
28/12/2001 Sumatra Isl., Sulawesi pr ... Flood 2000 
8/1/2002 Dempo Utara (Southern Sum ... Flood 40 
10/1/2002 Alor, Manggarai, Sikka, B ... Epidemic 757 
13/01/2002 Medan city (Sumatra Isl.) ... Flood 2000 
27/01/2002 Bondowoso, Sampang, Surab ... Flood 500750 
27/03/2002 Gomo and Amandraya sub-di ... Flood 780 
17/04/2002 Sumba Isl. (East Nusa Ten ... Flood 
 
00/05/2002 Kolaka district (Sulawesi ... Flood 1000 
15/08/2002 Poso region (Sulawesi) Earthquake (seismic activity) 2548 
00/08/2002 West, Central Kalimentan ... Wildfire 200 
10/10/2002 Manokwari, Ransiki, Orans ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 9082 
11/11/2002 Garut (near Bandoung, Jav ... Volcano 5000 
19/11/2002 South Aceh, Southwest Ace ... Flood 87000 
11/12/2002 Pacet (Java Isl.) Mass movement wet 5 
20/09/2002 Ransiki (Irian Jaya regio ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 155 
2/11/2002 Simeulue Isl. Earthquake (seismic activity) 60 
6/4/2003 
 
Epidemic 2 
00/01/2003 Java, Sulawesi islands Flood 10000 
8/1/2003 Batulayrar village (West ... Flood 230 
29/01/2003 Garut, Nenggeng, Budi Ate ... Mass movement wet 1760 
31/01/2003 Cantilan village, Kuninga ... Mass movement wet 20 
10/1/2003 Solok, Kapai Tabu Karambi ... Flood 3700 
23/01/2003 Dompu area Earthquake (seismic activity) 2502 
28/01/2003 Cilacap district (Central ... Flood 15000 
13/02/2003 Jakarta area Flood 33000 
18/03/2003 Makale, Sa'dan Balusu are ... Mass movement wet 
 
31/03/2003 Ende, Sikka, East Flores ... Mass movement wet 229548 
27/05/2003 Morotai Isl. Earthquake (seismic activity) 247 
11/8/2003 Wasile area (Halmahera Is ... Earthquake (seismic activity) 500 
2/11/2003 Hahorok sub-district (Lan ... Flood 1498 
30/11/2003 Muraro, Jambi, Tanjab Tim ... Flood 25000 
10/12/2003 Jambi, Riau, South and No ... Flood 350000 
00/08/2003 West Timor Drought 15000 
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APPENDIX G Indonesian Pre-Tsunami Disaster Legislation 
Act No. 6 / 1974 on the Basic Arrangement of Social Welfare: indicates the provision of 
assistance to Indonesians by the government when their social lives are affected by social and 
natural disasters (Siahaan 2006). The regulation also called for the Indonesian government to 
develop social assistance and social insurance programs that would help to rehabilitate disaster 
affected populations. 
 
Act No. 4 / 1984 on Epidemics: indicates that social disease can overwhelm communities and 
create the potential for disasters. The Act identified the Ministry of Health as a lead institution, 
which has the authorization to issue and cancel declarations of epidemics. The Act also identified 
a variety of responsibilities for the organizations involved in epidemic activities, including but 
not limited to: 1) investigation; 2) examination and quarantine; 3) prevention and immunization, 
4) management of corpses and 5) disease training and education (Siahaan 2006). 
 
Act No. 5 / 1990 on the Conservation of Biological Natural Resources and Ecosystems: 
indicates that it is the government‟s responsibility to protect Indonesia‟s natural resources and 
ecosystems from the potential of disaster. The Act also indicates that the government shall take 
steps to rehabilitate areas that are damaged as a result of natural events such as landslides, 
erosion, forest fires and earthquakes, or man-made events caused by misuse (Siahaan 2006). 
 
Act No. 23 / 1992 on Health: indicates that Indonesians are entitled by right to their health, 
which ensures economic and social prosperity. The Act states that both the Indonesian 
government and its various communities have the general responsibility to maintain and improve 
health conditions. The act also indicates that it the responsibility of the Government to “regulate, 
promote and supervise the implementation” of health related activities (Siahaan 2006). 
 
Act No. 24 / 1992 on Spatial Planning: indicates that Indonesia acknowledges that is national 
security and prosperity depends upon the effective and efficient use of its resources and social 
resources. In terms of disaster management, the act identifies a range of areas worthy of spatial 
protection, including “protected forests, turf areas, water conservation area, costal area, river 
area, areas around a lake/dam, spring, conservation areas on nature, natural park, national park, 
national forest and nature park for tourist attraction, cultural and science park, and area  prone to 
natural disaster” (Siahaan 2006). 
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Act No. 23 / 1997 on Environmental Management: indicates that it is the Indonesian 
government‟s responsibility to protect and preserve the environment through regulations that 
include, but are not limited to, the issuance of licenses.  In the event that a disaster occurs, the 
Act indicates that individuals and organizations that possess a license are entitled to financial 
compensation, or immunity from legal damages, if the environmental destruction in their area of 
responsibility was caused by the disaster (Siahaan 2006). 
 
Act No. 22 / 2001 on Oil and Gas: does not directly affect issues of disaster management, 
however, it does indicate that businesses are obligated to prevent pollution and restore any 
environmental damages they cause (Siahaan 2006). 
 
Act No. 2 / 2002 on Police Institution: indicates that the Indonesian Police have the 
responsibility to maintain public security, enforce the law, and protect the safety of the 
community. In terms of disaster management, the Indonesian Police are responsible for 
protecting the public from disaster, and their specific responsibilities includes search and rescue 
activities and the delivery of assistance until other institutions can recommence their normal 
functions (Siahaan 2006). 
 
Act No. 3 / 2002 on State Defense: this Act does not directly affect issues of disaster 
management, however, it identifies that state defense is a primary function of the Indonesian 
government. As such, it is the responsibility of both the government and the citizens to defend 
the nation from internal and external threats, which includes natural and man-made disasters 
(Siahaan 2006). 
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APPENDIX H Organizations in Core Administrative System 
Number Organization Name Acronym Jurisdiction Source of Funding 
122604_002 Badan Meteorologi Dan Geofisika bmg National Public 
122604_003 Presiden Republik Indonesia pri National Public 
122604_004 Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu kib National Public 
122604_005 Situs Resmi Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat mekokesra National Public 
122604_006 Tentara Nasional Indonesia tni National Public 
122604_007 Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia polri National Public 
122604_009 Government of Malaysia govmy International Public 
122604_011 Ministry of Trade, Id mtradid National Public 
122604_012 Ministry of Health, Id mhealid National Public 
122604_013 Government of Aceh Province govaceh Provincial Public 
122604_014 Government of North Sumatra Province govnsum Provincial Public 
122604_015 Provincial Police of Aceh achppol Provincial Public 
122604_016 Cut Meutia Hospital (Lhokseumawe Aceh) cmghosp Local Public 
122604_020 PT Angkasa Pura II persero National Public 
122604_021 Sultan Iskandar Muda / Blang Bintang (Banda Aceh) Airport simapt Local Public 
122604_022 Office of the Governor of Aceh Province ogap Provincial Public 
122604_023 Suara Muhammadiyah Radio muhamrad Local Non-Profit 
122604_024 Prima FM primfm Local Private 
122604_025 Dalka Radio dalrad Local Private 
122604_026 Megaphone Radio megrad Local Private 
122604_027 Banda Aceh Hospital for the Mentally Ill bahospmi Local Public 
122604_029 International Organization for Migration iom International Non-Profit 
122604_030 Gorilla 3 Military Post gor3mp Local Public 
122604_031 Afrika 6 Marine Post af6mp Local Public 
122604_032 Afrika 1 Marine Post af1mp Local Public 
122604_033 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for Indonesia unochaid International Public 
122604_034 Palang Merah Indonesia pmi National Non-Profit 
122604_035 World Health Organization, Id whoid International Public 
122604_036 United Nations Children's Fund unicef International Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
122704_001 Vice-Presiden Republik Indonesia ovpid National Public 
122704_002 National Disaster Management Coordination Board, Id bakornas National Public 
122704_003 City of Lhokseumawe ctylho Local Public 
122704_004 Ministry of Finance, Id mfinid National Public 
122704_005 Free Aceh Movement (GAM) gam Provincial Special Interest 
122704_006 Ministry of Public Works, Id mpwid National Public 
122704_007 City of Banda Aceh ctybanda Local Public 
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122704_008 United Nations un International Public 
122704_009 Government of Japan govjap International Public 
122704_010 Government of Taiwan govtai International Public 
122704_011 Government of the United States govus International Public 
122704_012 Government of Australia govaul International Public 
122704_013 Government of Indonesia govid National Public 
122704_014 Australian Red Cross ausrcros International Non-Profit 
122704_015 Halim Perdanakusmuh Military Air Base (Jakarta) hpmair National Public 
122704_016 Ministry of Social Affairs, Id msaid National Public 
122704_019 Government of Spain govsp International Public 
122704_020 Government of India govin International Public 
122704_023 United Nations Mission to Indonesia unind International Public 
122704_024 Ministry of Defense, Australia middifaust International Public 
122704_025 Air Force, Australia afaus International Public 
122704_026 Free Aceh Movement (Central Command) gamcc International Special Interest 
122704_027 Iskandar Muda Military Command immc National Public 
122704_031 Dompet Dhuaga Republika Foundation ddrf National Non-Profit 
122704_032 Medical Emergency Rescue Committee merc International Non-Profit 
122704_033 Red Cross - West Aceh Branch rcwab Local Non-Profit 
122704_034 Doctors without Borders - Indonesia Mission msfid International Non-Profit 
122704_035 Bali Hotel Association bha Provincial Non-Profit 
122704_036 PT Toh Jiwa Cargo tjc National Private 
122704_037 Bintang Supermarket bintsup International Private 
122704_038 Sourcing Bali sbali National Private 
122704_039 Dijon Food Specialties dfs Local Private 
122704_040 Ombak Putih ombak National Private 
122704_041 Air Force, Indonesia afind National Public 
122704_042 Indonesian Red Cross - Jakarta Chapter idrcrosjc Provincial Non-Profit 
122704_043 Lippo Bank Slipi Branch lbsb Local Private 
122704_044 Office of the Prime Minister of Japan opmjap International Public 
122704_045 PT Pasifik Satelit Nusantara ptpsn National Private 
122704_047 United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator for Indonesia unorci International Public 
122704_048 United Nations Development Program undp International Public 
122704_049 United Nations Country Team - Indonesia uncti International Public 
122704_050 Health Office of the Province of North Sumatra hopns Provincial Public 
122704_051 United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team undac International Public 
122704_052 Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations ochaun International Public 
122704_053 European Union eu International Public 
122704_054 Government of the United Kingdom govuk International Public 
122704_055 Government of Denmark govden International Public 
122704_058 Government of Saudia Arabia govsa International Public 
122704_059 Government of Norway govnor International Public 
122704_060 Government of Canada govcan International Public 
122704_061 Government of New Zealand govnz International Public 
122704_063 Government of Germany govger International Public 
122704_064 Government of the Netherlands dutch International Public 
122704_065 Government of China govchin International Public 
122704_066 Government of the United Arab Emirates govuae International Public 
122704_069 Government of Singapore govsing International Public 
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122704_075 Government of Greece govgre International Public 
122704_076 Government of France govfra International Public 
122704_077 Government of Egypt govegypt International Public 
122704_079 Regency of East Aceh regea Local Public 
122704_080 City of Bireun ctybir Local Public 
122704_081 District of Pidie distpid Local Public 
122704_082 District of North Aceh distna Local Public 
122704_083 Regency of Nagan Raya regnr Local Public 
122704_084 Regency of Krueng Mane regkm Local Public 
122704_085 District of Nias distni Local Public 
122704_086 District of Serdang Bedagai distsb Local Public 
122704_087 District of Tapanuli Tengah disttt Local Public 
122704_088 Adam Malik Hospital amhosp Local Public 
122704_089 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent ifrc International Non-Profit 
122704_090 Indonesian Red Cross Hosptial (Lhoksemawe) irdcslhosp Local Non-Profit 
122704_091 Dr. Fauziah General Hospital dfghosp Local Public 
122704_092 Melati Perbaungan Hospital mphosp Local Public 
122704_093 Langsa Hospital lanhosp Local Public 
122704_094 Bireun Hospital birhosp Local Public 
122704_095 Aceh Timur Hospital athosp Local Public 
122704_096 Simuelue Hospital simhosp Local Public 
122704_097 Village of Kuala kuvil Local Public 
122704_098 District of Aceh Utara distau Local Public 
122704_099 Medan Polonia Airport mpapt Local Public 
122704_100 Center for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response chepr National Public 
122704_101 Jakarta Health Agency jakha Provincial Public 
122704_102 Government of South Sumatra Province govssp Provincial Public 
122704_103 Hasan Sadikin Hospital (West Java) hshosp Local Public 
122704_104 Dr. Soetomo Hospital (East Java) soehosp Local Public 
122704_105 Sardjito General Hospital sarhosp Local Public 
122704_106 South Sulawesi Hospital sshosp Local Public 
122704_107 City of Medan ctymed Local Public 
122704_108 World Health Organization who International Public 
122704_109 World Health Organization, Id - Banda Aceh Field Office whoidba International Public 
122704_110 Department of Health, Aceh Province dohap Provincial Public 
122704_111 World Health Organization - South East Asian Regional Office whosearo International Public 
122704_112 Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator unsecoord International Public 
122704_113 Ministry of Health POSKO posko National Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
122804_001 Cut Mutia Hospital Victim Camp cmhospc Local Public 
122804_002 Cut Mutia Emergency Command Post cmecp Local Public 
122804_003 Regency of North Aceh regna Local Public 
122804_004 Office of the Governor of North Sumatra ogns Provincial Public 
122804_005 Navy of Indonesia navid National Public 
122804_009 City of Meulaboh ctymeu Local Public 
122804_011 Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime, Id mfmid National Public 
122804_012 Bank Indonesia bkid National Public 
122804_013 Office of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Id ocmpeid National Public 
122804_021 Gadjah Mada University gmu Provincial Public 
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122804_022 Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, Id mjhrid National Public 
122804_027 Garuda Indonesia gar National Private 
122804_028 Jatayu jatayu National Private 
122804_031 European Union Monitoring and Information Center eumic International Public 
122804_032 Embassy of the United States, Jakarta embus International Public 
122804_033 Department of International Development, UK diduk International Public 
122804_034 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Id mfaid National Public 
122804_037 Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Jakarta emchina International Public 
122804_039 Office of the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China opmchina International Public 
122804_042 Asian Development Bank adb International Public 
122804_043 World Bank wb International Public 
122804_044 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Id memrid National Public 
122804_045 PT Pertamina ptper National Public 
122804_046 PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara ptpln National Public 
122804_047 PT Telekom pttel National Private 
122804_049 Aceh-North Sumatra Natural Disaster Relief Agency asndra Provincial Public 
122804_050 Polonia Air Force Base (Medan) pafb Local Public 
122804_051 Office of Social Welfare Government of North Sumatra ohgns Provincial Public 
122804_052 Pirngadi General Hospital pirhosp Local Public 
122804_053 Brimob Hospital brihosp Local Public 
122804_054 Poldasu Hospital polhosp Local Public 
122804_055 Soekarno-Hatta Jakarta International Airport shiapt Local Public 
122804_056 Harapan Bunda Hospital habunhosp Local Private 
122804_057 Tjoet Njak Dien Public Kitchen tndpk Local Non-Profit 
122804_058 Ministry of Defense, Singapore mdsing International Public 
122804_059 Ministry of Defense, Id mdid National Public 
122804_060 Armed Forces of Singapore milsing International Public 
122804_063 Army of Indonesia armyind National Public 
122804_064 United Nations World Food Program unwfp International Public 
122804_065 Medan Command Post medcp Local Public 
122804_066 Association of Medical Doctors of Asia amda International Non-Profit 
122804_067 Association of Medical Doctors of Asia - Indonesia Chapter amdaid National Non-Profit 
122804_069 Kesdam Hospital keshosp Local Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
122904_001 Indonesian House of Representatives idhr National Public 
122904_012 Lion Air lion National Private 
122904_016 University of Indonesia uniid National Public 
122904_018 Rumah Sakit (Aceh) Zainoel Abidin General Hospital zbgh Local Public 
122904_022 Office of the Governor of Jakarta ogj Provincial Public 
122904_027 Government of Jakarta Province govjak Provincial Public 
122904_028 Indonesian Association of Provincial Administrations iapa Provincial Non-Profit 
122904_029 Bank DKI bankdki Provincial Public 
122904_031 International Monetary Fund imf International Public 
122904_032 Office of the President of the United States podus International Public 
122904_036 Serambi Indonesia Lhokseumawe Office serlo Local Private 
122904_037 United Nations Population Fund unpf International Public 
122904_038 United Nations World Food Program, Banda Aceh Field Office unwfpba International Public 
122904_039 United Nations World Food Program, Loeksemawe Field Office unwfpl International Public 
122904_040 United Nations World Food Program, Sigli Field Office unwfps International Public 
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122904_041 United Nations World Food Program, Medan Field Office unwfpm International Public 
122904_042 International Organization for Migration, Aceh Office ioma International Non-Profit 
122904_043 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization unfao International Public 
122904_046 Navy of the United States navus International Public 
122904_047 CARE care International Non-Profit 
122904_048 Navy of Japan navjap International Public 
122904_049 Navy of Australia navaus International Public 
122904_050 Doctors without Borders msf International Non-Profit 
122904_051 International Medical Corps imc International Non-Profit 
122904_053 United States Agency for International Development usaid International Public 
122904_054 Canadian International Development Agency cida International Public 
122904_057 United Nations Information Center unic International Public 
122904_058 Yayasan OBOR obor National Non-Profit 
122904_059 Indonesian Tionghoa Association inti National Non-Profit 
122904_062 Japan International Cooperation Agency jica International Public 
122904_063 Peace Winds Japan pwj International Non-Profit 
122904_065 International Committee of the Red Cross ircro International Non-Profit 
122904_066 Ministry of Transportation, Id mtranid National Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
123004_005 Muhammadyah muham National Non-Profit 
123004_009 Office of the Governor of West Nusa Tenggara ogwnt Provincial Public 
123004_010 Indonesian Red Crescent bsmi National Non-Profit 
123004_012 Partai Keadailan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperous Party) pks National Special Interest 
123004_016 Disaster Mitigation Command Center of North Aceh Regency nadmcc Local Public 
123004_018 Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Id mctid National Public 
123004_025 Indonesia Science Institute idsi National Public 
123004_027 Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations osgun International Public 
123004_029 Red Cross - South Aceh Branch rcsab Local Non-Profit 
123004_030 Aceh Kita akita National Non-Profit 
123004_031 United Nations Joint Logistics Center - National unjlcn International Public 
123004_032 United Nations Joint Logistics Center - Banda Aceh unjlcba International Public 
123004_033 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization - Indonesia Office unfaoid International Public 
123004_034 Utapao (Thailand) Air Base utupao International Public 
123004_036 Military of Australia milaus International Public 
123004_038 Military of the United States milus International Public 
123004_039 Military of Malaysia milmal International Public 
123004_040 United States Air Force usaf International Public 
123004_041 New Zealand Air Force nzaf International Public 
123004_042 Navy of Singapore navsing International Public 
123004_044 Navy of India navind International Public 
123004_045 United Nations Joint Logistics Center - Regional unjlcr International Public 
123004_046 Government of Chile govchile International Public 
123004_051 Government of Mexico govmex International Public 
123004_052 Government of Tunesia govtun International Public 
123004_053 Government of Jordan govjor International Public 
123004_054 Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance usfda International Public 
123004_056 District of Aceh Jaya distaj Local Public 
123004_060 Calang Hospital calhosp Local Public 
123004_061 Pringadi Hospital prihosp Local Public 
295 
 
Number Organization Name Acronym Jurisdiction Source of Funding 
123004_062 Sari Mutiara Hospital samhosp Local Public 
123004_063 Elisabeth Hospital elishosp Local Public 
123004_066 Office of the Directorate General of Communicable Disease Control and Environmental Health odgcdch National Public 
123004_067 Cipto Magunkusumo General Hospital cimghosp Local Public 
123004_068 Health Office of the Province of Bangka Belitung hopbb Provincial Public 
123004_069 Singapore and Australia Field Hospital safhosp Local Public 
123004_070 Blang Bintang Airport Field Hospital bbafhosp Local Public 
123004_071 District Military Health Team Field Hospital dmhtfhosp Local Public 
123004_072 City of Makassar ctymak Local Public 
123004_073 University of North Sumatra unins Local Public 
123004_074 Sigli Military Field Hospital smfhosp Local Public 
123004_075 Meulaboh Military Field Hospital mmfhosp Local Public 
123004_076 Health Department South Sumatra Province hdssp Provincial Public 
123004_077 Aceh Timur Field Hospital atfhosp Local Public 
123004_079 Islam Siti Fakinah Hospital sfhosp Local Private 
123004_080 Kontras Aceh kont National Non-Profit 
123004_081 Walubi walubi National Non-Profit 
123004_083 Japanese Red Cross jrc International Non-Profit 
123004_084 Singapore Red Cross singrc International Public 
123004_085 Malaysian Red Cross malrc International Non-Profit 
123004_086 Taiwanese Red Cross tairc International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
123104_002 Office of the Prosecutor, Aceh Province nadpo Provincial Public 
123104_003 Office of the Prosecutor, Nias Regency opnr Local Public 
123104_004 Office of the Attorney General, Id oagid National Public 
123104_005 Danish Red Cross drc International Non-Profit 
123104_006 Continental Airlines conair International Private 
123104_007 Aerowisata Catering Services acs National Private 
123104_009 United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator for the Tsunami Relief Effort unsctre International Public 
123104_010 International Humanitarian Partnership ihp International Non-Profit 
123104_011 United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization unsesco International Public 
123104_012 Ministry of Education, Id meid National Public 
123104_013 On-Site Operation Coordination Center - Jakarta osoccj International Public 
123104_014 On-Site Operation Coordination Center - Banda Aceh osoccba International Public 
123104_015 Wahli wahli National Non-Profit 
123104_016 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees unhcr International Public 
123104_017 Jesuit Relief Services jrs International Non-Profit 
123104_018 Mercy Corps International mercy International Non-Profit 
123104_019 World Vision of Indonesia wvid International Non-Profit 
123104_020 Meulaboh Airport meulapt Local Public 
123104_021 United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team - Banda Aceh undacba International Public 
123104_022 United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team - Jakarta undacj International Public 
123104_025 Haji Hospital (Medan) hajhosp Local Public 
123104_026 Rumkit Hospital rumhosp Local Public 
123104_027 Pertamina Hospital (Jakarta) perthosp Local Private 
123104_028 Health Office of the Province of Dinas Kesehatan hopdk Provincial Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010105_003 Office of the Prime Minister of Australia opmaus International Public 
010105_004 Department of State, United States dosus International Public 
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010105_007 Ministry of National Development and Planning, Id bappenas National Public 
010105_008 Embassy of Japan, Jakarta embjapan International Public 
010105_009 Embassy of the United Kingdom, Jakarta embuk International Public 
010105_010 United Nations Field Office in Banda Aceh unfoba International Public 
010105_011 Iskandar Muda Air Force Base imafp Local Public 
010105_012 Aceh Sepakat Foundation asf National Non-Profit 
010105_013 Jl. Binjai Evacuation Center, Medan jlbec Local Public 
010105_014 Australian Agency for International Development ausaid International Public 
010105_015 Malaysian Air Force malaf International Public 
010105_019 Air Force of the United Kingdom afuk International Public 
010105_020 Navy of France navfra International Public 
010105_021 Air Force of Switzerland afswitz International Public 
010105_022 Apple Air apair International Private 
010105_023 Tanjung Priok Port (Jakarta) tpp Local Public 
010105_024 Indonesian Society of Paediatricians isp National Non-Profit 
010105_025 Puskesmas Health Center phc Local Public 
010105_026 Yogyakarta Harbor yoghar Local Public 
010105_027 Nya Dien Airport (Meulaboh) ndapt Local Public 
010105_028 Government of Morocco govmor International Public 
010105_029 TNT Express World Wide tnt International Private 
010105_030 Lapangan Bola Hospital lbhosp Local Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010205_001 PT Aceh Media Grafika ptamg National Private 
010205_002 Kompas Gramedia Group kgg National Private 
010205_003 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle pdi-p National Special Interest 
010205_004 Tjut Nyak Dhien Airport tndapt Local Public 
010205_005 Sub-District of Johan Pahlawan Command Center jpcc Local Public 
010205_006 Embassy of Canada, Jakarta embcan International Public 
010205_008 Embassy of India, Jakarta empind International Public 
010205_009 Embassy of Pakistan, Jakarta embpak International Public 
010205_010 Government of Pakistan govpak International Public 
010205_011 Navy of Pakistan navpak International Public 
010205_014 Embassy of Singapore, Jakarta embsing International Public 
010205_015 Embassy of Morocco, Jakarta embmor International Public 
010205_016 Embassy of Chile, Jakarta embchil International Public 
010205_017 Embassy of Egypt, Jakarta embegy International Public 
010205_020 Alcatel Indonesia alcatel National Private 
010205_024 Baiturrahman Grand Mosque baitmos Local Non-Profit 
010205_025 Government of Papua Province gpp Provincial Public 
010205_026 Mission Aviation Fellowship maf International Non-Profit 
010205_027 Sentani Airport (Jayapura) senapt Local Public 
010205_028 Oxford Committee for Famine Relief oxfam International Non-Profit 
010205_030 Ericsson erics International Private 
010205_031 Indonesian Red Cross National Special Disaster Response Team idrcnsdrt National Non-Profit 
010205_032 Subang Airport (Malaysia) subapt International Public 
010205_033 Kangkawi International Airport (Malaysia) kangapt International Public 
010205_034 Army of Australia armyaus International Public 
010205_035 United Kingdom Red Cross ukrc International Public 
010205_036 Spainish Red Cross sprc International Public 
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010205_037 Iceland Red Cross icerc International Public 
010205_039 Military of India milind International Public 
010205_040 Military of Germany milger International Public 
010205_041 Military (Self-Defense Forces) of Japanese miljapan International Public 
010205_042 Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia opmmal International Public 
010205_043 Organization of the Islamic Conference oic International Non-Profit 
010205_045 Medical Emergency Relief, International merlin International Non-Profit 
010205_047 Meulaboh General Hospital mghosp Local Public 
010205_048 Sigli Hospital sighosp Local Public 
010205_049 Air Force of Singapore afsing International Public 
010205_050 Save the Children - United Kingdom stc International Non-Profit 
010205_051 Star Air star National Private 
010205_052 United Nations Disaster Management Team - Indonesia undmpt International Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010305_004 Office of the Prime Minister of Singapore opmsing International Public 
010305_008 Office of the Prime Minister of South Korea opmsk International Public 
010305_009 Jakarta Provincial Police jakpol Provincial Public 
010305_010 Balai Sidang Jakarta Convention Center jcc Provincial Public 
010305_013 Paris Club paris International Public 
010305_014 World Bank Consultative Group on Indonesia wbcgid International Public 
010305_015 Jakarta Public Works Agency jpwa Provincial Public 
010305_016 Jakarta Office for Development Affairs joda Provincial Public 
010305_017 Office of the Governor of Gorontalo Province govgp Provincial Public 
010305_018 Office of the Governor of Southeast Sulawesi Province ogssp Provincial Public 
010305_019 Office of the Governor of West Kalimantan Province govwkp Provincial Public 
010305_021 Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology bppt National Public 
010305_022 Embassy of Sweden, Jakarta embswe International Public 
010305_023 Embassy of France, Jakarta embfra International Public 
010305_025 Embassy of Tunisia, Jakarta embtun International Public 
010305_026 Embassy of Jordan, Jakarta embjor International Public 
010305_029 Greenpeace gp International Non-Profit 
010305_035 Office of the Former President of the United States George H. W. Bush fpodus1 International Non-Profit 
010305_036 Officer of the Former President of the United States William Jefferson Clinton fpodus2 International Non-Profit 
010305_037 Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington D.C. embrepindo International Public 
010305_039 Erricson Relief ericsrel International Non-Profit 
010305_045 Iskandar Muda Military (Aceh) Hospital imhosp Local Public 
010305_046 Martha Friska Hospital mfhosp Local Private 
010305_047 Herna Hospital herhosp Local Private 
010305_048 Gleneagles Hospital gehosp Local Private 
010305_049 Lantamal TNI Hospital ltnihosp Local Public 
010305_050 Malahayati Islamic Hospital malhosp Local Private 
010305_052 Field Hospital in Aceh Besar (China) fhabhosp Local Public 
010305_053 Indonesian Humanitarian Emergency Commission hec National Public 
010305_055 World Vision International wvi International Non-Profit 
010305_056 Medical Assistance Programs map International Non-Profit 
010305_057 Terre des Hommes Netherlands tdh International Non-Profit 
010305_058 Port of Belawan (Medan) ptbel Local Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010405_001 Pt Excelcomindo Pratama excel National Private 
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010405_010 Coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations for Tsunami Victims cngotv International Non-Profit 
010405_011 Association of Private Jakarta Hospitals apjhosp Provincial Non-Profit 
010405_014 AIG Lippo Indonesia aiglip National Private 
010405_015 Office of the Insurance Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, Id oidmif National Public 
010405_017 House of Representative Team for the Supervision of the Distribution of Humanitarian Aid tsdha National Public 
010405_018 Syah Kuala State University (unsyah) sksu Local Public 
010405_019 Bogor Institute of Agriculture ipb Local Public 
010405_025 Office of the Prime Minister of Myanmar opmmaya International Public 
010405_035 National Sports Council koni National Non-Profit 
010405_036 National Sports Council Aceh Chapter nscac Provincial Non-Profit 
010405_038 Embassy of Switzerland, Jakarta embswi International Public 
010405_039 Government of Switzerland govswi International Public 
010405_040 Embassy of Spain, Jakarta embspain International Public 
010405_041 Embassy of Portugal, Jakarta embpor International Public 
010405_042 Government of Portugal govpor International Public 
010405_045 Social Welfare Agency of North Aceh Province naswa Provincial Public 
010405_046 Santa Fe Relocations sfr International Private 
010405_047 Indonesia Peduli idped National Non-Profit 
010405_048 Exxon Mobile exxon International Private 
010405_049 Unilever unil International Private 
010405_050 Asia Pulp and Paper / Sinar Mas Group appsmg International Private 
010405_051 General Electric ge International Private 
010405_052 British American Tobacco bat International Private 
010405_053 World Wide Movers wwm International Private 
010405_054 Ache Humanitarian Committee hca Provincial Non-Profit 
010405_059 Ministry of the Environment, Id minenvid National Public 
010405_061 National Disaster Management Center, Id ndmc National Public 
010405_063 Government of Estonia govest International Public 
010405_064 Air Force of Norway afnor International Public 
010405_065 Norway Red Cross norrc International Public 
010405_066 United Nations World Food Program Bangkok Logistics Center unwfpblc International Public 
010405_067 United Nations Environment Program unep International Public 
010405_069 Tzu Chi Foundation tzu International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010505_004 Ministry of Public Housing, Id mphid National Public 
010505_005 Office of State Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, Id osmcsme National Public 
010505_006 United Nations Operations Coordination Center in Banda Aceh unoccba International Public 
010505_007 Indonesian Supreme Court idsc National Public 
010505_009 Indonesian Office of the Attorney General idoag National Public 
010505_010 Navy of South Korea navsk International Public 
010505_012 Merpati Nusantara Airlines mnair National Private 
010505_019 Ujong Batee Refugee Camp ubrc Local Public 
010505_021 National Commission for Child Protection, Id nccp National Public 
010505_023 Port of Banda Aceh ptba Local Public 
010505_024 Port of Meulaboh ptmeul Local Public 
010505_025 Port of Sabang (Weh Isaland) ptsab Local Public 
010505_026 Port of Lhoknga ptlho Local Public 
010505_027 Port of Lhokseumawa (East Aceh Province) ptlhok Local Public 
010505_028 Disaster Resource Network drn International Non-Profit 
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010505_029 Singapore Airport singapt International Public 
010505_030 Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e. V. help International Non-Profit 
010505_031 Indonesian Forum for the Environment walhi National Non-Profit 
010505_033 Association of Medical Doctors of Asia - Japan amdajap International Non-Profit 
010505_034 Association of Medical Doctors - Cambodia amdac International Non-Profit 
010505_035 Association of Medical Doctors - Formosa amaf International Non-Profit 
010505_036 Sibolga Airport sibapt Local Public 
010505_039 Cut Nyak Dhien Hospital (Meulaboh) cndhosp Local Public 
010505_040 Meuraksa Hospital meuhosp Local Public 
010505_041 Lhok Nga Health Education Center lhhec Local Public 
010505_042 Boehringer Ingelheim  boeh International Private 
010505_043 PT Bio Farma bio National Public 
010505_044 Indonesian Doctor's Association ida National Non-Profit 
010505_045 City of Dit Kesad ctydk Local Public 
010505_046 Batam Hospital bathosp Local Private 
010505_047 Merpati Airlines merpati National Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010605_003 City of Batam ctybat Local Public 
010605_004 Sekupang Transit House sth Local Public 
010605_007 Malasian Military milmalis International Public 
010605_025 Ministry of Home Affaris, Id mhaid National Public 
010605_026 Kantor Berita Radio 68H kbr68 Local Private 
010605_027 Media Development Loan Fund mdlf International Non-Profit 
010605_029 Butterworth Miltiary Airport (Malaysia) bmapt International Public 
010605_030 British Airways briair International Private 
010605_032 Civil Military Aid Committee cmac National Public 
010605_035 Médecins du Monde mdm International Non-Profit 
010605_036 International Catholic Migraiton Commission icmc International Non-Profit 
010605_037 International Relief and Development ird International Non-Profit 
010605_038 Cap Anamur capana International Non-Profit 
010605_039 Lhokseumawe Airport lhokapt Local Public 
010605_040 Port of Singkel portsing Local Public 
010605_043 National Institute of Science lipi National Public 
010605_044 Indonesian National Federation of Peasants Organization fspi National Non-Profit 
010605_045 Sri Lankan National Organization of Fisher Folk nasfo International Non-Profit 
010605_047 Mentor Initiative menin International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010705_011 Kampas Humanity Fund khf National Non-Profit 
010705_012 Melia Purosani Hotel mph Local Private 
010705_013 Yogyakarta Tourism Center ytc Provincial Public 
010705_019 Muhammadiyah University Malang muhuni Provincial Private 
010705_020 Asia Foundation asiafd International Non-Profit 
010705_021 Office of the Deputy Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Id odcmpwid National Public 
010705_022 Office of the Deputy Governor of Aceh Province odgap Provincial Public 
010705_023 Group of Seven G7 International Public 
010705_024 Oxfam - United Kingdom oxfamuk International Non-Profit 
010705_025 United Nations Humanitarian Air Service unhas International Public 
010705_026 Catholic Relief Services crs International Non-Profit 
010705_027 Food for the Hungry International fhi International Non-Profit 
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010705_028 Genelabs Diagnostics gendia International Private 
010705_029 Government of Hungary govhun International Public 
010705_030 Portuguese Medical Contingency Hospital (Banda Aceh) pmchosp Local Public 
010705_031 Indonesia Medical Assocation ima National Non-Profit 
010705_032 Korean Medical Association kma International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010805_002 State Ministry for Women's Empowerment, Id smwe National Public 
010805_003 United Nations Development Fund for Women undfw International Public 
010805_004 United Nations Millennium Project unmp International Public 
010805_005 Federal Agency for Technical Relief, Germany thw International Public 
010805_006 United Nations Joint Logistics Center - Columbo, Sri Lanka unjlccol International Public 
010805_010 Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, United States cdcus International Public 
010805_013 Indonesian Civil Aviation Authority icaa National Non-Profit 
010805_014 Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore caas International Non-Profit 
010805_015 Church World Service cws International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
010905_001 Hang Nadim Airport (Batam) hnapt Local Public 
010905_002 Dji Sam Soe dss National Private 
010905_003 Indonesian Buddhist Association iba National Non-Profit 
010905_004 Bandung Institute of Technology bit National Public 
010905_005 City of Medan Disaster Mitigation Center ctymdmc Local Public 
010905_013 Liberal Democratic Party, Japan ldp International Special Interest 
010905_017 Action Against Hunger aah International Non-Profit 
010905_018 Sabang Military Air Base sabapt Local Public 
010905_020 Military of New Zealand milnz International Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
011005_003 General Motors gm International Private 
011005_004 American Red Cross amrc International Non-Profit 
011005_005 United Parcel Service ups International Private 
011005_006 PT Korea Exchange Bank Danamon ptkebd International Private 
011005_007 Korea Support Center for Tsunami Disaster ksctd International Non-Profit 
011005_009 Amazon.com amazon International Private 
011005_010 Agency for Education, Aceh Province aeap Provincial Public 
011005_013 Embassy of Libya, Jakarta govlib International Public 
011005_015 People's School Foundation psf Provincial Non-Profit 
011005_016 Keutapang Camp kcamp Local Public 
011005_017 Gue Gajah Camp ggcamp Local Public 
011005_018 Lampeunurut Camp lamcamp Local Public 
011005_019 Simeuleu Isle Camp sicamp Local Public 
011005_021 Habitat International Coaliation hic International Non-Profit 
011005_022 United States Army usarmy International Public 
011005_023 Helen Keller International hkint International Non-Profit 
011005_024 Department of Public Works, Banda Aceh dpwba Local Public 
011005_025 Civil Military Operations Center - Banda Aceh cmocba National Public 
011005_029 YAPPIKA yappika National Non-Profit 
011005_030 PT Tempo Inti Media Terbuka timt National Private 
011005_031 SurfAid International surf International Non-Profit 
011005_032 World Vision - Canada wvc International Non-Profit 
011005_033 Mama Mia mmia Local Non-Profit 
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)( )( )( )( )( 
011105_004 PT Jamsostek ptjam National Public 
011105_005 PT Jamsostek - Banda Aceh Branch Office ptjamba National Public 
011105_006 PT Jamsostek - Lhokseumawe Branch Office ptjaml National Public 
011105_007 PT Jamsostek - Meulaboh Branch Office ptjamm National Public 
011105_008 PT Semen Andalas Indonesia ptsai International Private 
011105_009 Binawan Institute of Health Sciences bihs National Public 
011105_010 Golkar Party golkar National Special Interest 
011105_013 Media Group media National Private 
011105_014 Banda Aceh Museum bamus Local Public 
011105_016 PT Pelni pelni National Private 
011105_018 Save the Children - United States saveus International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
011205_007 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain mfasp International Public 
011205_009 Military of Spain milsp International Public 
011205_011 Navy of Spain navyspain International Public 
011205_012 Rajawali Group rajgr National Private 
011205_013 Panglima Laot paloat Local Non-Profit 
011205_015 Danish Military danmil International Public 
011205_018 International Business Machines ibm International Private 
)( )( )( )( )( 
011305_002 Government of Southeast Sulawesi Province govsesp Provincial Public 
011305_003 Managment Coordination Board of Southeast Sulawesi Province mcbssp Provincial Public 
011305_006 Pekanbaru Airport (Riau Province) pekapt Local Public 
011305_007 Ernest & Young eandy International Private 
011305_009 Touch Community Services tcs International Non-Profit 
011305_010 Mercy Relief merrel International Non-Profit 
011305_011 National Volunteer Philanthropy Center nvpc International Non-Profit 
011305_012 Young Men's Christian Association - Singapore ymcasing International Non-Profit 
)( )( )( )( )( 
011405_003 United Cities of Local Government uclg International Non-Profit 
011405_005 Embassy of Romania, Jakarta embrom International Public 
011405_006 Government of Romania govrom International Public 
011405_007 Office of the Deputy Governor of North Sumatra odgns Provincial Public 
011405_008 Embassy of Cuba, Jakarta embcub International Public 
011405_011 SATKORLAK satkorlak National Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
011505_001 Department of Defense, United States dodus International Public 
011505_003 Port of Kreung Raya (Banda Aceh) ptkreray Local Public 
011505_004 Mainum Saleh Airfield msaif Local Public 
011505_005 Islamic Relief islrel National Non-Profit 
011505_006 Palyja paly National Private 
011505_007 Aceh Regional Police acehrpol Local Public 
)( )( )( )( )( 
011605_001 Banda Aceh Office of Spatial Planning and Settlement csps Local Public 
011605_002 Council of Buddhist Communities cbc International Non-Profit 
011605_003 Indonesian Contractors Association ica National Non-Profit 
011605_004 PT Nindiya Karya ptninkar National Public 
011605_005 PT Hutama Karya pthutkar National Public 
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011605_007 Camp 85L in Lhok Nga 85cmp Local Public 
011605_008 Firemen Without Borders fwb International Non-Profit 
011605_009 Total E&P Indonesia tepid National Private 
011605_010 PT Perumnas ptperum National Public 
011605_017 Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum pdam Local Public 
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APPENDIX I Hamming Results for the Domestic Sub-System 
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APPENDIX J Hamming Results for International Sub-System 
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APPENDIX K Hamming Results for the Core System 
 
 
306 
 
APPENDIX L Indonesian Post-Tsunami Disaster Legislation 
Disaster Management Law No. 24/2007: established the focus and scope of Indonesian disaster 
management policy and the rights, responsibilities and obligations of the government and society 
in responding to the threats posed by disaster.  As a concept, disaster management policy must 
provide protection to Indonesian communities; harmonize existing laws and regulations; 
guarantee a coordinated and comprehensive response; respect local culture; develop partnerships, 
and create the conditions for peace.  The Law specifically detailed the roles and authority of 
governmental bodies at the various levels of jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the Law called for the 
creation of a National Disaster Relief Agency, whose functions include the formation and 
implementation of disaster relief policy.  This Law stands as the legal framework upon which 
Indonesian Disaster Management policy and institutions would be developed.  The law also 
imposes criminal sanctions on those who ignore their disaster management responsibilities and 
duties or inhibit disaster management efforts. 
 
Presidential Regulation No. 8/ 2008: outlines the creation of the National Disaster Relief 
Agency and details the Agency‟s disaster management responsibilities, as well as the roles and 
responsibilities of the various government agencies and officials who, by law, are integrated into 
Indonesia‟s new disaster management system. 
 
Government Regulation No. 21/2008: details disaster management operations as “a series of 
efforts that include the determination of risk management policy, disaster prevention activities, 
emergency response and rehabilitation. The regulation further indicates that the Indonesian 
disaster response plan shall be coordinated by the National Disaster Relief agency at the national 
level, and supported by complementary agencies at the provincial and district/city levels. 
 
Government Regulation No. 22/2008: Outlines the tasks and responsibilities that must be 
managed during the period of emergency response.  At the time of the emergency, specific 
response activities shall include: 1) the assessment of damages, losses and resources; 2) the 
statute of the disaster; 3) rescue and evacuation; 4) basic needs fulfillment; 5) protection of 
vulnerable groups; and 6) the immediate restoration of critical infrastructure and facilities. To 
accomplish these responsibilities, Indonesia‟s disaster management agencies have the authority 
to coordinate and manage human resources, tools, and logistics. Other issue areas addressed by 
this statute include: 1) immigration, customs and quarantine; 2) the procurement of goods and 
services, 3) the procurement of budgetary resources; 4) management and accountability; 5) 
search and rescue; and 6) command and control authority. 
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Government Regulation No: 23/2008: Covers the role of International Institutions and 
International Nongovernmental Institutions in Indonesian disaster management activities.  These 
institutions will strengthen Indonesia‟s disaster management capacity, especially in the areas of 
disaster response, threat reduction, victim assistance and community recovery.  This Regulation 
outlines the procedural steps that must be completed, including submission of work plans, letters 
of intent, lists of resources, personnel, equipment, location and activities, and coordination 
procedures, which must be in place prior participating in disaster response activities in Indonesia. 
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